El Deseo y su Interpretación
(1958- 1959)

Artículos psicoanalíticos citados por Lacan en su seminario

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A REVISED PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF THE PSYCHOSES AND PSYCHONEUROSES

W. R. D. FAIRBAIRN

INTRODUCTION

Within recent years I have become increasingly interested in the problems presented by schizophrenic and schizoid patients and have devoted special attention to these problems. The result has been the emergence of a point of view which, if it proves to be well-founded, must necessarily have far-reaching implications both for psychiatry in general and for psycho-analysis in particular. My various findings and the conclusions to which they lead involve not only a considerable revision of prevailing ideas regarding the nature and ætiology of schizoid conditions, but also a considerable revision of ideas

regarding the prevalence of schizoid processes and a corresponding change in current clinical conceptions of the various psychoneuroses and psychoses. My findings and conclusions also involve a recasting and re-orientation of the libido theory together with a modification of various classical psycho-analytical concepts.

For various reasons the present paper will be for the most part restricted to a consideration of the more general aspects of the point of view to which I have been led by the study of schizoid conditions. Special consideration of the psychopathology of these schizoid conditions themselves must unfortunately be deferred until a subsequent occasion. It is necessary to make clear, however, that much of the argument which follows depends upon a conclusion to which I have been driven by the analysis of schizoid cases, but which, for lack of space to expand the theme, I must reluctantly treat as axiomatic—the conclusion, namely, that the schizoid group is much more comprehensive than has hitherto been recognized, and that a high percentage of anxiety states and of paranoid, phobic, hysterical and obsessional symptoms have a definitely schizoid background. The comprehensive meaning which I have come to attach to the concept of 'Schizoid' may perhaps best be indicated by the statement that, according to my findings, the schizoid group comprises all those to whom the Jungian concept of 'Introvert' would apply. The fundamental feature of an

overtly schizoid state (as indeed the term implies) is a splitting of the ego: and it is the commonest thing for a deep analysis to reveal splits in the ego not only in individuals suffering from frankly psychopathological conditions, but also in individuals who present themselves for analysis on account of difficulties to which no definite psychopathological labels have been attached. The significance of splitting the ego can only be fully appreciated when it is considered from a developmental standpoint. As has been well described by Edward Glover (1932, J. Ment. Sci., 78, 819–842), the ego is gradually built up in the course of development from a number of primitive ego-nuclei: and we must believe that these ego-nuclei are themselves the product of a process of integration. The formation of the component nuclei may be conceived as a process of localized psychical crystallization occurring not only within zonal, but also within various other functional distributions. Thus there will arise within the psyche, not only e.g. oral, anal and genital nuclei, but also male and female, active and passive, loving and hating, giving and taking nuclei, as well as the nuclei of internal persecutors and judges (super-ego nuclei). We may further conceive that it is the overlapping and interlacing of these various nuclei and classes of nuclei that form the basis of that particular process of integration which results in the formation of the ego Schizoid states must, accordingly, be regarded as occurring characteristically in individuals in whom this process of integration has never been satisfactorily realized, and in whom a regressive disintegration of the ego has occurred.

THE INHERENT LIMITATIONS OF THE LIBIDO THEORY

There is an obvious correspondence between the development of the ego as just briefly outlined and Freud's original formulation of the libido theory. The account given of the formation of the ego-nuclei falls naturally into line with Freud's conception that the libido is originally distributed over a number of bodily zones, some of which are specially significant and are highly libidinized. There is a common element also between the conception that successful development of the ego depends upon an adequate integration of the ego-nuclei and Freud's conception that the success of libidinal development depends upon the integration of the various libidinal distributions under the mastery of the genital impulse. Nevertheless, as will shortly appear, the libido

theory contains an inherent weakness which renders it desirable that this theory should be recast in a mould which will render
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it more in conformity with the pattern of ego-development which has just been outlined.
The inherent weakness of the libido theory is best appreciated, however, when we consider it in the form in which it emerged from Abraham's revision. Abraham, of course, allotted to each of the more significant libidinal zones a special place in psychogenetic development and postulated a series of phases of development, each characterized by the dominance of a specific zone: and, in accordance with this scheme, each of the classical psychoses and psychoneuroses came to be attributed to a fixation at a specific phase. There can be no question of the correctness of relating schizoid conditions to a fixation in the early oral (incorporative and pre-ambivalent) phase characterized by the dominance of sucking. Nor, for that matter, can there be any doubt about the correctness of attributing manic-depressive conditions to a fixation in the later oral (ambivalent) phase characterized by the emergence of biting. For the dominant ego-nuclei in the schizoid and the manic-depressive are found to conform in character to these respective attributions. It is not such plain sailing, however, where the two anal phases and the early genital phase are concerned. There can be no doubt that, as Abraham pointed out so clearly, the paranoiac employs a primitive anal technique for the rejection of his object, the obsessional employs a more developed anal technique for gaining control of his object and the hysteric attempts to improve his relationship with his object by a technique involving a renunciation of the genital organs. Nevertheless, my own findings leave me in equally little doubt that the paranoid, obsessional and hysterical states—to which may be added the phobic state—essentially represent, not the products of fixations at specific libidinal phases, but simply a variety of techniques employed to defend the ego against the effects of conflicts of an oral origin. The conviction that this is so is supported by two facts: (a) that the analysis of paranoid, obsessional, hysterical and phobic symptoms invariably reveals the presence of an underlying oral conflict, and (b) that paranoid, obsessional, hysterical and phobic symptoms are such common accompaniments and precursors of schizoid and depressive states. By contrast, it is quite impossible to regard as a defence either the schizoid or the depressive state in itself—each a state for which an orally based ætiology has been found. On the contrary, these states have all the character of conditions against which the ego requires to be defended.
Further consideration of Abraham's modification of the libido
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theory raises the question whether the 'anal phases' are not in a sense an artefact: and the same question arises in the case of the 'phallic phase'. Abraham's phases were, of course, intended to represent not only stages in libidinal organization, but also stages in the development of object-love. Nevertheless, it is not without significance that the nomenclature employed to describe the various phases is based upon the nature of the libidinal aim, and not upon the nature of the object. Thus, instead of speaking of 'breast' phases, Abraham speaks of 'oral' phases; and, instead of speaking of 'fæces' phases, he speaks of 'anal' phases. It is when we substitute 'fæces phase' for 'anal phase' that the limitation in Abraham's scheme of libidinal development is seen to declare itself; for, whilst the breast and the genital organs are natural and biological objects of the libidinal impulse, fæces certainly is not. On the contrary it is only a symbolic object. It is only, so to speak, the clay out of which a model of the object is moulded.
The historical importance of the libido theory and the extent to which it has contributed to the advance of psycho-analytical knowledge requires no elaboration; and the merit of

the theory has been proved by its heuristic value alone. Nevertheless, it would appear as if the point had now been reached at which, in the interests of progress, the classic libido theory would have to be transformed into a theory of development based essentially upon object-relationships. The great limitation of the present libido theory as an explanatory system resides in the fact that it confers the status of libidinal attitudes upon various manifestations which turn out to be merely techniques for regulating the object-relationships of the ego. The libido theory is based, of course, upon the conception of erotogenic zones. It must be recognized, however, that in the first instance erotogenic zones are simply channels through which the libido flows, and that a zone only becomes erotogenic when libido flows through it. The ultimate goal of the libido is the object; and in its search for the object the libido is determined by similar laws to those which determine the flow of electrical energy, i.e. it seeks the path of least resistance. The erotogenic zone should, therefore, be regarded simply as a path of least resistance: and its actual erotogenicity may be likened to the magnetic field established by the flow of an electrical current. The position is then as follows. In infancy, owing to the constitution of the human organism, the path of least resistance to the object happens to lie almost exclusively through the mouth; and the mouth accordingly becomes the dominant libidinal organ. In the mature individual on the other hand (and again

1It should be explained that it is not any part of my intention to depreciate the significance of the 'genital' stage in comparison with the oral stage. My intention is rather to point out that the real significance of the 'genital' stage lies in a maturity of object-relationships, and that a genital attitude is but an element in that maturity. It would be equally true to say that the real significance of the oral stage lies in an immaturity of object-relationships, and that the oral attitude is but an element in that immaturity: but at the oral stage the importance of the physical, as against the psychical, element in relationships is more marked than at the 'genital' stage owing to the dependence of the infant.

owing to the constitution of the human organism) the genital organs provide a path of least resistance to the object—but, in this case, only in parallel with a number of other paths. The real point about the mature individual is not that the libidinal attitude is essentially genital, but that the genital attitude is essentially libidinal. There is thus an inherent difference between the infantile and the mature libidinal attitudes arising out of the fact that, whereas in the case of the infant the libidinal attitude must be of necessity predominantly oral, in the case of the emotionally mature adult the libido seeks the object through a number of channels, among which the genital channel plays an essential, but by no means exclusive, part. Whilst, therefore, it is correct to describe the libidinal attitude of the infant as characteristically oral, it is not correct to describe the libidinal attitude of the adult as characteristically genital. It should properly be described as 'mature'. This term must, however, be understood to imply that the genital channels are available for a satisfactory libidinal relationship with the object. At the same time, it must be stressed that it is not in virtue of the fact that the genital level has been reached that object-relationships are satisfactory. On the contrary, it is in virtue of the fact that object-relationships are satisfactory that true genital sexuality is attained.1

From what precedes it will be seen that (as it happens) Abraham's 'oral phases' are amply justified by the facts. It is otherwise, however, with his 'earlier genital or phallic phase'. His 'final genital' phase is justified in the sense that the genital organs constitute a natural channel for the mature libido; but, like the 'anal phases', his 'phallic phase' is

an artefact. It is an artefact introduced under the influence of the misleading conception of fundamental erotogenic zones. A deep analysis of the phallic attitude invariably reveals the
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presence of an underlying oral fixation associated with phantasies of a fellatio order. The phallic attitude is thus the product of an identification of the genital organs with the breast as the original part-object of the oral attitude—an identification which is characteristically accompanied by an identification of the genital organs with the mouth as a libidinal organ. The phallic attitude must, accordingly, be regarded, not as representing a libidinal phase, but as constituting a technique; and the same holds true of the anal attitudes.

The conception of fundamental erotogenic zones must be regarded as forming an unsatisfactory basis for any theory of libidinal development because it is based upon a failure to recognize that libidinal pleasure is fundamentally just a sign-post to the object. According to the conception of erotogenic zones the object is regarded as a sign-post to libidinal pleasure; and the cart is thus placed before the horse. Such a reversal of the real position must be attributed to the fact that, in the earlier stages of psycho-analytical thought, the paramount importance of the object-relationship had not yet been sufficiently realized. Here again we have an example of the misunderstandings which arise when a technique is mistaken for a primary libidinal manifestation. In every case there is a critical instance; and in this case the critical instance is thumb-sucking. Why does a baby suck his thumb? Upon this simple question hangs the whole fate of the conception of erotogenic zones and the form of libido theory based upon it. If we answer that the baby sucks his thumb because his mouth is an erotogenic zone and sucking provides him with erotic pleasure, it may sound convincing enough; but we are really missing the point. To bring out the point, we must ask ourselves the further question—'Why his thumb?' And the answer to this question is—'Because there is no breast to suck'. Even the baby must have a libidinal object; and, if he is deprived of his natural object (the breast), he is driven to provide an object for himself. Thumb-sucking thus represents a technique for dealing with an unsatisfactory object-relationship; and the same may be said of masturbation. Here it will doubtless occur to the reader that thumb-sucking and masturbation should properly be described, not simply as 'erotic', but more specifically as 'autoerotic' activities. This, of course, is true. Nevertheless, it would also seem to be true that the conception of erotogenic zones is itself based upon the phenomenon of autoerotism and has arisen largely owing to a mistaken interpretation of the real significance of this phenomenon. Autoerotism is essentially a technique whereby the
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individual seeks not only to provide for himself what he cannot obtain from the object, but to provide for himself an object which he cannot obtain. The 'anal phases' and the 'phallic phase' merely represent attitudes based upon this technique. It is a technique which originates in an oral context, and which always retains the impress of its oral origin. It is thus intimately associated with incorporation of the object—which is, after all, only another aspect of the process whereby the individual attempts to deal with frustration in oral relationships. In view of this intimate association it will be seen that at the very outset thumb-sucking, as an autoerotic (and erotic) activity, acquires the significance of a relationship with an internalized object. It is no exaggeration to say that the whole course of libidinal development depends upon the extent to which objects are incorporated and the nature of the techniques which are employed to deal with incorporated objects. These techniques are about to be discussed. Meanwhile, it is

sufficient to point out that the significance of the anal and phallic attitudes lies in the fact that they represent the libidinal aspects of techniques for dealing with objects which have been incorporated. It must always be borne in mind, however, that it is not the libidinal attitude which determines the object-relationship, but the object-relationship which determines the libidinal attitude.

A THEORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF OBJECT-RELATIONSHIPS BASED ON THE QUALITY OF DEPENDENCE UPON THE OBJECT

It is one of the chief conclusions to which I have been led by the study of schizoid cases that the development of object-relationships is essentially a process whereby infantile dependence upon the object gradually gives place to mature dependence upon the object. This process of development is characterized (a) by the gradual abandonment of an original object-relationship based upon identification, and (b) by the gradual adoption of an object-relationship based upon differentiation of the object. The gradual change which thus occurs in the nature of the object-relationship is accompanied by a gradual change in libidinal aim, whereby an original oral, sucking, incorporating and 'taking' aim comes to be replaced by a mature, non-incorporating and 'giving' aim compatible with developed genital sexuality. The stage of infantile dependence contains within it two recognizable phases—the early and late oral phases; and the stage of mature dependence corresponds to Abraham's 'final genital phase'. Between these two stages of infantile and mature dependence is a

transition stage characterized by an increasing tendency to abandon the attitude of infantile dependence and an increasing tendency to adopt the attitude of mature dependence. This transition stage corresponds to three of Abraham's phases—the two anal phases and the early genital (phallic) phase.

The transition stage only begins to dawn when the ambivalence of the late oral phase has already commenced to give way to an attitude based upon dichotomy of the object. Dichotomy of the object may be defined as a process whereby the original object, towards which both love and hate have come to be directed, is replaced by two objects—an accepted object, towards which love is directed, and a rejected object, towards which hate is directed. It should be added, however, that, in accordance with the developments which have occurred during the oral phases, both the accepted and the rejected objects tend to be treated largely as internalized objects. In so far as the transition stage is concerned with the abandonment of infantile dependence, it is now seen to be inevitable that rejection of the object will play an all-important part. Consequently, the operation of rejective techniques is a characteristic feature of the stage; and it is upon this feature that Abraham seems to have fastened when he introduced the conception of the anal phases. In its biological nature defæcation is, of course, essentially a rejective process; and in virtue of this fact it naturally lends itself to be exploited as a symbol of emotional rejection and readily forms the basis of rejective mental techniques. What applies to defæcation also applies to urination; and there is reason to think that the importance of urination as a function of symbolic rejection has been under-estimated in the past, especially since, for anatomical reasons, the urinary function provides a link between the excretory and genital functions.

In accordance with the point of view here adopted, paranoia and the obsessional neurosis are not to be regarded as expressions of a fixation at the early and late anal stages respectively. On the contrary, they are to be regarded as states resulting from the employment of special defensive techniques which derive their pattern from rejective excretory processes. The paranoid and obsessional techniques are not exclusively rejective techniques, however. Both of them combine acceptance of the good object

with rejection of the bad object. The essential difference between them will be considered shortly. Meanwhile it may be noted that the paranoid technique represents a higher degree of rejection; for in externalizing the rejected object the paranoid

2The paranoid technique must be carefully distinguished from the technique of projection, with which it is commonly confused. Projection consists in attributing inner impulses to outer objects; and, although it is seen at its best in paranoid persons, its employment is no necessary indication of the presence of a paranoid trend. The paranoid technique, on the other hand, consists in the externalization of internalized objects, which have been rejected.

individual treats it as unreservedly and actively bad—as a persecutor indeed.2 For the obsessional individual, on the other hand, excretory acts represent not only rejection of the object, but also parting with contents. In the obsessional technique, accordingly, we find a compromise between the taking attitude of early dependence and the giving attitude of mature dependence. Such an attitude of compromise is completely alien to the paranoid individual—for whom excretory acts represent nothing but rejection.

Hysteria provides another example of a state resulting from the use of a special rejective technique, as against a state resulting from a fixation at a specific stage of libidinal development, viz. the phallic stage. According to Abraham's scheme, of course, the hysterical state is attributed to a rejection of the genital organs during the phallic phase in consequence of excessive guilt over the Œdipus situation. This view is not confirmed by my recent findings. On the contrary, it would appear to be a misconception, to which an over-estimation of the importance of the Œdipus situation has contributed in no small measure.

It is one of the conclusions to which I have felt driven that the Œdipus situation is essentially a sociological rather than a psychological phenomenon. Sociologically speaking, its importance would be difficult to exaggerate. Psychologically speaking, however, it is a relatively superficial phenomenon, the chief significance of which lies in the fact that it represents a differentiation of the single object of the ambivalent (late oral) phase into two objects, one being an accepted object, identified with one of the parents, and the other being a rejected object, identified with the remaining parent. The guilt attached to the Œdipus situation, accordingly, is derived not so much from the fact that this situation is triangular as from the facts (1) that the incestuous wish represents the theft from one or both parents of love which is not freely bestowed, and (2) that there is present in the child a sense that his love is rejected because it is bad. This was well borne out in the case of one of my female patients, who during childhood

was placed in circumstances calculated to stimulate incestuous phantasies to the highest degree. Owing to disagreements between her parents they occupied separate bedrooms. Between these bedrooms lay an interconnecting dressing-room; and, to protect herself from her husband, my patient's mother made her sleep in this dressing-room. She obtained little display of affection from either parent. At a very early age she acquired a crippling infirmity, which made her much more dependent upon others in reality than is an average child. Her disability was treated as a sort of skeleton in the family cupboard by her mother, whose guiding principle in her upbringing was to force the pace in making her independent as quickly as possible. Her father was of a detached and unapproachable personality; and she experienced greater difficulty in making emotional contact with him than with her mother. After her mother's death, which occurred in her teens, she made desperate attempts to establish emotional contact with her father, but all

in vain. It was then that the thought suddenly occurred to her one day: 'Surely it would appeal to him if I offered to go to bed with him!' Her incestuous wish thus represented a last desperate attempt to make an emotional contact with her object—and, in so doing, both to elicit love and to prove that her own love was acceptable. Such would appear to be the real urge behind the incestuous wish; but this urge remains relatively unaffected by any Œdipus context. In the case of my patient the incestuous wish was, of course, renounced; and, as might be expected, it was followed by an intense guilt-reaction. The guilt was no different, however, from the guilt which had arisen in relation to her demands upon her mother for expressions of love which were not forthcoming, and in default of which it seemed proved that her own love was bad. Her unsatisfactory emotional relationship with her mother had already given rise to a regression to the early oral phase, in virtue of which the breast had been reinstated as an object, and in consequence of which one of her chief symptoms was inability to eat in the presence of others without feeling nausea. Her rejection of her father's penis thus had behind it a rejection of her mother's breast; and there was evidence of a definite identification of the penis with the breast.

This case serves to illustrate the fact that, whilst there is no occasion to deny a rejection of the genital organs on the part of the hysteric, it is superfluous to introduce a specifically Œdipus situation to explain this rejection. On the contrary, the explanation of this rejection lies in the fact that the hysteric identifies the genital organs

as a part-object with the original object of the libidinal impulse at the stage of infantile dependence, viz. the breast. The hysteric's rejection of the genital organs thus resolves itself into an unsuccessful attempt to abandon the attitude of infantile dependence. The same holds true of the rejection of the object embodied in the paranoid and obsessional techniques. It is no part of the hysterical technique, however, to externalize the rejected object. On the contrary, the rejected object remains incorporated. Hence the characteristic hysterical dissociation—the significance of which lies in the fact that it represents the rejection of an incorporated object. At the same time the hysterical technique, like the obsessional technique, represents a partial acceptance of the giving attitude of mature dependence; for it is characteristic of the hysterical individual that he is prepared to surrender everything to his love-objects except his genital organs and what these organs represent to him.

The significance of paranoia, the obsessional neurosis and hysteria is now seen to lie in the fact that each represents a state resulting from the employment of a specific technique; and the phobic state must be regarded in a similar light. Each of the various techniques in question must be interpreted as a specific method of attempting to deal with the characteristic conflict of the transition stage in so far as this conflict has remained unresolved. The conflict is one between (a) a developmental urge to advance to an attitude of mature dependence upon the object and (b) a regressive reluctance to abandon the attitude of infantile dependence upon the object.

In accordance with what precedes, it is now submitted that the development of object-relationships conforms to the following scheme:—

I. Stage of Infantile Dependence, characterized by an Attitude of Taking.

1. Early Oral—Sucking and Incorporating—Pre-ambivalence.

2. Late Oral—Biting and Incorporating—Ambivalence.

II. Stage of Transition between Infantile Dependence (Taking) and Mature Dependence (Giving), or Stage of Quasi-Independence.

Exteriorization of the Incorporated Object—Dichotomy of Object.

III. Stage of Mature Dependence, characterized by an Attitude of Giving.

Accepted and Rejected Objects Exteriorized.
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The distinctive feature of this scheme is that it is based upon the nature of the object-relationship, and that the libidinal attitude is relegated to a secondary place. What has convinced me of the paramount importance of the object-relationship is the analysis of schizoid patients; for it is in the schizoid individual that difficulties over relationships with objects present themselves most clearly. During the course of analysis, such an individual provides the most striking evidence of a conflict between an extreme reluctance to abandon infantile dependence and a desperate longing to renounce it; and it is at once fascinating and pathetic to watch the patient, like a timid mouse, alternately creeping out of the shelter of his hole to peep at the world of outer objects and then beating a hasty retreat. It is also illuminating to observe how, in his indefatigable attempts to emerge from a state of infantile dependence, he resorts by turns to any or all four of the transitional techniques which have been described—the paranoid, obsessional, hysterical and phobic. The fact that each of these techniques may be seen operating in a context to which the Œdipus situation makes a minimal contribution is perhaps especially illuminating. What emerges as clearly as anything else from the analysis of a schizoid case is that the greatest need of a child is to obtain conclusive assurance (a) that he is genuinely loved by his parents, and (b) that his parents genuinely accept his love. It is only in so far as such evidence is forthcoming in a form sufficiently convincing to enable him to depend safely upon his real objects that he is able gradually to renounce infantile dependence without misgiving. In the absence of such evidence his relationship to his objects is fraught with too much anxiety over separation to enable him to renounce the attitude of infantile dependence; for such a renunciation would be equivalent to forfeiting all hope of ever obtaining the satisfaction of his unsatisfied emotional needs. Frustration of his desire to be loved and to have his love accepted is the greatest trauma that a child can experience; and indeed this is the only trauma that really matters from a developmental standpoint. It is this trauma which creates fixations in the various forms of infantile sexuality to which a child is driven to resort in an attempt to compensate by substitutive satisfactions for the failure of his emotional relationships with his outer objects. Fundamentally these substitutive satisfactions (e.g. masturbation and anal erotism) all represent relationships with internalized objects, to which the individual is compelled to turn in default of a satisfactory relationship with objects in the outer world. Where
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relationships with outer objects are unsatisfactory, we also encounter such phenomena as exhibitionism, homosexuality, sadism and masochism; and these phenomena should be regarded as attempts to salvage natural emotional relationships which have broken down. Valuable as it is to understand the character of these 'relationships by default', such understanding is much less important than a knowledge of the factors which compromise natural relationships. By far the most important of these factors is a situation in childhood, which leads the individual to feel that his objects neither love him nor accept his love. It is when such a situation arises that the inherent drive of the libido towards the object leads to the establishment of aberrant relationships and to the various libidinal attitudes which accompany them.

The scheme of development outlined in the preceding table has been based on the quality of dependence upon the object because it has emerged from the analysis of schizoid cases that this is the most important factor in early relationships. It is desirable, however, to be clear as to the nature of the object appropriate to each stage of development. And here it is important to distinguish between the natural (biological)

object and the object as it presents itself in psychopathological cases. Objects may, of course, be either part-objects or whole objects; and, when the biological history of early childhood is considered, it becomes plain that there is only one natural part-object, viz. the breast, and that the most significant whole object is the mother—with the father as rather a poor second. As has already been pointed out, fæces is not a natural object. It is a symbolic object; and the same may be said of the genital organs. Thus, whilst the most important immediate factor in homosexuality is a search for the father's penis, this object is merely a substitute for the father himself. What primarily determines the substitution is the fact that paternal love appears to be withheld. At the same time, the substitution of a part-object for a whole object is a regressive phenomenon involving a revival of the original (oral) relationship with the original part-object (the breast). The homosexual's search for his father's penis thus resolves itself, so to speak, into a search for his father's breast. The persistence of the breast as a part-object is well-marked in the case of hysterics, for whom the genital organs always retain an oral significance. This is well illustrated in the case of a female hysterical patient, who, in describing her pelvic 'pain', remarked: 'It feels as if something wanted feeding inside.' The frequency with which

hysterical soldiers complain of gastric symptoms is similarly significant.

In the light of what has just been said, the natural objects appropriate to the various stages of development may be indicated as follows:—

I. Infantile Dependence.
1. Early Oral—Breast (Part Object).
2. Late Oral—Whole Object (the Mother) treated as a Breast.
II. Quasi-Independence (Transitional). Whole Object treated as Contents.
III. Mature Dependence. Whole Object (including the Object's Genital Organs).

THE STAGE OF TRANSITION BETWEEN INFANTILE AND ADULT DEPENDENCE, ITS TECHNIQUES AND ITS PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

It will be noticed that in the preceding tables the transition stage has been described as a stage of 'Quasi-Independence'; and the reason for the adoption of this description is of sufficient importance to demand special attention. It emerges with the utmost clarity from the study of schizoid cases that the most characteristic feature of the state of infantile dependence is identification with the object. Indeed, it would not be going too far to say that, psychologically speaking, identification with the object and infantile dependence are really the same phenomenon. On the other hand, mature dependence involves a relationship between two independent individuals, who are completely differentiated from one another as mutual objects. This distinction between the two kinds of dependence is identical with Freud's distinction between the narcissistic and the anaclitic choice of objects. The relationship involved in mature dependence is, of course, only theoretically possible. Nevertheless, it remains true that the more mature a relationship is, the less it is characterized by identification; for what identification essentially represents is failure to differentiate the object. It is when identification persists at the expense of differentiation that a markedly compulsive element enters into the individual's attitude towards his objects. This is well seen in the infatuations of schizoid individuals. It may also be observed in the almost uncontrollable impulse so commonly experienced by schizoid and depressive soldiers to return to their wives or their homes,

when separated from them owing to military necessities. The abandonment of infantile dependence involves an abandonment of relationships based upon identification in

favour of relationships with differentiated objects. In the dreams of schizoids the process of differentiation is frequently represented by the theme of trying to cross a gulf or chasm, albeit the crossing which is attempted may also occur in a regressive direction. The process itself is commonly attended by considerable anxiety; and the anxiety attending it finds characteristic expression in dreams of falling, as also in such symptoms as acrophobia and agoraphobia. On the other hand, anxiety over failure of the process is reflected in nightmares about being imprisoned or confined underground or immersed in the sea, as well as in the symptom of claustrophobia.

The process of differentiation of the object derives particular significance from the fact that infantile dependence is characterized not only by identification, but also by an oral attitude of incorporation. In virtue of this fact the object with which the individual is identified is also an incorporated object or, to put the matter in a more arresting fashion, the object in which the individual is incorporated is incorporated in the individual. This strange psychological anomaly may well prove the key to many metaphysical puzzles. Be that as it may, however, it is common to find in dreams a complete equivalence between being inside an object and having the object inside. I had a patient, for example, who had a dream about being in a tower; and his associations left no room for doubt that this theme represented for him not only an identification with his mother, but also the incorporation of his mother's breast—and, incidentally, his father's penis.

Such then being the situation, the task of differentiating the object resolves itself into a problem of expelling an incorporated object, i.e. it becomes a problem of expelling contents. Herein lies the rationale of Abraham's 'anal phases'; and it is in this direction that we must look for the significance of the anal techniques which play such an important part during the transition stage. It is important here as elsewhere to ensure that the cart is not placed before the horse, and to recognize that it is not a case of the individual being preoccupied with the disposal of contents at this stage because he is anal, but of his being anal because he is preoccupied at this stage with the disposal of contents.

The great conflict of the transition stage may now be formulated as a conflict between a progressive urge to surrender the infantile

attitude of identification with the object and a regressive urge to maintain that attitude. During this period, accordingly, the behaviour of the individual is characterized both by desperate endeavours on his part to separate himself from the object and desperate endeavours to achieve reunion with the object—desperate attempts 'to escape from prison' and desperate attempts 'to return home'. Although one of these attitudes may come to preponderate, there is in the first instance a constant oscillation between them owing to the anxiety attending each. The anxiety attending separation manifests itself as a fear of isolation: and the anxiety attending identification manifests itself as a fear of being shut in, imprisoned or engulfed ('cribbed, cabined and confined'). These anxieties, it will be noticed, are essentially phobic anxieties. It may accordingly be inferred that it is to the conflict between the progressive urge towards separation from the object and the regressive lure of identification with the object that we must look for the explanation of the phobic state.

Owing to the intimate connection existing between identification and oral incorporation, and consequently between separation and excretory expulsion, the conflict of the transition period also presents itself as a conflict between an urge to expel and an urge to retain contents. Just as between separation and reunion, so here there tends to be a constant oscillation between expulsion and retention, although either of these attitudes may become dominant. Both attitudes are attended by anxiety—the attitude of

expulsion being attended by a fear of being emptied or drained, and the attitude of retention by a fear of bursting (often accompanied or replaced by a fear of some internal disease like cancer). Such anxieties are essentially obsessional anxieties: and it is the conflict between an urge to expel the object as contents and an urge to retain the object as contents that underlies the obsessional state.

The phobic and obsessional techniques are thus seen to represent two differing methods of dealing with the same basic conflict: and these two differing methods correspond to two differing attitudes towards the object. From the phobic point of view the conflict presents itself as one between flight from and return to the object. From the obsessional point of view, on the other hand, the conflict presents itself as one between expulsion and retention of the object. It thus becomes obvious that the phobic technique corresponds to a passive attitude, whereas the obsessional technique corresponds to an active attitude. The obsessional technique also expresses a much

higher degree of aggression towards the object; for, whether the object be expelled or retained, it is being subjected to forcible control. For the phobic individual, on the other hand, the choice lies between escaping from the power of the object and submitting to it. In other words, whilst the obsessional technique is essentially sadistic in nature, the phobic technique is essentially masochistic.

In the hysterical state we can recognize the operation of another technique for attempting to deal with the basic conflict of the transition period. In this case the conflict appears to be formulated as simply one between acceptance and rejection of the object. Acceptance of the object is clearly manifested in the intense love-relationships which are so typical of the hysteric: but the very exaggeration of these emotional relationships in itself raises a suspicion that a rejection is being over-compensated. This suspicion is confirmed by the propensity of the hysteric to dissociative phenomena. That these dissociative phenomena represent a rejection of the genitals need not be stressed; but, as was pointed out earlier, analysis can always unmask an identification of the rejected genitals with the breast as the original object of the libidinal impulses during the period of infantile dependence. This being so, it is noteworthy that what is dissociated by the hysteric is an organ or function in himself. This can only have one meaning—that the rejected object is an internalized object. On the other hand, the hysteric's over-valuation of his real objects leaves no room for doubt that in his case the accepted object is an externalized object. The hysterical state is thus seen to be characterized by acceptance of the externalized object and rejection of the internalized object.

If the paranoid and the hysterical states are now compared, we are confronted with a significant contrast. Whereas the hysteric overvalues objects in the outer world, the paranoid individual regards them as persecutors; and, whereas the hysterical dissociation is a form of self-depreciation, the attitude of the paranoid individual is one of extravagant grandiosity. The paranoid state must, accordingly, be regarded as representing rejection of the externalized object and acceptance of the internalized object.

Having interpreted the hysterical and paranoid techniques in terms of the acceptance and rejection of objects, we can now obtain interesting results by applying a similar interpretation to the phobic and obsessional techniques. The conflict underlying the phobic state may be concisely formulated as one between flight to the object and flight from the object. In the former case, of course, the object is accepted,

whereas in the latter case the object is rejected. In both cases, however, the object is treated as external. In the obsessional state, on the other hand, the conflict presents itself as one between the expulsion and the rejection of contents. In this case, accordingly, both the accepted and the rejected objects are treated as internal. If in the case of the phobic state both the accepted and the rejected objects are treated as external and in the obsessional state both are treated as internal, the situation as regards the hysterical and paranoid states is that one of these objects is treated as an externalized object and the other as an internalized object. In the hysterical state, it is the accepted object that is externalized, whereas, in the paranoid state, the object which is externalized is the rejected object. The nature of the object-relationships characteristic of the four techniques may be summarized in the following table:—

Technique	Accepted Object	Rejected Object
Obsessional.	Internalized.	Internalized.
Paranoid.	Internalized.	Externalized.
Hysterical.	Externalized.	Internalized.
Phobic.	Externalized.	Externalized.

The chief features of the stage of transition between infantile and adult dependence may now be briefly summarized. The transition period is characterized by a process of development whereby object-relationships based upon identification gradually give place to relationships with a differentiated object. Satisfactory development during this period, therefore, depends upon the success which attends the process of differentiation of the object; and this in turn depends upon the issue of a conflict over separation from the object—a situation which is both desired and feared. The conflict in question may call into operation any or all of four characteristic techniques—the obsessional, the paranoid, the hysterical and the phobic: and, if object-relationships are unsatisfactory, these techniques are liable to form the basis of characteristic psychopathological developments in later life. The various techniques cannot be classified in any order corresponding to presumptive levels of libidinal development. On the contrary, they must be regarded as alternative techniques, all belonging to the same stage in the development of object-relationships. Which of the techniques is employed, or rather to what extent each is employed would appear to depend in large measure upon the nature of the object-relationships established during the preceding stage of infantile

dependence. In particular it would seem to depend upon the degree to which objects have been incorporated, and upon the relationships which have been established between the developing ego and its internalized objects.

THE STAGE OF INFANTILE DEPENDENCE AND ITS PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

Now that the nature of the transition period and the defences which characterize it have been considered at some length, it is time for us to turn our attention to the period of infantile dependence and to those psychopathological states which are germinated in this period.

The outstanding feature of infantile dependence is its unconditional character. The infant is completely dependent upon his object not only for his existence and physical well-being, but also for the satisfaction of his psychological needs. It is true, of course, that mature individuals are likewise dependent upon one another for the satisfaction of their psychological, no less than their physical, needs. Nevertheless, on the psychological side, the dependence of mature individuals is not unconditional. By contrast, the very helplessness of the child is sufficient to render him dependent in an unconditional sense. We also notice that, whereas in the case of the adult the object-relationship has a considerable spread, in the case of the infant it tends to be focussed

upon a single object. The loss of an object is thus very much more devastating in the case of an infant. If a mature individual loses an object, however important, he still has some objects remaining. His eggs are not all in one basket. Further, he has a choice of objects and can desert one for another. The infant, on the other hand, has no choice. He has no alternative but to accept or to reject his object—an alternative which is liable to present itself to him as a choice between life and death. His psychological dependence is further accentuated by the very nature of his object-relationship; for, as we have seen, this is based essentially upon identification. Dependence is exhibited in its most extreme form in the intra-uterine state; and we may legitimately infer that on its psychological side this state is characterized by an absolute degree of identification. Identification may thus be regarded as representing the persistence into extra-uterine life of a relationship existing before birth. In so far as identification persists after birth, the individual's object constitutes not only his world, but also himself: and it is to this fact, as has already been

pointed out, that we must attribute the compulsive attitude of many schizoid and depressive individuals towards their objects.

Normal development is characterized by a process whereby progressive differentiation of the object is accompanied by a progressive decrease in identification. So long as infantile dependence persists, however, identification remains the most characteristic feature of the individual's emotional relationship with his object. Infantile dependence is equivalent to oral dependence—a fact which should be interpreted, not in the sense that the infant is inherently oral, but in the sense that the breast is his original object. During the oral phases, accordingly, identification remains the most characteristic feature of the individual's emotional relationship with his object. The tendency to identification, which is so characteristic of emotional relationships during these phases, also invades the cognitive sphere, with the result that certain orally fixated individuals have only to hear of someone else suffering from any given disease in order to believe that they are suffering from it themselves. In the conative sphere, on the other hand, identification has its counterpart in oral incorporation; and it is the merging of emotional identification with oral incorporation that confers upon the stage of infantile dependence its most distinctive features. These features are based upon the fundamental equivalence for the infant of being held in his mother's arms and incorporating the contents of her breast.

The phenomenon of narcissism, which is one of the most prominent characteristics of infantile dependence, is an attitude arising out of identification with the object. Indeed primary narcissism may be simply defined as just such a state of identification with the object, secondary narcissism being a state of identification with an object which is internalized. Whilst narcissism is a feature common to both the early and the late oral phases, the latter phase differs from the former in virtue of a change in the nature of the object. In the early oral phase the natural object is the breast; but in the late oral phase the natural object becomes the mother. The transition from one phase to the other is thus marked by the substitution of a whole object (or person) for a part-object. Nevertheless the object continues to be treated as a part-object (the breast), with the result that the person of the mother becomes an object for incorporation. The transition from the early to the late oral phase is also characterized by the emergence of the biting tendency. Thus, whereas in the early oral phase the libidinal attitude of incorporation monopolizes the field, in the late oral

phase it is in competition with an accompanying attitude of biting. Now biting must be regarded as being essentially destructive in aim, and indeed as representing the very prototype of all differentiated aggression. Consequently the dawn of the late oral phase heralds the emergence of emotional ambivalence. The early oral phase is well described as pre-ambivalent. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the pre-ambivalent state is not simply one in which aggression has not yet been differentiated from the libido. The early oral urge to incorporate is essentially a libidinal urge, to which true aggression makes no contribution, even as a component factor. The recognition of this fact is of the very greatest importance for an understanding of the essential problem underlying schizoid states. It is true that the incorporative urge is destructive in effect, in the sense that the object which is eaten disappears. Nevertheless the urge is not destructive in aim. When a child says that he 'loves' cake, it is certainly implied that the cake will vanish, and, ipso facto, be destroyed. At the same time the destruction of the cake is not the aim of the child's 'love'. On the contrary, the disappearance of the cake is, from the child's point of view, a most regrettable consequence of his 'love' for it. What he really desires is both to eat his cake and have it. If the cake proves to be 'bad', however, he either spits it out or is sick. In other words, he rejects it; but he does not bite it for being bad. This type of behaviour is specially characteristic of the early oral phase. What is characteristic is that, in so far as the object presents itself as good, it is incorporated, and, in so far as it presents itself as bad, it is rejected; but, even when it appears bad, no attempt is made to destroy it. On the contrary, it is the good object that is 'destroyed', albeit only incidentally and not by intention. In the late oral phase the situation is different; for in this phase the object may be bitten as well as incorporated. This means that direct aggression, as well as libido, may be directed towards the object. Hence the appearance of the ambivalence which characterizes the late oral phase.

In accordance with what precedes, it becomes evident that the emotional conflict which arises in relation to object-relationships during the early oral phase takes the form of the alternative, 'to incorporate or not to incorporate', i.e. 'to love or not to love'. This is the conflict underlying the schizoid state. On the other hand, the conflict which characterizes the late oral phase resolves itself into the alternative, 'to incorporate or to destroy', i.e. 'to love or to hate'. This is the conflict underlying the depressive state. It will be seen,

accordingly, that the great problem of the schizoid individual is how to love without destroying by love, whereas the great problem of the depressive individual is how to love without destroying by hate. These are two very different problems.

The conflict underlying the schizoid state is, of course, much more devastating than the conflict underlying the depressive state: and, since the schizoid reaction has its roots in an earlier stage of development than the depressive reaction, the schizoid individual is less capable of dealing with conflict than is the depressive. It is owing to these two facts that the disturbance of the personality found in schizophrenia is so much more profound than that found in depression. The devastating nature of the conflict associated with the early oral phase lies in the fact that, if it seems a terrible thing for an individual to destroy his object by hate, it seems a much more terrible thing for him to destroy his object by love. It is the great tragedy of the schizoid individual that it is his love which seems to destroy; and it is because his love seems so destructive that he experiences such difficulty in directing his libido towards objects in outer reality. He becomes afraid to love; and therefore he erects barriers between his objects and himself. He tends both to keep his objects at a distance and to make himself remote from them. He rejects his objects; and at the same time he withdraws his libido from them. This

withdrawal of libido may be carried to all lengths. It may be carried to a point at which all emotional and physical contacts with other persons are renounced; and it may even go so far that all libidinal links with outer reality are surrendered, all interest in the world around fades and everything becomes meaningless. In proportion as libido is withdrawn from outer objects it is directed towards internalized objects; and, in proportion as this happens, the individual becomes introverted. And incidentally it is on the observation that this process of introversion is so characteristic of the onset of schizoid states that I base the conclusion that the 'introvert' is essentially a schizoid. It is essentially in inner reality that the values of the schizoid are to be found. So far as he is concerned, the world of internalized objects is always encroaching upon the world of external objects; and in proportion as this happens his real objects become lost to him.

If loss of the real object were the only trauma of the schizoid state, the position of the schizoid individual would not be so precarious. It is necessary, however, to bear in mind the vicissitudes of the ego, which accompany loss of the object. Reference has already been made to

the narcissism which results from an excessive libidinization of internalized objects; and such narcissism is specially characteristic of the schizoid. Accompanying it we invariably find an attitude of superiority which may manifest itself in consciousness to a varying degree as an actual sense of superiority. It should be noticed, however, that this attitude of superiority is based upon an orientation towards internalized objects, and that in relation to objects in the world of outer reality the attitude of the schizoid is essentially one of inferiority. It is true that the externally oriented inferiority may be masked by a facade of superiority based upon an identification of external with internalized objects. Nevertheless, it is invariably present; and it is evidence of a weakness in the ego. What chiefly compromises the development of the ego in the case of the schizoid individual is the apparently insoluble dilemma which attends the direction of libido towards objects. Failure to direct libido towards the object is, of course, equivalent to loss of the object; but since, from the point of view of the schizoid, the libido itself is destructive, the object is equally lost when libido is directed towards it. It can thus readily be understood that, if the dilemma becomes sufficiently pronounced, the result is a complete impasse, which reduces the ego to a state of utter impotence. The ego becomes quite incapable of expressing itself; and, in so far as this is so, its very existence becomes compromised. This is well exemplified by the following remarks of a patient of mine during an analytical session: 'I can't say anything. I have nothing to say. I'm empty. There's nothing of me. … I feel quite useless; I haven't done anything. … I've gone quite cold and hard; I don't feel anything. … I can't express myself; I feel futile.' Such descriptions well illustrate not only the state of impotence to which the ego is reduced, but also the extent to which the very existence of the ego is compromised by the schizoid dilemma. The last quoted remark of this patient is perhaps particularly significant as drawing attention to the characteristic affect of the schizoid state; for the characteristic affect of the schizoid state is undoubtedly a sense of futility.

Amongst other schizoid phenomena which may be mentioned here are a sense of being wasted, a sense of unreality, intense self-consciousness and a sense of looking on at oneself. Taken together, these various phenomena clearly indicate that an actual splitting of the ego goes hand in hand with the impotence and impoverishment of the ego already noted. It would seem, therefore, that withdrawal of the libido from external objects is accompanied by a loosening of the bonds which

hold the ego together. This fact is particularly significant as evidence of the extent to which the integrity of the ego depends upon object-relationships as contrasted with libidinal attitudes.

It is not sufficient to say that the splitting of the ego which characterizes acute schizoid states is due simply to a withdrawal of libido from object-relationships; for the withdrawal of libido may proceed still further. The libido may be withdrawn in varying degrees even from that part of the psyche which is, so to speak, nearest to external objects. It may be withdrawn from the realm of the conscious into the unconscious. When this happens, the effect is as if the ego itself had withdrawn into the unconscious; but the actual position would seem to be that, when the libido deserts the conscious part of the ego (such as it is), the unconscious part of the ego is all that is left to behave as a functioning ego. In extreme cases the libido would seem to desert even the unconscious part of the ego and relapse into the primal id, leaving on the surface only the picture with which Kraepelin has familiarized us in his account of the last phase of dementia præcox. Whether such a mass-withdrawal of the libido can properly be ascribed to repression is a debatable question, although where the process is restricted to a withdrawal from object-relationships it may give that impression. At any rate I am assured by a very intelligent schizoid patient that the effect of withdrawal of the libido 'feels quite different' from that of simple repression. There can be no doubt, however, that withdrawal of the libido from the conscious part of the ego has the effect of relieving emotional tension and mitigating the danger of violent outbursts of precipitate action; and in the case of the patient just referred to such a withdrawal did occur just after a violent outburst. There can be equally little doubt that much of the schizoid individual's anxiety really represents fear of such outbursts occurring. This fear commonly manifests itself as a fear of going insane or as a fear of imminent disaster. It is possible, therefore, that massive withdrawal of the libido has the significance of a desperate effort on the part of an ego threatened with disintegration to avoid all relationships with external objects by a repression of the basic impulses which urge the individual on to make emotional contacts. In the case of the schizoid, of course, these impulses are essentially oral impulses. It is when this effort is within measurable distance of succeeding that the individual begins to tell us that he feels as if there were nothing of him, or as if he had lost his identity, or as if he were dead, or as if he had ceased to exist. The fact is that in renouncing the libido the ego

renounces the very form of energy which holds it together; and the ego thus becomes lost. Loss of the ego is the ultimate psycho-pathological disaster which the schizoid individual is constantly struggling, with more or with less success, to avert by exploiting all available techniques (including the transitional techniques) for the control of his libido. In essence, therefore, the schizoid state is not a defence, although evidence of the presence of defences may be detected in it. It represents the major disaster which may befall the individual who has failed to outgrow the early oral stage of dependence.

If the great problem which confronts the individual in the early oral phase is how to love the object without destroying it by love, the great problem which confronts the individual in the late oral phase is how to love the object without destroying it by hate. Accordingly, since the depressive reaction has its roots in the late oral phase, it is the disposal of his hate, rather than the disposal of his love, that constitutes the great difficulty of the depressive individual. Formidable as this difficulty is, the depressive is at any rate spared the devastating experience of feeling that his love is bad. Since his love at any rate seems good, he remains inherently capable of a libidinal relationship with outer objects in a sense in which the schizoid is not. His difficulty in maintaining

such a relationship arises out of his ambivalence. This ambivalence in turn arises out of the fact that during the late oral phase, he was more successful than the schizoid in substituting direct aggression (biting) for simple rejection of the object. Whilst his aggression has been differentiated, however, he has failed in some degree to achieve that further step in development which is represented by dichotomy of the object. This further step, had he taken it, would have enabled him to dispose of his hate by directing it, predominantly at least, towards the rejected object; and he would have been left free to direct towards his accepted object love which was relatively unaccompanied by hate. In so far as he has failed to take such a step, the depressive remains in that state which characterized his attitude towards his object during the late oral phase. His external object during that phase was, of course, a whole object (his mother). Nevertheless, it was treated as a part-object (the breast); and his libidinal attitude towards it was incorporative. The incorporated object of the depressive thus comes to be an undivided whole object, towards which he adopts an ambivalent attitude. The presence of such an inner situation is less disabling so far as outer adjustments are concerned than is the corresponding inner situation in the case of

the schizoid; for in the case of the depressive there is no formidable barrier obstructing the outward flow of libido. Consequently the depressive individual readily establishes libidinal contacts with others; and, if his libidinal contacts are satisfactory to him, his progress through life may appear fairly smooth. Nevertheless the inner situation is always present; and it is readily reactivated if his libidinal relationships become disturbed. Any such disturbance immediately calls into operation the hating element in his ambivalent attitude; and, when his hate becomes directed towards the internalized object, a depressive reaction supervenes. Any frustration in object-relationships is, of course, functionally equivalent to loss of the object, whether partial or complete; and, since severe depression is so common a sequel to actual loss of the object (whether by the death of a loved person or otherwise), loss of the object must be regarded as the essential trauma which provokes the depressive state.

What precedes may at first sight appear to leave unexplained the fact that a depressive reaction so commonly follows physical injury or illness. Physical injury or illness obviously represents loss. Yet what is actually lost is not the object, but part of the individual himself. To say that such a loss, e.g. the loss of an eye or a limb, represents symbolic castration takes us no further; for it still remains to be explained why a reaction which is characteristically provoked by loss of the object should also be provoked by loss of part of the body. The true explanation lies in the fact that the depressive individual still remains to a marked degree in a state of infantile identification with his object. To him, therefore, bodily loss is functionally equivalent to loss of the object; and this equivalence is reinforced by the presence of an internalized object, which, so to speak, suffuses the individual's body and imparts to it a narcissistic value.

There still remains to be explained the phenomenon of involutional melancholia. There are many psychiatrists, of course, who tend to regard the ætiology of this condition as entirely different from that of 'reactive depression'. Nevertheless, the two conditions have sufficient in common from a clinical standpoint to justify us in invoking the principle of entia non sunt multiplicanda prœter necessitatem: and indeed it is not really difficult to explain both conditions on similar principles. Involutional melancholia is by definition closely associated with the climacteric; and the climacteric would seem to be in itself evidence of a definite waning of libidinal urges. It cannot be said, however, that there is any equivalent diminution of aggression. The

balance between the libidinal and the aggressive urges is thus disturbed; and, further, it is disturbed in the same direction as when the hate of any ambivalent individual is activated by loss of the object. Accordingly, in an individual of the depressive type the climacteric has the effect of establishing the same situation as does actual loss of the object where object-relationships are concerned; and the result is a depressive reaction. If the prospect of recovery in the case of involutional melancholia is less hopeful than in the case of reactive depression, this is not difficult to explain; for, whereas in the latter case libido is still available for a restoration of the balance, in the former case it is not. Involutional melancholia is thus seen to conform to the general configuration of the depressive state; and it imposes upon us no necessity to modify the conclusion already envisaged—that loss of the object is the basic trauma underlying the depressive state. As in the case of the schizoid state, this state is not a defence. On the contrary, it is a state against which the individual seeks to defend himself by means of such techniques (including the transitional techniques) as are available for the control of his aggression. It represents the major disaster which may befall the individual who has failed to outgrow the late oral stage of infantile dependence.

In accordance with what precedes, we find ourselves confronted with two basic psychopathological conditions, each arising out of a failure on the part of the individual to establish a satisfactory object-relationship during the period of infantile dependence. The first of these conditions, viz. the schizoid state, is associated with an unsatisfactory object-relationship during the early oral phase; and the second of these conditions, viz. the depressive state, is associated with an unsatisfactory object-relationship during the late oral phase. It emerges quite clearly, however, from the analysis of both schizoid and depressive individuals that unsatisfactory object-relationships during the early and late oral phases only give rise to their characteristic psychopathological effects when object-relationships continue to be unsatisfactory during the succeeding years of early childhood. The schizoid and depressive states must, accordingly, be regarded as dependent upon a regressive reactivation, during early childhood, of situations arising respectively during the early and late oral phases. The traumatic situation in either case is one in which the child feels that he is not really loved. If the phase in which infantile object-relationships have been pre-eminently unsatisfactory is the early oral phase, this trauma provokes in the child a reaction conforming to the

idea that he is not loved because his own love is bad and destructive; and this reaction provides the basis for a subsequent schizoid tendency. If, on the other hand, the phase in which infantile object-relationships have been pre-eminently unsatisfactory is the late oral phase, the reaction provoked in the child conforms to the idea that he is not loved because of the badness and destructiveness of his hate; and this reaction provides the basis for a subsequent depressive tendency. Whether in any given case a schizoid or depressive tendency will eventually give rise to an actual schizoid or depressive state depends in part, of course, upon the circumstances which the individual is called upon to face in later life; but the most important determining factor is the degree to which objects have been incorporated during the oral phases. The various defensive techniques which characterize the transition period (i.e. the obsessional, paranoid, hysterical and phobic techniques) all represent attempts to deal with difficulties and conflicts attending object-relationships in consequence of the persistence of incorporated objects. These defensive techniques are accordingly seen to resolve themselves into differing methods of controlling an underlying schizoid or depressive tendency, and thus averting the onset of a schizoid or depressive state, as the case may

be. Where a schizoid tendency is present, they represent methods designed to avert the ultimate psychopathological disaster which follows from loss of the ego; and, where a depressive tendency is present, they represent methods designed to avert the ultimate psychopathological disaster which follows from loss of the object.

It must be recognized, of course, that no individual born into this world is so fortunate as to enjoy a perfect object-relationship during the impressionable period of infantile dependence, or for that matter during the transition period which succeeds it. Consequently, no one ever becomes completely emancipated from the state of infantile dependence, or from some proportionate degree of oral fixation; and there is no one who has completely escaped the necessity of incorporating his early objects. It may consequently be inferred that there is present in every one either an underlying schizoid or an underlying depressive tendency, according as it was in the early or in the late oral phase that difficulties chiefly attended infantile object-relationships. We are thus introduced to the conception that every individual may be classified as falling into one of two basic psychological types—the schizoid and the depressive. It is not necessary to regard these two types as having more than phenomenological significance. Nevertheless,

it is impossible to ignore the fact that in the determination of these two types some part may be played by a hereditary factor—viz. the relative strength of the inborn tendencies of sucking and biting.

Here we are reminded of Jung's dualistic theory of psychological types. According to Jung, of course, the 'introvert' and the 'extravert' represent fundamental types, into the constitution of which psychopathological factors do not primarily enter. My own conception of basic types differs from that of Jung not only in so far as I describe the two basic types as the 'schizoid' and the 'depressive' respectively, but also in so far as I consider that a psychopathological factor enters into the very constitution of the types envisaged. There is, however, another essentially dualistic conception of psychological types, with which my own conception is in much greater agreement than with that of Jung—the conception which is expounded by Kretschmer in his two works entitled Physique and Character and The Psychology of Men of Genius, and according to which the two basic psychological types are the 'schizothymic' and the 'cyclothymic'. As these terms themselves imply, he regards the cyclothymic individual as predisposed to circular or manic-depressive psychoses, and the schizothymic individual to schizophrenia. There is thus a striking agreement between Kretschmer's conclusions and my own findings—an agreement all the more striking since my views, unlike his, have been reached by an essentially psycho-analytical approach. The only significant divergence between the two views arises out of the fact that Kretschmer regards the temperamental difference between the types as based essentially upon constitutional factors and attributes their psychopathological propensities to this temperamental difference, whereas my view is that psychopathological factors arising during the period of infantile dependence make at any rate a considerable contribution to the temperamental difference. There is, however, sufficient agreement between Kretschmer's views and those here advanced to provide some independent support for my conclusion that the schizoid and the depressive states represent two fundamental psychopathological conditions, in relation to which all other psychopathological developments are secondary. Kretschmer's views also provide some independent support for the conclusion that either an underlying schizoid tendency or an underlying depressive tendency is present at some level in every individual, and that all individuals

may be classified upon this basis, so far as their psychopathological propensities are concerned.

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Every theory of basic types is inevitably confronted with the problem of 'mixed types'. Kretschmer freely acknowledges the existence of mixed types; and he explains their occurrence on the grounds that the incidence of a type is governed by the balance of two antagonistic biological (and perhaps hormonic) groups of factors, which may be unusually evenly balanced. According to the views here presented, the occurrence of mixed types is to be explained not so much in terms of the balance of antagonistic elements as in terms of the relative strength of fixations in developmental phases. Where difficulties over object-relationships assert themselves pre-eminently during the early oral phase, a schizoid tendency is established; and, where difficulties over object-relationships assert themselves pre-eminently during the late oral phase, the establishment of a depressive tendency is the result. In so far, however, as such difficulties are fairly evenly distributed between the two phases, we may expect to find a fixation in the late oral phase superimposed upon one in the early oral phase; and in that case a deeper schizoid tendency will be found underlying a superimposed depressive tendency. That such a phenomenon may occur admits of no doubt whatsoever; and indeed even the most 'normal' person must be regarded as having schizoid potentialities at the deepest levels. It is open to equally little question that even the most 'normal' person may in certain circumstances become depressed. Similarly, schizoid individuals are not wholly immune to depression; and depressed individuals are sometimes found to display certain schizoid characteristics. Whether a depressive or a schizoid state will declare itself in any given case doubtless depends in part upon whether the precipitating circumstances take the form of loss of the real object or of difficulties in object-relationships assuming some other form; and, where there is a fairly even balance between fixations in the early and the late oral phases, this may be the determining factor. Nevertheless the most important factor must always remain the degree of regression which is provoked; and this is determined primarily by the relative strength of fixations. In the last instance the degree of regression must depend upon whether the chief problem of the indi-; vidual lies in the disposal of his love or in the disposal of his hate and there must be few individuals in whom the disposal of love and the disposal of hate are attended by equal difficulty.

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1939) THE PSYCHO-ANALYSIS OF AFFECTS. INT. J. PSYCHO-ANAL., 20:299 (IJP)

THE PSYCHO-ANALYSIS OF AFFECTS

EDWARD GLOVER

As time goes on it becomes clearer that the recent fallow period in the development of psycho-analysis is due to a comparative neglect of the problem of affect. The obscurity surrounding early stages of ego organization or the nature of early ideational content is as nothing compared with the obscurity that clouds the understanding of primary affects and their vicissitudes. And this for a number of reasons. Not only is ideational content easier to grasp than the more labile and impermanent expressions of affect, but the

exploration of affect tends to arouse greater subjective resistances. Moreover, clinical observers naturally focus their attention rather exclusively on those affective reactions that are most frequently and most obviously responsible for pathological states. Thus the constant reference made during recent clinical discussions to the factor of 'anxiety' (either manifest or latent) tends to give the impression that analysts regard this state and its immediate sequelæ, hate and guilt, as the only affective responses of early childhood and therefore as the mainsprings of neurotic or psychotic reaction. Similarly a recent recrudescence of interest in transference is justified by its sponsors on the ground that the latent anxiety content of these transferences has not been duly appreciated. Although praiseworthy enough this over-emphasis is not without its dangers. Therapeutically regarded the essence of transference is the displacement of affect, and undue concentration on the 'anxiety-hate-guilt' group is likely to impede understanding of other important affective reactions.

Yet another factor in the comparative neglect of affects is the tendency to be too exclusively interested in ideational derivatives of instinct (e.g. in the more stereotyped forms of primitive unconscious phantasy); or again, to consider such unconscious phantasies solely in terms of the specific instinct from which they are felt to be derived. By so doing the observer is liable to gloss over the fact that the driving power of instincts cannot be properly appreciated without some measure of the affects they engender. In other words the boundary concept of instinct is of clinical value in two directions only: in so far as it promotes an adequate classification of phenomena, and in so far as the concept of continuous flow of energy makes it easier to understand

the existence of periodic stresses and of regressions. It is to the actual derivatives of instinct-stress that we must look for an explanation of mental behaviour. And amongst the primary derivatives of and responses to instinct-stress, affective reactions are by far the most powerful.

A fresh investigation of affect therefore requires not only more careful analysis of affective experiences but a plausible reconstruction of the affective states occurring during early phases of infancy, when analytic observation cannot be checked by examination of ideational derivatives, when, in fact one can do little more than draw inferences either from behaviouristic data or from analytic observations made on other and older subjects.

As far as reconstruction is concerned, it is appropriate to recall that one of the most successful efforts in this direction lies to the credit of Ernest Jones. In his paper on 'Fear, Guilt and Hate'1 he set himself the task of describing systematically some early 'layerings' of affective states, if one may use a mixed dynamic-topographic expression. These views were a logical development of the author's earlier interest in the relations of instinct to morbid anxiety, and although they do not claim to be a complete reconstruction of the vicissitudes of affect in infancy they provide an instructive example of the method by which more comprehensive reconstructions can be made. It is clear that adequate understanding of affective problems cannot be achieved unless the subject is approached from a number of angles. Freud has already shown that no mental event can be understood unless it is examined metapsychologically. And affective phenomena call for a greater variety of approaches than any other mental manifestation. This is borne out by the fact that affects can be classified in a great variety of ways. They can be described in crude qualitative terms, e.g. of subjective pleasure or 'pain', or labelled descriptively according to the predominant ideational system associated with them in consciousness. They can be classified by reference to the instinct or component instinct from which they are derived, or they can be considered as either 'fixed' or

'labile'. They can be divided into primary affects and secondary affects, more precisely into 'positive' and 'reactive' affects, or they can be considered as tension and discharge phenomena. Finally, they can be grouped as simple or compound ('mixed' and/or 'fused') affects.

1This JOURNAL, Vol. X, 1929.

Generally speaking, the simpler the classification the less value it has. In this respect the pleasure-pain criterion is not very satisfactory. Similarly, the approach by reference to instinct requires considerable expansion before it can be of much service. Study of the affective reactions following frustration of different component impulses provides a valuable line of inquiry. Variations in the distribution of libido or of aggressive charges throughout the different body organs or zones are responsible for characteristic affective experiences. And no doubt these could be traced back to differences in the nature of sensory excitation and of stimulation of the sympathetic system. For example, the contribution of gastric, intestinal, skin and muscle erotism (sadism or aggression) to the characteristic states that go to make up 'oral depressive' affect is certainly worthy of investigation. Similarly, the psychic displacement of libido from one zone to another, e.g. from the genitals to the extremities is responsible for a good deal of complication in subjective feeling. In short, the more complicated the relation of affective states the more necessary it becomes to distinguish clearly between simple and compound affects. The concept of fusion of affects has to be distinguished from that of 'mixed' affect, or again from simultaneous experience of affects of different origin. To take a simple example, the phenomenon of ambivalence is ill-described as a rapid alternation of love and hate affects or as a simultaneous experience of love and hate attitudes towards one and the same object. It is much better understood by extending the concept of fusion of instinct (which has been so abundantly justified in the case of sadism or masochism), and postulating an actual fusion of affect. The refractoriness of ambivalence to analysis and the fact that its partial disappearance during analysis involves a series of defusions and refusions of instinct is convincing evidence in this direction. The compelling and sometimes disruptive force of ambivalence is more comprehensible if it is regarded from the affective rather than from the ideational standpoint. This view is borne out by study of more complicated states of 'mixed' affect, such as are encountered occasionally in cases of perversion, where frustration affects are associated with gratification affects, or again in cases where compulsive sexual activity arises as a response to anxiety.

Moreover, in the case of affects that have proved pathogenic it is easy to demonstrate that many of these, although apparently simple, are actually compound or fused. They disappear only after a number of distinct affective elements (whose existence is proved by the presence

2'Jealousy as a Mechanism of Defence', this JOURNAL, Vol. XIII, 1932.

of characteristic unconscious phantasies) have been analysed. Several writers, in particular Joan Riviere, 2 have pointed out that jealousy formations are by no means simple: that they comprise a number of psychic situations. But clinically regarded the significance of jealousy depends on the fact that it is an extremely disturbing affect reducible on analysis to simpler elements of grief, anger, and fear. Perhaps the best example of an affect which although apparently primary is actually exceedingly complicated is that of depression. Some states of depression are certainly simpler and more primitive than others, compare e.g. the relatively simpler manifestations occurring

in schizophrenia with those of 'depressive states'. The later depressions are, however, extremely elaborate. The simplest examination of ideational content shows that they combine a feeling of impoverishment due to internal loss of love, feeling of deadness due to the action of internal anger directed against the love-object (with which the ego is partly identified) together with reactions of anxiety, guilt and remorse. These different reactions are bound together by what might be called an 'affective matrix', in this case an overwhelming feeling of hurt, the ultimate expression of frustration. The feelings of depression experienced in hysteria although similar in constitution are much less closely fused, and overlap more with other affects. They also conceal a deep jealousy reaction which induces a greater sense of active stress and therefore counteracts to some extent the 'stone-dead' feelings occurring in true depression. Hysterical depressives, despite their 'dead' feelings, are notoriously hyperactive. In any case, these more stereotyped ('fixed') components by no means exhaust the analysis of depressive affects. As has been suggested, these include also a variety of emotional reactions contributed specifically by disturbed or overcharged components of infantile instinct. And at this point the difficulty arises of discriminating between purely psychic experience and corporeal sensations of a hypochondriacal kind (e.g. mental and physical feelings of 'weight').

These findings suggest that it is to the lesser known components of any emotional cluster that one must turn in order to elucidate the early history of affect. And in this connection the most useful classification of affects seems to be that into tension affects and discharge affects. Freud himself indicated the importance of this approach when he called attention to the fact that the effects of excitation should

not be regarded solely from the quantitative point of view. Rise and fall in excitation, he suggested, is important because there are definite qualities associated with different quantities of the same instinct excitation. So that presumably there are qualitatively different affective responses to frustrations of different quantities of instinct. And since there is no exact correlation between tension and 'pain', or between discharge and pleasure, there seems no alternative to investigating a large mass of clinical material in order to isolate and identify specific tension affects. The following example may serve to illustrate this line of approach.

Those accustomed to analyse acute anxiety states must have observed that the more distressing forms of panic occur during periods of instinctual stress. The nature of the stress can be gathered by studying the efflorescence of unconscious phantasies (e.g. of sadistic intercourse) that ensues. The accompanying tension is experienced both physically and mentally. The physical forms include a variety of muscular innervations and organ sensations; the most familiar psychic reaction is best described as a feeling of mental 'bursting' which usually induces a lively apprehension of 'being disrupted', 'flying into fragments' or 'going mad'. Similarly, in depressive cases, when the feeling of internal weight begins to give way to active suicidal feelings, it is not hard to detect an increase in unconscious sadistic tensions which can no longer be immobilized. In this phase the depression affect frequently disappears to be replaced by a vaguely described but compelling 'intolerable feeling', comparable to bursting. Unlike the hysteric, the depressive case does not exhibit any panic on experiencing these explosive tensions. He simply takes it for granted that the feeling justifies any action calculated to relieve it. Where the hysteric would be content with fits of screaming or jumping up and down, the depressive is ready to commit suicide. These are, of course, outstanding examples. In milder conditions the bursting feelings are less constant and require for their periodic release some external justification. Thus, in some cases of frigidity,

increase in the fear of penetration can be shown to accompany increase in unconscious sexual tension and phantasy. The actual bursting feeling is due to an overcharge of sado-masochistic energies, and the genital penetration is thought of as pricking an inflated balloon. In mixed cases of anxiety hysteria and obsessional neurosis the feelings are much more localized. If, as is frequently the case, they are given physical expression this usually takes the form of intolerable tension on the bridge of the nose,

3Personal communication.

hands or feet, forearms or shoulder girdle. The mental forms readily pass over into a 'letting go' of obsessional ideas not unlike a maniacal 'flight', although much more organized and accompanied by actual dread. During the analysis of hysterical phobias, particularly phobias of insanity, it can frequently be observed that the mutilation ideas present are stimulated by an explosive feeling following an unconscious sadistic tension. A similar situation can sometimes be uncovered in phobias of pregnancy. Anxiety of bursting is a common accompaniment of neurotic disturbances of sexual function, particularly in those cases of impotence where there is a strong unconscious homosexual organization oscillating between active and passive phantasies. In such cases there is usually no outlet for adult sexuality except perhaps a residual and rather abortive type of masturbation; social activities are restricted to a sort of hermit-like existence, and sublimatory outlets are heavily curtailed. In less severe cases of conditional impotence, the anxiety of bursting is sometimes represented by a marked repugnance to growing fat. Marjorie Brierley3 has observed a similar reaction in women and regards it as due to 'homosexual' tension. It is more marked where outlets for masculinity are missing or impeded, e.g. in talented women who cannot find or sustain any relieving activity or else cannot work at their chosen career. Finally one might mention that in the later stages of some organic disorders (e.g. cardiovascular, liver and kidney diseases) the appearance of acute œdema or ascites may produce a frenzied reaction quickly followed by a phase of despair.

Whatever may be the state of mind common to these various reactions, its unconscious ideational expression evidently depends on the level of mental organization and instinctual conflict existing at any given stage of development. And obviously the analytical interpretation would vary either according to the clinical picture or according to the theoretical predilections of the analyst. Thus it could be described as a typical Œdipus reaction exhibiting the usual fears of orgasm and penetration: it is obviously a form of unconscious homosexual tension. Between these two forms there lies a strong pregnancy fear associated with infantile theories of impregnation, e.g. delivery by bursting through the abdominal wall. Its anal components are not difficult to detect, in particular the fear of anal retention. This retention is not the usual passive form, but an active inhibition

of a powerful drive towards expulsion. In both anal and urethral aspects the fear of incontinence (i.e. of the phantasy significance of incontinence) is indisputably a factor of the first importance. Incidentally bursting sensations are probably more urgent in urethral than in any other forms of experience.

The feeling can also be interpreted in the usual topographical terms. The part played by the super-ego (using this term in the customary sense) is quite clear. Not only does it respond rapidly to any rise of sadistic id-tension, but there seem grounds for assuming that the total psychic tension is increased by active interference on the part of a maternal type of severe super-ego. Brierley has observed this in particular in cases of frustrated

unconscious homosexuality. At deeper levels the influence of early ego development is obvious. Melitta Schmideberg has pointed out that the infant projects its love and hate feeling to various parts of its own body and consequently fears conflict between these independent parts. The pleasure parts are good and narcissistically loved, the 'pain' parts are hated and feared. She believes that anxiety of hostile parts of the body fighting each other gives rise to a fear of disruption. It is stimulated by unpleasant physical sensations (including reactions to clothes), frustration or pain, and is increased by identification of parts of the body with dangerous introjected objects. It is, in her opinion, counteracted by achieving control over the body through muscular activity. Finally, observations of the painful anxieties exhibited by infants when subjected to increasing stimulation either mental or physical (e.g. screaming reactions on being tickled, or later, fears of bursting during explosive laughter) indicate that the feelings of psychic disruption follow sudden rise of libidinal excitation. The important point is, however, that this excitation owes its peculiar disruptive quality to simultaneous rise of sadistic tension. Not just simply to accompanying hate, rivalry or aggression, but to a characteristic quality of sadistic over-excitation. Psychic feeling of disruption is thus a typical and very early tension affect, which in course of development may become fixed in different forms ('canalized' by association with phantasy systems) according to the experiences and unconscious ideations of different developmental periods.

If this view be accepted certain conclusions follow of both theoretical and practical interest. It would seem desirable to investigate more closely the earlier psychic forms of fear that previously have been regarded rather from a theoretical standpoint. Here again Ernest

4'The Early Development of Female Sexuality', this JOURNAL Vol. VIII, 1927.

Jones4 has opened a path by describing the dread of what he calls aphanisis. Aphanisis, in his view, is essentially a tension reaction due to the unavoidable absence of efferent discharge of erotic excitation. Owing to the existence of sadistic components this tension becomes intolerable and a dread develops of 'total annihilation of the capacity for sexual gratification, direct or indirect'. The most familiar clinical manifestation of the dread of aphanisis is, he believes, the castration complex. Although there is much in common between his views and those of the present writer, the fact that Jones stresses the element of destruction and mutilation distinguishes the dread of aphanisis from the dread of disruption or bursting. From the writer's point of view aphanisis is a slightly more organized fear which develops later than the fear of disruption. The former is no doubt reinforced through the mechanism of projection, i.e. the full force of sadism is reflected on the self. Fear of aphanisis occurs at a point nearer to 'discharge' (motility). This is in keeping with theoretical views of the development of affects at different points in an 'excitation-discharge' sequence. No doubt these affects overlap with each other or merge to some extent. Undoubtedly there is fear of disruption in aphanisis, and fear of aphanisis contributes to the fear of disruption. Nevertheless, until further investigations are made there seems good clinical ground for distinguishing between these two forms. In aphanisis the excitation travels to a point near to motility. It threatens to break into destructive action (directed outwards and therefore threatening destruction in return). The consequent reflection of this excitation back to the central psychic system gives rise to the characteristic affect. In the case of 'bursting' affect the excitation is freer (more mobile). It, too, stimulates the central psychic system and sets up its characteristic affect. But there is some reason to suppose that the backward flow of excitation causes increased stasis in the afferent system. This increased stasis sets up

intolerable tension, and, the avenues to motility remaining blocked, a variety of physical sensations ensue. These take the form of sensory disturbances and/or muscular tensions, i.e. an 'ineffective' form of 'internal' behaviour.

Explanations of this sort are of necessity extremely tentative. It might be argued, for instance, that bursting tensions occur nearer to motility than the tensions inducing dread of aphanisis. Or again,

that differences between the two states are due to the fact that dread of aphanisis is fostered by introjective tendencies, whereas the bursting affect has a closer relation to projective tendencies of the mind. One is tempted to add that these dynamic relations between excitation, affect and behaviouristic discharge may throw some light on the manic-depressive affective sequence. It seems likely, for example, that the bursting feelings accompanying depression represent an abortive manic phase, in which excitation is arrested short of activity, but cannot be completely inhibited. However this may be there seems reasonable prospect that the application of metapsychological criteria to clinical observations will lead to a more comprehensive understanding of primary affects. There is certainly ample scope for investigation since it is, at any rate, plausible that there are as many primitive affects as there are primitive ego-nuclei.

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Additional papers of importance are:—Melitta Schmideberg '"Bad Habits" in Childhood' this JOURNAL, Vol. XVI 1935

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AFFECTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE1

MARJORIE BRIERLEY

In the early days of psycho-analysis affect played a leading rôle in theory and in practice. Freud's first hypotheses were framed in terms of ideas rendered dynamic by their emotional charges. Thus, the hysteric was said to suffer from repressed painful reminiscences and cure was held to follow the recovery of these memories, together with the adequate discharge of the associated feelings. The essence of cure by catharsis was abreaction of affect. Psychic tension appeared first as feeling-tension, and conflict as conflict between ideas with incompatible feeling-charges. Soon, however, Freud's investigation of the repressed unconscious brought him up against problems of instinct. With the formulation of the libido theory and the conception of conflict as conflict between ego and sexual instincts, the ideo-motor terminology lapsed into disuse. To-day the language of instinct holds the field in theory. Thus, we speak of cathexes of objects rather than of the emotional charges of ideas and tend, in practice, to regard these two expressions as synonymous, though the precise relation between instinct and affect is by no means fully understood as yet. The modern concept of the three-fold structure of the mind is a concept of an unorganized id-reservoir of instinct out of which organized ego and super-ego systems are differentiated. We regard instinct as the source and stimulus of psychic activity. We regard mind as an apparatus for the

regulation of instinct-tension and as the mediator between instinct and the outer world. We think of the development of mind as progressive organization, adaptation and modification of instinct. Nevertheless, we are also accustomed to think of development as progressive mastery of anxiety, an affect concept, and we do not hesitate to equate instinct-defence with defence against the emergence of intolerable affects. But, until quite recently, very little attention has been paid in theory to affects as such, apart from anxiety and from some studies of special emotions such as pity and jealousy. Indeed, Federn's last paper (2) constains the first systemic theory of affect in the literature.

1Read before the XIVth International Psycho-analytical Congress, Marienbad, August 6, 1936.

In spite of this temporary eclipse in theory, in practice affect has never lost its importance. Whatever differences of opinion exist as to principles of technique, no analyst fails to pay attention to his patient's feelings. Diagnosis, prognosis and criteria of cure all involve some estimation of affectivity. Indeed, patients themselves leave us in no doubt here. With few exceptions, they one and all complain of some disorder of feeling and tend to estimate their own progress by changes in their feelings and in their ability to cope with them. In practice we find our way only by following the Ariadne thread of transference affect and go astray if we lose contact with this. It is time that we restored affects to a place in theory more consonant with their importance in practice. This paper is an attempt to clear the ground by reviewing briefly some of the cardinal problems of affect.

Probably every analyst would agree with the general statement that affects have a peculiarly intimate relation with instincts but that they are essentially ego-experiences. As Freud said years ago: 'It is surely of the essence of an emotion that we should feel it, i.e. that it should enter consciousness' (7, pp. 109, 110). Further, we should probably agree that affects constitute a specific kind, or mode, of ego-experience; that they vary both in quality and quantity and that individuals differ markedly both in the range and in the intensity of their affectivity. It is when we try to make these general statements more precise that we get into difficulties.

In the first place it may be argued that, since affect is so closely related to instinct, it is putting the cart before the horse to attempt to arrive at a theory of affect before we have achieved a complete theory of instinct. Recent literature offers abundant evidence that our theory of instinct is still in the melting-pot. But, if we consider this welter of discussion, we perceive that it does not tend to any discarding of the primary working hypotheses formulated by Freud but, rather, to the re-examination and re-casting of these hypotheses in forms more consonant with our growing knowledge, particularly of the early stages of development. For instance, the libido theory is not wrong; it is only that, as originally stated, it now appears in some respects to be inadequate and, in others, to be too rigid. Further, it need make little difference to our study of affects as such whether we accept the death instinct or its variants 'Destrudo' (27) and 'Mortido' (2, p. 6), or whether we lean to the more readily demonstrable instinct of aggression. For instance, the inter-relationships of fear, guilt and hate traced out by Ernest Jones (15) are not altered whichever view we

take. So far from waiting on the theory of instinct we might reasonably expect that a closer study of affect would contribute to the solution of some of the problems of instinct. The layering of affects described by Ernest Jones corresponds to their genetic sequence. Fuller knowledge of these sequences, and of what Glover calls the

compounding of affects (12, p. 139), might provide a useful index to the stages, phases or positions of mental development.

Our notion of the relation between instinct and affect will vary according to whether we believe that impulses can themselves be conscious or not. Freud writes: 'If the instinct did not attach itself to an idea, or manifest itself as an affective state, we could know nothing about it' (7, p. 109). This notion, that instinct can be represented in the mind either as an idea or as an affect, is also expressed by Nunberg (21, p. 174). He describes affects as the most direct derivatives of instinct in the psyche, where they easily combine with the other representatives of instinct, images and ideas. This alternative representation calls to mind Freud's description of consciousness as a sensory organ having a double surface of perception (4, p. 528), external and internal, and suggests that ideas are external surface phenomena, whereas affects arise from stimulation of the internal surface. This tends to align affects with organic sensations, and is getting very near to the James-Lange theory, criticized in our literature by Kulovesi (19). Actually, we recognize that affects are very closely linked with organic sensation but we usually differentiate between the sensory and emotional elements of an affective experience. Freud distinguishes anxiety from other affects by the fact that stereotyped organic reactions seem to form an integral part of it (8, p. 75). Certainly, in his earlier papers, he ranged affects on the efferent rather than the afferent side of the instinctual arc. Thus he writes in 1915, 'ideas are cathexes—ultimately of memory-traces—whilst affects and emotions correspond with processes of discharge, the final expression of which is perceived as feeling' (7, p. 111). And also 'Affectivity manifests itself essentially in motor (i.e. secretory and circulatory discharge) resulting in an (internal) alteration of the subject's own body without reference to the outer world; motility, in actions designed to effect changes in the outer world' (7, p. 111, foot-note). This discharge idea is still present in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety in the suggestion that affects may be the normal equivalents of hysterical attacks but in a much wider connection. Freud there defines anxiety as a precipitate but not necessarily a complete reproduction

of birth experience and queries whether all affects may not be such precipitates, possibly of phylogenetic experiences (8, p. 76). This is a notion not far removed from his earlier definition of instincts themselves as being, 'at least in part, the precipitates of different forms of external stimulation, which in the course of phylogenesis have effected modifications in the organism' (6, p. 64). All our modern conceptions of the relation of anxiety to symptom-formation and of its rôle in development contradict the idea that affect is itself a discharge and support the view that it is a tension-phenomenon impelling to discharge either in the outer or the inner world. Both the fact that affect is a mode of consciousness and clinical experience incline us to place affect, both topographically and in time-order, in the middle of the instinct-reaction arc. Affects which appear to arise spontaneously always have unconscious stimuli and, in practice, we find affectivity tends to be high where frustration, particularly internal frustration, is marked. Wälder distinguishes neurotics from other mental patients by their hyper-affectivity, which he equates with disorder of instinct (25, p. 93). Glover thinks that 'The primary obsessional state is essentially an affective state or, rather, a sequence of alternating affects having very simple unconscious ideational content', and that all the complicated obsessional rituals 'have the same object in view, viz. to provide an ever more complicated meshwork of conceptual systems through which affect may pass in a finely divided state. When, for some reason or other, these rituals are interfered with we observe once more the existence of massive affects (12, p. 137). A patient suffering from conversion hysteria realized very early on that she either developed symptoms or

'felt rotten'. Nobody could teach her anything, or change her opinion, about her motives for forming symptoms. In practice one can often observe not only symptoms but impulsive behaviour which is designed to short-circuit affect development. I have one patient who regularly feels the strongest possible urge to break off analysis at once whenever she is threatened with any considerable dose of transference affect.

The conception of affects as tension-phenomena is, of course, in line with Freud's earliest formulations of the working of the psychic apparatus and the pleasure-pain principle (4). On the quantitative side we have, I think, to conceive of some threshold above which instinct-tension becomes appreciable as affect, and of a higher threshold, which may be attained either by the strength of the stimulus itself or by damming due to frustration, above which affect becomes intolerable

2The clinical relations between anxiety and sadism are well established (17). The relation of fear to 'self-preservation' and the position of the latter in the Eros-Death classification are still far from clear.

and necessitates some immediate discharge, either outwards or inwards. Weiss' views on the analogies between bodily and mental pain accord with this (26). The fact that all affects are either pleasurably or painfully toned and not infrequently mixed, indicates some general relationship between degree of tension and pleasurable or painful toning, but the precise relations are still exceedingly obscure. As Freud noted in regard to erotic tension (5, p. 68), it is quite obvious that very high tensions of pleasurable affect can be enjoyed, whereas very low tensions of painful feeling can be intolerable. Qualitative factors have also to be taken into account. Further, if one puts Freud's earlier views on the production of pain (6, p. 67) alongside his latest views on the development of anxiety (10, p. 122, 3) one feels that one is approaching a situation in which pain and anxiety are the same thing and all instinct-tension threatens to become anxiety-tension. This would do away with what Freud himself has always insisted on, namely, the variety of instinctual impulses existing in human nature. It seems safer to suppose, as McDougall does (20, p. 47), that every primary impulse gives rise to its own qualitatively specific affect (and probably also has its own quantitative thresholds). Certainly, the whole situation is greatly simplified if (following Ernest Jones, 16, p. 278) fear is recognized as a primary emotion which does not have to be derived from libidinal or aggressive instincts, but is easily aroused in connection with them.2 It accords with Freud's notion of the essence of anxiety as anxiety of helplessness (8, p. 126) and does not contradict the view of birth as the prototype of human anxiety experience. The first fear situation in life must leave its stamp on the psyche and tend to be reactivated in later situations which involve the same primary affect. In fact, it seems to be a notion which has sound biological and psychological backing. Moreover, the three types of response to fear which one can observe in animals, namely, flight, immobilization, and attack, one can also observe in infants, and they have their parallels in psychic activities. The difficulty is, of course, to sort out what are primary instincts and emotions. It often appears that the same instinctual impulse may give rise to a variety of feelings and, moreover, we never have to deal with single impulses. But fusion of impulses and variation of affect takes place

in relation to objects. Clearly, we shall not get any further by considering the relation of affect and instinct without taking into account their ego-connections. Here, the most hopeful approach would appear to be the developmental one.

Classifications of the contents of consciousness or modes of ego experience are all based on the introspections of self-conscious adult egos. What is the state of affairs in the dawn of consciousness in the infant? Here we can only speculate, but what inferences can we draw from clinical evidence and from our all too scanty records of the behaviour of infants in arms? It becomes more and more apparent that the earliest hypotheses were vitiated by the usual type of fallacy, by the attribution to the baby of an integral ego of the adult type. I am myself convinced that Glover is right in considering 'that the earliest ego tendencies are derived from numerous scattered instincts and converge gradually until, about the age of two, a coherent analsadistic organization is established' (11, p. 8), and that, in the beginning, there are as many ego-nuclei as there are more or less definitive reaction systems. After all, we know from observation that consciousness is at first intermittent and discontinuous. The new-born baby spends more time asleep than awake, and waking, when spontaneous, is usually due to some need or discomfort. When enforced it is frightening. In either case it is often highly emotional. Infantile reactions are full of feeling and of the all-or-none type. For the time being the baby is psychically living wholly in the immediate present experience, with nothing corresponding to the adult perspective. The point is that each of these sporadic flashes of consciousness is an ego-experience in so far as it is conscious and it leaves a memory-trace which can be re-activated and which may be regarded, from the point of view of ego structure, as an ego element. Any such element stamped in by repeated experience could form an ego-nucleus and it is not difficult to see that it must come about that an instinctual oral primacy will correspond with an ego-oral-nuclear primacy, nor why it is that early linkages occur between different ego-nuclei, or how varied these linkages can be. Thus the complexity of oral symptomatology, stressed by Melitta Schmideberg in an unpublished paper on eating disturbances, reflects the range of variation which is possible in the character of the initial nuclei and in their early linkages. From analysis one gets the impression that linkages occur very easily through simultaneous or rapidly succeeding activation of different nuclei in relation to a common object. It is not, however, ego-development as

such which concerns us here, only the connections with affect. Affect, as inferred from its expression in behaviour, can be aroused by internal conditions or by external happenings. It is influenced both by the internal need and by the nature of the response from the outer world with which this need is met. The affect manifested is, in fact, the index to the fate of the impulse and to the nature of the beginning psychic object-formation. A good external object is one which satisfies instinct and so produces a state of contented feeling. The good or bad nature of the psychic object will be determined by the pleasant or unpleasant feelings experienced in relation to it. Or, as Joan Riviere expressed it (23, p. 418), a good feeling creates a good object, a bad feeling a bad object. Nowhere, perhaps, is the constant interplay between external and internal reality more obvious than in the realm of affect.

At the beginning of mental life we are accustomed to posit a phase, prior to object-differentiation and cathexis, that we label primary identification. This initial stage is, by definition, lacking in cognitive discrimination. It is presumed to be a state of feeling-awareness but it can scarcely be devoid of sensory impressions. The very ambiguity of the English word 'feeling' indicates that this state is a fusion of sensory and affect awareness. The child must sense the breast, for instance, before it begins to perceive (i.e. recognize) it, and it must feel its sucking sensations before it recognizes its own mouth. It will develop recognition wherever there is a basis for it in sensory experience. Thus knowledge and cathexis of self and knowledge of the external world and object

cathexis will proceed simultaneously. Freud said 'The ego is first and foremost a body-ego' (9, p. 33), but it would seem that there might be advantages at this stage in saying that the ego is at first a series of sensation-egos, part-body part-object nuclei. Joan Riviere shewed the importance of organic sensations in relation to internal object formation in her Vienna paper (23).

The child is first concerned with objects only in relation to its own feelings and sensations but, as soon as feelings are firmly linked to objects, the process of instinct-defence becomes a process of defence against objects. The infant then tries to master its feelings by manipulating their object-carriers. The mechanisms of introjection and projection are essentially methods of mastering feeling, phantasied as concrete dealings with objects. In practice we usually find that wherever a symptom, e.g. diarrhœa, occurs that can be interpreted as anxious expulsion of bad internalized objects, it has also to be understood

as an attempt to get rid of undesired affects. For example, an obsessional neurotic carried her child to term by the help of recurrent attacks of diarrhœa. She did protect her child by expelling fæcal bad objects, but what she was trying to cure in herself by this process was her ambivalent emotional conflict.

The sharp contrast which appears to exist in infancy between good and bad objects is, perhaps, partly the result of the completeness of the alternation of early feelings (the infant in a rage is a different infant psychically to the contented baby) and, perhaps also due to the fact pointed out by Hardcastle (13, pp. 9, 10) that the baby, at first, probably cannot distinguish between the real sensation and the hallucinatory image evoked during privation. This unsatisfying image may not only force the child towards reality as Freud thought, but also form a constant focus for 'bad object' formation.

It is clear that affects must play an important part in the progressive organization of the ego, although we have always to remember the reciprocal action which goes on here, by which affects themselves become modified through their organization in ego systems. The child who urinates happily after sucking to its heart's content will establish a very different type of linkage between its oral and urethral ego systems to the one perpetually wetting itself in angry privation. In general, those nuclei will tend to integrate and those feelings to blend which are similar. Freud's 'pure pleasure ego' (6, p. 78) may never have actual existence, but we accept ego-synthesis as a function of libido. It is positively-toned 'good' objects with their correlated 'good' body-systems which provide a stable core for the slowly growing me-system, the co-ordinated personal ego which seems to emerge about the second year. The appearance of this definitive 'I', with its capacity for self-consciousness as distinct from what academicians used to call simple consciousness, corresponds with the transition described by Melainie Klein (18, p. 147) and Joan Riviere (23, p. 413) from part-object relationship to total object appreciation and cathexis, a transition which, in Klein's opinion, regularly ushers in a depressive position due to the accompanying recognition of its ambivalence towards its objects. This primitive ambivalent 'I' may resort to the manic defence (22) of denying its own aggression and, as Glover pointed out (12), it may begin to employ the wide range of obsessional manœuvres to preserve itself from the melancholic and paranoiac situations which its alternations of feeling tend to produce. I should like to interpolate here that I doubt whether any human being

ever achieves complete object-formation in the sense of discarding part-object relationships, any more than anyone achieves complete ego-integration. It is a question of degree.

It must be in the early definitive 'I' stage that affects begin to become co-ordinated into enduring attitudes of love and hate towards real persons. We should, I think, avoid a good deal of unnecessary confusion if we used different words for different grades of affectivity. It is true we have not yet decided what the primary affects are, though we have seen that there is a good case for recognizing fear as such, but we are justified in supposing that, in so far as they are qualitatively distinct, they are simple, e.g. appetitive longings, anxieties and angers. Ernest Jones' grouping of instincts under the headings 'attraction' and 'repulsion', 'like' and 'dislike' (14, p. 261), might well be applied to affects. Alexander's vectors (1, p. 406), incorporation, elimination and retention, express the logic of impulse rather than of the emotions themselves and are paralleled by the major defence mechanisms. They do not contribute towards qualitative discrimination amongst affects. But one can group affects qualitatively as sympathetic in the literal sense, or antipathetic.

If we keep affect as a generic term, in English the word 'feeling' would seem to me the best to reserve for these earliest waves of relatively undiluted affectivity, which may be objectless in the adult sense but which are invariably associated and closely interwoven with sensations. The first affects connected with objects, affects arising in ego-nuclei in relation to relatively simple part-object systems, might rank as the first emotions.3 The attitudes, which are not in themselves emotions, but which are dispositions to experience certain emotions about certain objects, we might conveniently call sentiments, the term used by Shand (24, p. 50). I believe that we could learn a great deal from more detailed study of the vicissitudes of emotions and the genesis of sentiments.

But there is a further complication. We not only have to deal with pre- and post-personal periods of ego and affect development. We also have to cope with ego-differentiation, wirh super-ego as well as ego integration. Most English analysts tend to agree with Melanis Klein (17) as to the early beginning of super-ego formation, but it ie

3But compare McDougall (20). Ernest Jones suggests that emotions may be distinguished from simple feelings by their more extensive bodily reverberations.

4There is no essential contradiction in the conception of the progressive integration of part-egos (differentiated presentation systems) into a personal ego and the notion that 'oceanic feeling' in the phase of primary identification may be the prototype of mystical experience.

still mysterious why some introjections result in super-ego identifications and others in ego-identifications. A clue is perhaps to be found in the tendency of good objects to be assimilated to the developing me-systems. In the adult, the line between ego and good super-ego or ego-ideal is seldom so sharply defined as between ego and hostile super-ego. The infant wants, above all, to avoid painful feelings, so from the beginning bad systems tend to be isolated, except in so far as they join with one another to form composite bad systems. It has to be emphasized that all presentation systems are ego-object systems, however rudimentary, 4 and all have an origin in sensory experience, however distorted this may become in phantasy elaboration. Many such systems may come into existence which never become integrated with the definitive ego, and in this sense, Melanie Klein is right in maintaining that some phantasies revealed in analysis have never been conscious, i.e. in the sense that they have never been accessible to the definitive ego or self-consciousness. This is, doubtless, one reason why some affects are so inaccessible and their associated phantasies so difficult to verbalize. They are, genetically, pre-verbal. Affect language is older than speech. The infant uses its voice

to convey its feelings long before it has any words. As Ferenczi (3, pp. 190-1) pointed out it establishes communication with the external world by such feeling-speech as crying and crowing long before it learns to talk. Regression to feeling-speech is not infrequent in analysis of early infantile situations.

We have here a way out of the dilemma provided by the apparent existence of repressed affects. The repressed is, indeed, cut off from the main ego, but it is, in itself, a primitive ego-fragment. A certain paradox exists here in theory. By definition, the id is an unorganized reservoir of instinctual drives and yet the repressed unconscious, which always exhibits some degree of organization, is also attributed to it. It would seem that we should transfer the repressed unconscious to the primitive ego system. In dealing with affects we are dealing not only with impulse-object tensions but also with inter- and intra-ego tensions.

What happens when a repressed fragment of ego-experience comes

into consciousness? The patient feels the emotion he was formerly unable to endure. If we can reconstruct for him by transference interpretation the conditions which originally provoked this feeling, especially if we can recover the infantile reality-bases of his phantasies, the experience will fall into perspective as a part of his personal history. In structural terms, the dissociated ego-fragment can become integrated with the reality-ego. Abreaction does not do away with the liability to feel, though it reduces the pathological intensity of the infantile emotion. Its major function is to open the hitherto barred path from id to personal ego. Working-through is, in part, a drainage of residual affect pockets, but, in essence, it is a stabilizing process of ego-assimilation and re-integration.

This paper was drafted before Federn's last contribution (2) appeared, and on reading it I find that he expresses some very similar views, but with differences which I attribute, in the main, to his effort to make his theory of affect fit in with his views on narcissism and on ego-boundaries. Thus, he at first contrasts affects with cathexes. He says, 'bei den Objektinteressen tritt das Ich mit einem libido-besetzen Objekt in Beziehung, bei den Affekten mit einem libido-besetzen Vorgang des Ichs selber' (2, p. 13). But he has to admit that affects also arise in relation to cathexes. His definition of affects is 'Affekte entstehen stets zwischen zwei aufeinander wirkenden Ichgrenzen und sind verschieden je nach der Art der Triebbesetzheit des Ichs an diesen Grenzen' (2, p. 14). But he is obliged to go beyond this in the case of some affects, in particular anxiety, which arise inside the ego. On the whole, affects accommodate themselves more readily to nuclear than to boundary conceptions.

In conclusion, I have only time for the briefest possible reference to the practical side. The dynamics of the psyche are the dynamics of affect. We cannot too often remind ourselves in practice that, in dealing with affects, we are dealing with living energy. Whatever the object with which the analyst may be identified at any given moment, and whatever mechanism or combination of mechanisms may be responsible for the creation of the immediate transference situation, the transference relation is always and throughout an affective relation. I have no intention whatsoever of minimizing the importance of intelligence in analysts but it is vital to remember that the process of analysis is not an intellectual process but an affective one. Analysis cannot proceed unless there is established between analyst and patient that mysterious affective contact which we call 'rapport'. We must

interpret affects intelligently, but we can only do this in so far as we make direct contact with them by 'empathy'. It is only by empathy that we can be certain what the patient is

feeling. To my mind, empathy, true telepathy, is indispensable to sound analysis. The wisdom we need is a combination of intelligent understanding with emotional intuition. Moreover, we have not only to register and interpret affect in impulse-object terms. We have the further task of analysing the affects themselves. Almost all the affects we meet clinically are highly differentiated end-products. In as far as we are able to unravel the tangled skein of a composite affect, we lay bare a fragment of developmental history. We can not only trace history, we can see history in the making. We can watch the process of affect modification going on under our eyes. We may legitimately express the process of cure in structural terms as permanent modification of the super-ego, but, in fact, we produce this modification only in so far as we enable the patient to re-feel the feelings he originally entertained about the objects he has introjected. The problem of super-ego modification is, in practice, the problem of resolving transference anxiety and transference ambivalence. In the progressive libidinization of transference hate we have the story of super-ego modification. We must have logical theory, but we do not work with theory, we work with living feeling. We should do well to check our theory by constant reference to our working knowledge of affects.

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AN UNFINISHED PAPER ON HAMLET: PRINCE OF DENMARK

ELLA M. SHARPE

[INTRODUCTION. This publication consists of extracts from an unfinished paper on Hamlet with which Ella Sharpe intended to continue the series begun with 'From King Lear to The Tempest.'1 The sub-title of the latter paper, 'Some conclusions taken from a study in progress on "The Cyclic Movement in Shakespeare's Plays"' indicates the scope of the project on which she was engaged at the time of her death. Among her papers there is a rough diagram, a 'First Scheme of Cyclic Movement'; this divides the total movement into two phases based on the chronological sequence of the plays. Each phase is distinguished by an alternating tragedy and comedy rhythm and each shows a descent to a nadir of depression followed by an ascent to successful 'Re-instatement of the ideal'.

The first phase runs from Richard III through Titus Andronicus (off-set by The Taming of the Shrew) and Romeo and Juliet (Love's Labour Lost) to the first nadir represented by Richard II and the compensatory Midsummer Night's Dream. The movement then ascends through King John, the Merchant of Venice (annotated as 'key comedy?') and Henry IV (Much Ado About Nothing) to a climax in Henry V.

The second phase includes the descent from this climax through Julius Caesar (As You Like It and Twelfth Night), through Hamlet (Merry Wives of Windsor) and Troilus and Cressida (All's Well That Ends Well) to Measure for Measure, which is queried as the key comedy of this second phase. The curve then plunges down through Othello and King Lear, Anthony and Cleopatra and Macbeth, to the second nadir of Coriolanus and Timon of Athens. It then swings upward once more through Pericles, Cymbeline and The Winter's Tale to The Tempest. These sequences omit some plays and do not accord in every respect with the chronology given in the Encyclopedia Britannica, but the scheme is plainly only a first tentative arrangement which would have been carefully revised. It is summarized because it shows so clearly the 'plan' in mind.

Measure for Measure seems to represent a final unsuccessful effort to stave off the fall into the abyss of depression; below this play the alternation is no longer between tragedy and comedy but between out-turned and in-turned aggression, a rhythm of activity and inactivity. Thus, as between Othello and King Lear, Othello slays Desdemona but King Lear is slain: Anthony kills himself but Macbeth is killed. At the nadir itself Coriolanus is killed and Timon kills himself. The nadir is a nadir of 'No love'. The second phase is distinguished from the first, amongst other things, by its

content of preoccupation with the coming generation. Rivalry with children becomes evident in the descending curve and of the ascending curve 'The new note is the next generation and fulfilment through children'. The Winter's Tale and The Tempest are apotheoses of young love in which rivalry is transcended.

Although this 'First Scheme' remained in embryo 'individual plays have the rhythm of the whole inside them'. The author's conception of the nature of this rhythm and her interpretative approach are conveyed in 'From King Lear to The Tempest'. This essay should have been followed by a paper on Hamlet. At the time of her death, she had already done a great deal of work on this play but, unfortunately, the manuscript is in far too unfinished a condition to be published as it stands. Some themes have only been jotted down and left with a note or two, others have been re-drafted several times; intentions as to title and order have changed in the course of work, etc. The

[Edited, with an Introduction, by MARJORIE BRIERLEY]

(Quotations follow Vision edition, London, 1947)

1This JOURNAL (1946), 27, p. 19.

editor has retained the most recent title and opening passages and tried to salvage as much of the remainder as could be arranged in a more or less logical order. Since there can be no formal conclusion to a work in progress, some more general views on the significance of Shakespearean drama for our understanding of creative art, sublimation and manic-depression have been presented at the end. Much more would have been included in the finished paper but it is hoped that the gist of the author's work has been preserved.]

Extracts from 'Shakespeare's Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark: a study of its organic, emotional and mental unity'.

Freud in the first instance revealed the Œdipus conflict, the central problem dramatized in this play. Ernest Jones, 2 in a masterly and exhaustive study of the manifest content of the play, gave a detailed exposition of it in terms of Freud's major discovery. The present writer has two purposes in this essay. The first is to reveal the organic, emotional and mental unity of the play. The second is to carry a step further the study of the 'cyclic movement' in Shakespearean drama begun in 'From King Lear to The Tempest'.

The starting-point of the present investigation is that of regarding the play, both as a whole and in its parts, as more likely to yield understanding of its creator than is obtainable by concentration on the individual character of Hamlet as identifiable with the poet. While we recognize Hamlet as 'of' Shakespeare, i.e. as created by him, yet the man who was poet, dramatist, actor, manager and successful transactor of business in the Elizabethan era was, in reality, not the character we know as Hamlet in the play. It is the whole play that reveals something of the poet. But it must be remembered that fuller apprehension needs psychological understanding not only of the authentic individual plays but of their relationship to each other in the total sweep and development of Shakespearean drama.

The play as a whole reveals an organic, emotional and mental unity. This assertion it is the writer's purpose to prove by illustration from the text but, in the first place, it is necessary to define these terms. 'Organic' refers fundamentally to the body as a functioning organism. The dramatic structure of the play, i.e. the movement of its sequences to the ultimate climax has a basic fidelity to certain bodily events. This basic fidelity to body-functions is accompanied by fidelity to 'emotional' experiences associated with them. The 'mental' content, the thoughts expressed by the different

characters, is congruent with the experiences of the poet which included these basic bodily and emotional situations.

The play of Hamlet in its unity is like any other product of imaginative genius, the outcome of ordered emotional experiences, but not of emotional experiences alone. It also reveals physical experiences that at one time were inseparable from their concomitant feelings. Situations that were once psycho-physical experiences, i.e. in infancy and childhood, have been welded through symbol and metaphor and psychic processes of 'ordering', into a creation which through words alone conveys the totality of body, emotion and mind. The organic functional basis of the whole play is revealed, for example, in the fact of Hamlet's procrastination. If we disregard for the moment the more familiar Œdipal explanation in relation to the killing of Claudius and consider only the effect of procrastination and its final result, we get both a simple pattern of bodily functioning as such and a basis for Aristotle's recognition of the cathartic function of great tragedy. Procrastination increases tension. Opportunity after opportunity to kill Claudius is presented to Hamlet and allowed to pass. Tension mounts. We are made aware of how great the gathering momentum is by the spasmodic outbursts that occur, e.g. when Hamlet kills Polonius on the spur of the moment, or leaps into Ophelia's grave and fights Laertes. These sudden releases of pent-up energy do not lessen our awareness of mounting tension; on the contrary, they increase the feeling of movement to the inevitable debâcle. In spite of our actual knowledge of the play's end, we are emotionally captured by the physical and emotional integrity of the experience of procrastination. We share it because we too have known it. Such procrastination through emotional causes must come to its predestined end when tension can no longer be endured in body or feeling. The final, complete discharge clears the system, physically and emotionally. This is the bodily pattern of purgation on which Aristotle's theory rests. The catharsis of

2Ernest Jones (1923): Essays in Applied Psycho-Analysis. London: Hogarth Press, p. 1.

feeling we experience at the close of the play is engendered in us because the poet effected such catharsis for himself in the very creation or re-creation of the tragedy. The genius of the poet lies partly in the fact that long-forgotten psycho-physical experiences remain accessible through the framing of symbolic and metaphorical word-bridges; continuity between past and present is unbroken.

The catharsis of emotion effected by tragedy based on the pattern of early experience must have a specific significance in relation to the poet, not merely a general one. It must be understood in its setting of personal relationships and not as an isolated incident. It has object and intent inseparable from emotions felt towards others.

Some enlightenment can be gained by considering the after-effects induced in the spectator of the tragedy of Hamlet. Catharsis yields for many, not only a sense of release and satisfaction, but an exhilaration of spirit. This again is consonant with the sense of well-being which follows bodily purgation. But again it is impossible for an infant or very young child to separate the experience of bodily well-being following purgation from a correlated situation of emotional satisfaction. We are not left mourning Hamlet's death but exalted, triumphing over death as Hamlet has triumphed.

'Good night, sweet prince,
And flights of angels sing thee to thy rest!'
(Act V, Sc. II.)

There is never any indication that the death of Claudius should transport him to bliss. We accept the inference that Hamlet goes to heaven, the others to outer darkness. Ophelia, it is prophesied by Laertes, will become a 'ministering angel' (Act V, Sc. I). As in any old morality play, the good purged ones go to heaven, the wicked are left to lament their sins. Hence we do not mourn the death of the 'sweet prince' but are lifted with him to the kingdom of redeemed souls. Unconsciously, we understand the poet, if we have had experiences resembling his.

Hence, I incline to accept as a basic dynamic psycho-physical situation of the infant poet-to-be, one in which he was furiously angry and furiously evacuated his bowels. Such experiences are common to all babies in emotional stress; the specificity of this is to be sought in indications that for this particular baby, the reaction achieved its desired end. The 'ministering angel', his mother, did not fail him. After purgation came cleansing and, after cleansing, restoration to the place of bliss, to heaven. That restoration may well have achieved the mother's separation from the father, the probable object of the original rage. Hamlet goes to heaven and angels minister to him. The hated parent figures, Claudius, and Gertrude who is in love with him, are dead: they exist no longer.

It will be apparent that this original dynamic situation is not reached until the end of the tragedy. An infant's emotional and bodily discharge is immediate and spontaneous and procrastination plays no part in it. The ability to procrastinate which is so distinctive of the play as a whole, is the memorial to a later emotional situation which resulted, not in return to heaven, but in dethronement and banishment.

A young child who has acquired sphincter control may revert to incontinence under emotional stress, e.g. in reaction to his mother's pregnancy or the birth of another child. He may also express resentment and hostility by disobedience, i.e. by failure to do what he knows he should at the time and place desired by the parents. In other words, a child may procrastinate by withholding his bowel-contents until evacuation can no longer be prevented and a 'catastrophe' occurs. Five children were born to Mary Shakespeare between William's third and sixteenth years and it is my impression that Hamlet's behaviour embodies the three-year-old's intense reactions to the first of these pregnancies and births. If Hamlet represents the rebellious vengeful child, Fortinbras represents the good docile child who foregoes his desire for revenge. It is therefore important when assessing the play from the angle of the poet's psychology, rather than of Hamlet's, to remember that in reality Shakespeare acted much more in manhood like the businesslike Fortinbras, clearing the stage of corpses for decent burial after the orgy of destruction which caused them to cover the ground because of Hamlet's long procrastination (the sudden mess after long 'impious' obstinacy). Fortinbras is in the background waiting to emerge when Hamlet's 'fit' is over. 'Fit' is the right word. It is common parlance, a 'fit of temper', a 'fit of rage', a 'bad mood'. No one should know this better than Gertrude, Hamlet's mother. Has not the poet voiced in her words his memories of his own mother?

'And thus awhile the fit will work on him;
Anon, as patient as the female dove
When that her golden couplets are disclosed,
His silence will sit dropping.' (Act V, Sc. I.)

Inseparable from the implicit bodily functioning discussed in relation to the metaphor implied in 'procrastination', the play reveals a cluster of related images firmly rooted in bodily experience. One set can be grouped under the idea of 'air'. Allied to 'air' are 'noise' and 'smell', both sweet and foul. The Ghost is 'as the air, invulnerable' (Act I, Sc.

I) 'airs from heaven, or blasts from hell' (Act I, Sc. IV) (methinks I scent the morning air') (Act I, Sc. V). Words being made of air can be 'wild and whirling' (Act I, Sc. V). The basic bodily reference in 'Foul crimes' (Act I, Sc. V) and 'noise so rude' (Act III, Sc. IV) is clear. The upward displacement from anus to mouth is obvious in such phrases as 'Unpack my heart with words. And fall a-cursing like a very drab' (Act II, Sc. II) and 'windy suspiration of forced breath' (Act I, Sc. II).

Air, noise and words, when they are implied metaphors for flatus and excreta, become violent, aggressive attackers of the ear: 'Cleave the general ear with horrid speech' (Act II, Sc. II); 'words like daggers enter in my ears' (Act III, Sc. IV).

The stark contrast between wicked and heavenly, foul and wholesome airs, 'contagious blastments' (Act I, Sc. III) and 'airs from heaven' (Act I, Sc. IV) is imaged further in the bird symbolism and is again inseparable from it, for air is the element in which birds fly. There is a relationship between birds and angels because of their winged flight. It is implied that Hamlet becomes an angel and wings his way to Heaven, whereas Claudius is the 'limed' bird, the black evil bird caught in sin. 'My words fly up, my thoughts remain below: Words without thoughts never to Heaven go' (Act III, Sc. IV).

But words are not only fair or foul airs, they are also 'pregnant', e.g. 'pregnant his replies' (Act I, Sc. V). Gertrude identifies Hamlet, when the 'fit' is not on him, with the 'female dove'. Hamlet's disgusted revulsion from earthly sexuality as represented by the relation between Gertrude and Claudius, which the Ghost terms 'damned incest' (Act I, Sc. V) is fully apparent throughout the play, as is its expression in his treatment of Ophelia. 'Get thee to a nunnery; why would'st thou be a breeder of sinners?' (Act III, Sc. I). Evidence of a different attitude towards procreation is less obvious but by no means lacking. The 'dove' is no bird of evil; it is perhaps the commonest Christian symbol of the Holy Spirit. The likening of Hamlet to a 'female dove' suggests identification, not with Gertrude the despised wife of Claudius but with an earlier, more 'heavenly' mother-figure, whose offspring ('golden couplets') are precious. When Hamlet sees Ophelia coming he says 'The fair Ophelia! Nymph, in thy orisons Be all my sins remember'd' and, a little later 'I did love you once' (Act III, Sc. I). Also 'I loved Ophelia: forty thousand brothers could not, with all their quantity of love, Make up my sum' (Act V, Sc. I). The injunction to Polonius is perhaps the most direct expression of this two-fold attitude 'Let her not walk in the sun: conception is a blessing; but as your daughter may conceive, friend, look to 't' (Act II, Sc. II).

Passages such as these make it possible to realize that there comes spontaneously to the poet's consciousness the evidence needed for the postulate that his unconscious mind was engaged upon the problem of contrast between heavenly and earthly procreation. Ernest Jones' essay, 'The Madonna's Conception through the Ear'3 is a scholar's compendium of research upon this theme. The practical confirmation of his arguments are to be found in the play of Hamlet. It only remained for the present writer to recognize that, although Ernest Jones has not utilized his own research in his psycho-analytical interpretation of Hamlet, 2 its application was long overdue. The theme of Immaculate Conception is a running motif throughout the play and recognizable mainly, though not wholly, through the contrast between sexuality and pregnancy that is gross and earthly and that which is divine. The contrast is between the immaculate birth of the only Son of God through the Virgin by the divine breath and the sexual creation by Eve tempted by the snake, in other words by intercourse with an earthly father.

One inference is inevitable. Since it is the relationship between Claudius and Gertrude that is the cause of Hamlet's 'madness', this

3Ernest Jones (1923): Essays in Applied Psycho-Analysis. London: Hogarth Press, p. 261. A Psycho-Analytic Study of Hamlet was first published in 1910, some years before The Conception of the Madonna through the Ear, first published 1914.

is a revival of the poet's reaction to a long forgotten fact. The symbolism reveals the young child's knowledge of his mother's pregnancy. The whole Christos myth is revealed by a series of opposites through which a Christ identification with Hamlet is discernible, Hamlet being himself the only truly begotten son of the Virgin-mother, immaculately conceived through the divine breath, and it is the young Shakespeare's next brother who became the fruit of sin, conceived through the wickedness of carnal relationship between his parents in their degraded sexual character. That the coming child was no Christ-child is to be inferred from the fact that the Ghost fades away on the crowing of the cock. Had it been the Holy Night no ghost would have dared to walk.

'Some say that ever 'gainst the season comes
Wherein our Saviour's birth is celebrated,
The bird of dawning singeth all night long,
And then they say no spirit dare stir abroad,
The nights are wholesome, then no planets
strike,
No fairy takes, nor witch hath power to charm,
So hallow'd, and so gracious is that time.'

(Act I, Sc. II.)

This also gives an interesting clue to the nature of the ghost.

On the Holy Night there arose a Star in the East. No eastern star arises when the ghost walks. There is, however, a star in the sky, and we know it must have travelled from the east for we are told it is a westering star, 'yond same star that's westward from the pole' (Act I, Sc. I) presumably north-north-west. This is no fortuitous poetic embellishment but a strictly accurate statement of psychological fact. Hamlet's 'antic' madness is described by him as 'north-north-west' (Act II, Sc. II). He is the westering star that once rose in the east and here is the identification with Christ. The westering star will follow its declining course, sink and disappear. It will rise again in the east. This is also the cycle in manic-depression. Hamlet dies and goes to Heaven. His death does not occur without the appearance of his successor, Fortinbras. Fortinbras, who has 'some rights of memory in this kingdom' (Act V, Sc. II) deserves more attention than he usually receives. He has the same meaning as Prince Hal who became Henry V, the same meaning as Edgar in King Lear. Young, hotheaded, rebellious Fortinbras is yet obedient to the King's will—

'… he in brief obeys,
Receives rebuke from Norway, and in fine
Makes vow before his uncle never more
To give the assay of arms against your majesty.'

(Act II, Sc. II.)

In the same way Prince Hal effected a revolution in his character and became an ideal king. Hamlet dies but Fortinbras succeeds him. So when the depressive mood passes, the psyche renews itself and begins a fresh cycle. Within the heart of the depression lies the implicit purpose of 'return' (the 'return of the hero') or resurrection. Hamlet's self-reproaches harp on the theme of his procrastination but his assumption of beggary and poverty, his feelings of humiliation and injured innocence, also belong to the Christos imagery, to the 'despised and rejected of men' moving to his predestined end.

The theme of banishment is also relevant here. It appears in many of the poet's plays, history, tragedy and comedy alike. In Hamlet it occurs in a number of different settings, the chief of these being the sending of Hamlet to England by Claudius. There are interesting variations of the theme which illustrate the complicated emotional reactions to the situation of 'leaving home'. Thus Hamlet wants to go back to 'school' (Act I, Sc. II) but is dissuaded by Claudius and Gertrude. Laertes begs leave to go to France. Hamlet refuses to believe his friend Horatio would play 'truant'. Yet Denmark is a 'prison' (Act II, Sc. II) which no one would willingly endure. The poet himself left home for London in his twentieth year. Reluctance to leave home, desire to leave home, being sent from home, taking the initiative and leaving, all reveal the conflict about 'home' and therefore about the parents. At the same time, this theme itself has at its heart the same significance as the star rising in the east, travelling westwards to its eclipse and then appearing again resplendent in the east. The complement to banishment is 'return'. Such a return the poet himself did in fact achieve. Under whatever cloud he may have left Stratford he returned to his native town a rich and famous man.

This theme of banishment and return is allied with another which may be called 'triumphal entry' and 'rejection in defeat'. In the play of Hamlet, the latter's defeat and death is followed by his triumphal entry into heaven. The theme recurs in many plays. Silent crowds watch Richard II 'that fair rose' ride to his

death in the Tower. Hamlet is also a 'rose of the fair state' (Act III, Sc. I). Bolingbroke rides through the acclaiming multitude to his coronation in Westminster—triumphant entry following Richard's rejection and defeat. In the play of Henry IV, the two themes are in close conjunction. Prince Hal on his way to coronation rejects the ingenuous overtures of Falstaff shouting from the crowd. The procession passes on. In Henry V, Falstaff dies, his heart 'fractured and corroborate'. The poet's choice of figures and events is not fortuitous but determined by the profoundest constellations of his psychic life. The unconscious Christos parallel is the triumphal entry into Jerusalem and the 'via dolorosa' to the Cross. Martyrdom links Richard II through Hamlet to Lear 'bound upon a wheel of fire'. Ample evidence of Hamlet's suffering is provided by the soliloquy beginning 'To be or not to be' (Act III, Sc. I).

This study of the play of Hamlet carries a step further the pursuit of the cyclic movement that I believe underlies the phenomenon of Shakespearean drama and inter-relates all the plays which in themselves manifest every facet of cyclic experience. In 'From King Lear to The Tempest' I said that it seemed to me that this cyclic movement I discerned corresponded with the psychological constellation known as manic-depression. The step further I now advance is that, in this poet's work, manic-depression is inseparable from the Christos identification. This has led me to surmise that the revolutionary solution of guilt problems attempted by Christianity is manic-depressive in character. The cyclic movement would certainly appear to be characteristic of manic-depressive efforts to deal with Œdipus problems, not by external revolution but by internal psychic methods. From this point of view, the 'myth' of Christianity might be said to convey the psychology of manic-depression. In regard to Shakespeare himself, it seems to me that the Christos saga was self-originated in the poet. The religious teaching he received, his absorption of the Bible stories, etc., merely confirmed and elaborated the pre-existing basic phantasies but did not engender them.

The Christos theme becomes still clearer if the relations to the father are considered as given in Hamlet in relation to the ghost and Claudius and to Ophelia. Without the Ghost there would be no play of Hamlet and we know quite well the deductions we

should make if we were told by a patient that he had seen a ghost, particularly if he added that on one occasion, when he was angry with his mother, he saw the ghost in her room and the mother did not, but thought her son was suffering from hallucinations. To begin with, we assume the Ghost to be a phantasy of Hamlet's. To learn what the Ghost is we must listen to what the poet makes him say. What manner of Ghost is he, projected in visible form from the mind of Shakespeare through Hamlet? It is especially important to realize this Ghost as projection for it throws an entirely new light on Hamlet's delay in killing Claudius. As projection, the command to kill Claudius comes from the depths of Hamlet's own unconscious mind, and we might add, is only to be entertained seriously when it has been experienced as a command from outside himself, from the idealized father himself. Even then killing Claudius is right only because he has already killed the father. This I maintain is sound psychology, in accordance with all analytical experience: the projection of the unconscious desire to kill the father because of its incompatibility with filial devotion, its embodiment in an objective Ghost who then lays the task of revenge as a duty upon his only son, all form part of a complicated and tortuous mental operation indicative of the extremities to which the psyche is driven by the conflict between filial hate and filial love. Seen in this light Claudius is a genuine father figure, whose uncle disguise is very thin.

Even this splitting of the idealized Ghost-father from the evil uncle-father does not make the task simple; both love and fear of the father still persist as deterrents and are aided by unconscious sympathy with Claudius. Hence the procrastination, the revival of a modified expression of hostility which now acts as a defence against the urge to kill and which protects Claudius until it breaks down at the end of the play.
[There is no reference in the manuscript to the earlier paper 'The Impatience of Hamlet'.4 The focus of the author's interest had moved away from the aspects then emphasized. There is, however, no fundamental contradiction between the earlier and later points of view. Thus, putting the matter in purely instinctual terms for the sake of brevity, it

4This JOURNAL (1929), 10, p. 270.

accords with ordinary analytic expectations that, when the anal defence of procrastination breaks down, the oral impatience should find abrupt expression; it would itself have aided in undermining the defence.]
The idealization of the Ghost-father is evident in many of Hamlet's remarks, e.g.

'So excellent a king, that was to this
Hyperion to a satyr, so loving to my mother,
That he might not beteem the winds of heaven
Visit her face too roughly;' (Act I, Sc. II.)
'This realm dismantled was
Of Jove himself; and now reigns here
A very, very—pacock.' (Act III, Sc. II.)

Interestingly enough, however, the conflict is so deep-seated that traces of rebellion and denigration creep into the conversation with the Ghost himself: 'Whither wilt thou lead me? Speak; I'll go no further', and 'Well said, old mole! Can'st work i' the earth so fast? A worthy pioneer.' Ambivalence is conveyed in the initial doubt as to the Ghost's nature and intentions:

'Be thou a spirit of health, or goblin damn'd,
Bring with thee airs from heaven, or blasts from

hell,
Be thy intents wicked, or charitable,
Thou com'st in such a questionable shape, '
(Act I, Sc. IV.)

That the fundamental source of the father conflict occurred in childhood, that the dramatization arises from that early time is deducible from certain evidences within the play. It is a time when the father was alive and the 'loss' experienced was psychic, not factual. Thus, for example, both in Norway and Denmark, when the Kings died, the succession would surely normally have passed to the eldest sons, to Fortinbras and Hamlet, not to their uncles. Both young men are heirs apparent, of age, and accomplished. We are also told that Hamlet was beloved in Denmark. As reality, the story breaks down; the drama is of childhood. The Hamlet in the play, in his suit of woe, is a young boy 'impious and obstinate', sulking in his mood of depression and harbouring his resentment against his parents for his disillusionment about their character and his dethronement by their second child.

The Ghost is not merely a projection of an idealized father (God the Father). He is the instigator of revenge (he had himself slain the King of Norway), the disembodied voice of the infant Hamlet's own grievances.

'Thus was I sleeping by a brother's hand
Of life, of crown, of queen, at once dispatch'd,
Cut off even in the blossoms of my sin,
Unhousel'd, disappointed, unannel'd,
No reckoning made, but sent to my account
With all my imperfections on my head:'
(Act I, Sc. V.)

He is now 'Doomed for a certain term to walk the night, And for the day confin'd to fast in fires, Till the foul crimes done in my days of nature Are burnt and purged away' (loc. cit.). If repentance is required to end it, it would appear that the term in Purgatory might go on for ever; there is no sign in the Ghost of any chastened spirit. In spite of fasts and fires he nowhere indicates sorrow for his own sins, only anger that he was suddenly cut off in the midst of them and supplanted by another 'a wretch whose natural gifts were poor to those of mine' (loc. cit.). All he desires is vengeance.

Hostility to the father is inseparable from hostility to the brother. Throughout the play, the Cain theme is mixed with the theme of patricide. When it opens King Hamlet has already killed King Fortinbras and Claudius has murdered the King. Hamlet calls the match with Laertes 'this brother's wager' (Act V, Sc. II), etc.

The 'dethroned' ideal father and the 'dethroned' first-born fuse in the Ghost. The suddenness of the banishment indicates the traumatic nature of the unconscious memories dramatized by the poet. It is also Lear's grievance that his Cordelia changed to him, practically in a trice, and preferred a husband to her father. Hamlet finds Denmark a prison and the Ghost is in a prison-house, enduring the forgotten sufferings of the infant-poet, solitary, getting nothing to eat and consumed with rage, while his rival is enjoying that bed out of which I believe he was removed. The Ghost's story is more than an appropriate punishment for sexual fathers and an inverted but nevertheless clear re-statement of the type of infantile phantasy whose ultimate refinement is the Immaculate Conception. It is a masterpiece of condensation and reversal of early experience. The child poet was poisoned in the ear by what he heard, i.e. the parents in a marital embrace. This turned everything sour within him and then he let out his own poison. For this he was promptly banished and so 'Thrift, thrift, Horatio; the funeral

bak'd meats Did coldly furnish forth the marriage tables' (Act I, Sc. II). Thus the grievances of the Ghost are

the grievances of the young Will Shakespeare. The mutual nature of the narcissistic blow is also revealed. If the father-imago is split into the ideal father and the sinning sexual one, the self also suffers that dissociation. The discovery of the father's sexuality is inseparable from discoveries relating to the child himself. Hamlet's self-derogations, e.g. 'O, what a rogue and peasant slave am I', et seq. (Act II, Sc. II) are the complement of his exaltation of the father-ideal. When the royal Ghost in his super-ego eminence returns to the bowels of the earth, he becomes the 'old mole', a poetic dramatization of Freud's theory of the inter-communication of super-ego and id. This identification with the Ghost again reveals the Christos idea, the unity between Son and Heavenly Father.

The narcissistic identification with the ideal father (the unity of Son and Heavenly Father) is more apparent in the story of Fortinbras. It is the double rôles of Hamlet and Fortinbras that reveal the poet. Fortinbras had a father killed by King Hamlet. However, he does not succeed to the throne of Norway but remains in tutelage to an old uncle, harbouring his resentment against King Hamlet's successor, Claudius. Thus Hamlet and Fontinbras are in the same relationship to Claudius. Fortinbras gathers up 'in the skirts of Norway' (Act I, Sc. I) a set of wild unruly youths to make war on Claudius. How like Lear's dangerous knights they sound. It is to repel young Fortinbras that the war-like preparations are made and the close watch kept at the beginning of the play. But when, at Claudius' request, the old uncle rebukes Fortinbras, the latter obediently gives up his plans to avenge his father's death and instead asks only for a quiet and orderly passage through Denmark, on a quest of honour elsewhere. It is only honour he covets. It is this valiant but obedient young man, who has given up his thirst for revenge, who returns in the final scene, when the orgy of death is over, to hear that Hamlet has named him as his successor. Fortinbras, the knight sans peur and sans reproche, ascends without bloodshed to the throne of Denmark, as soon as the wicked king and queen and the revengeful Hamlet have been disposed of by no deed of his. We can follow Hamlet's career with less compunction when we know the unconscious plan. Edgar in King Lear plays the same rôle as Fortinbras in another setting.

We can grasp more of this unconscious plan if we realize that the succession of Fortinbras is not only the re-establishment of the ideally good son, but also the re-establishment of the ideally good father. In the person of his son, the dead Fortinbras inherits the kingdom of the man who slew him. This double reinstatement is even clearer in the case of Edgar, who plays the same rôle as Fortinbras in King Lear. I puzzled long over the stage direction concerning Edgar's bearing a trumpet in front of him, when he finally became king. My reading, furnished me a detail that, for me, is satisfying. When Will Shakespeare, as a boy of five watched his father walk as High Bailiff at the head of a procession of aldermen through Stratford, he saw the silver mace borne on a cushion before him. That father lost his prestige and place of honour; his fortunes dwindled as the boy grew up. His reinstatement was actually accomplished by the poet in later life, when he obtained a coat-of-arms and property which rescued his father from ignominy.

The poignancy of this final triumph of the Fortinbras-Shakespeare over the Hamlet-rôle when the poet was thirty-seven lies in one's realization that the young child's battle is now being fought over again in other and adult circumstances. The poet had made good, he had reinstated his father and acquired a son, through whom the fine landed properties might pass to coming generations. Hamlet was written during the year in which the father died (1601) but it is doubtful whether before or after the actual death.

What cannot be in doubt is that four years previously he saw his only son buried. The profound grief and rebellion incident on this loss may well have re-animated the whole nexus of forgotten childhood 'loss' experience. His 'good' was again taken from him. But, whereas in the child between two and a half and five years old, the control of rage and evacuation is as full of rage and grief as its spontaneous 'spilling', in the man I should imagine the control of both rage and grief had become more effectively libidinized. The supersession of early narcissism by the ego-ideal is suggested in the competence of Fortinbras to take the stage and bring all things to an orderly conclusion. The adult's grief and rage now came to expression through the play of Hamlet, a 'spilling' having the shape and form of a masterpiece of creation.

The poet's own inner struggle to relinquish his hope of fulfilment of his Œdipal wishes and his later hopes for his son finds issue in

dramatization. The wishes themselves become the driving power of endeavour towards an immaterial goal. All culture is the outcome of the substitution of immaterial, symbolical fulfilment for literal fulfilment of unattainable material goals.

> … 'What is a man,
> If his chief good and market of his time
> Be but to sleep and feed? a beast, no more.
> Sure, he that made us with such large discourse,
> Looking before and after, gave us not
> That capability and god-like reason
> To fust in us unused.' (Act IV, Sc. IV.)

The poet transferred his allegiance to the Muses and in that service his reach in fact exceeded his grasp. In the play itself, the reverse process occurs, a movement from thought to action. Hamlet's soliloquies are a part of his defence against action; they belong to the period of procrastination and are finally replaced by action.

Hamlet has not only a masculine counterpart in Fortinbras but a feminine counterpart in Ophelia. Her madness is the equivalent of Hamlet's 'north north-west' madness. Through her he mourns a father lost and rejection by a lover; hatred of the sexual father hides his own disappointed love. Ophelia dies a virgin but her snatches of song express other wishes: 'Let in the maid, that out a maid, Never departed more' (Act IV, Sc. V). Hamlet addresses Polonius as 'Jephthah' (Act II, Sc. II) and it is Jephthah who, in the play rhyme on the Bible story, sacrifices the 'one fair daughter' whom he 'loved passing well' as a thankoffering to God. When Laertes advises Ophelia to be wary of Hamlet's favours, she replies submissively but enjoins him:

> 'Do not as some ungracious pastors do,
> Show me the steep and thorny way to heaven,
> Whiles, like a puff'd and reckless libertine,
> Himself the primrose path of dalliance treads,
> And recks not his own rede.' (Act 1, Sc. III.)

The 'thorny way' is reminiscent of the via dolorosa, the crown of thorns and the Cross. It would seem that the sacrificial Christos identification of Hamlet and of the poet himself, meet in Ophelia.

The feminine aspect of Hamlet is more explicit in Gertrude's description of him as a 'female dove' (quoted Act V, Sc. I) but may nevertheless have been the most closely guarded secret of Hamlet's soul, as also of the poet's. The phrases 'patient as the female dove … his silence will sit drooping' remind us of Viola (on the Elizabethan stage a boy pretending to be a girl who pretends to be a boy!) who 'never told her love … but Sat like patience on a monument, Smiling at grief' (Twelfth Night, Act II, Sc. IV). Hamlet

once complains that he is 'Unpregnant of my cause (Act II, Sc. II). His last words are 'The rest is silence' (Act V, Sc. II). The general atmosphere of the play of Hamlet is certainly one of watching, spying, suspecting, etc., which we know from clinical work to accompany paranoidal tendencies closely associated with repressed homosexuality.

Where Shakespeare himself is concerned, I think we may safely conclude that his bisexuality found expression in an alternating balance of masculine and feminine aims. The factors deciding that outcome I believe are many more than one can appreciate and are inextricably interwoven. If I had to decide what was the final formative influence I should select the unmastered Œdipus conflict. I rank very high the spectacle of his father's downfall, which would represent for the poet's unconscious mind the fulfilment of omnipotent wishes, resulting, in his case, in an access of guilt, remorse and pity and a consequent repression of aggression which made him, in later years, the 'gentle Shakespeare' and the restorer of his father's fortunes.

Fundamental infantile and early childhood conflicts dynamize the play as a whole but this does not mean that later events played no part in its creation. The poet's life experience up to the time of writing would have been available in its entirety. The graveyard scene, for instance, affords a good example of the formative influence of historical events and of their use as a 'cover memory'. The grave is for Ophelia; but the drowning and burial of Ophelia runs true to an incident known to the poet in early adolescence, when the gossip of Stratford was busy with the death of a young woman, Katherine Hamlett, who was found drowned in the Avon. The coroner's verdict was 'not proven' suicide. Hence the curtailment of religious rites at the burial. The poet's accessible memories thus endowed Ophelia with authentic life, but that authenticity covers another forgotten reality. That it was truly forgotten we must conclude from the spontaneous nature of the poet's genius. It is inconceivable that he made a conscious

purposive choice in remembering Katherine Hamlett and forgetting another more near to him. This memory 'covers' the death of his own sister, Anne, who died at the age of seven or eight and for whom his father and mother spent more than their means warranted in a ceremonial funeral. The cost of the hiring of the pall and tolling the bell throughout the day are entered in the church records.

It is to the graveyard scene also that we must look to find the recovery of buried memories aptly dramatized. As the clown digs, Hamlet remembers. 'Alas, poor Yorick! I knew him, Horatio, a fellow of infinite jest, of most excellent fancy: he hath bore me on his back a thousand times, and now how abhorred in my imagination it is! my gorge rises at it. Here hung those lips that I have kissed I know not how oft: where be your gibes now? your gambols, your songs, your flashes of merriment, that were wont to set the table in a roar?' (Act V, Sc. I). In view of what is known of the character of the elder Shakespeare, we can scarcely doubt that these are memories of the real father of the poet's youth. As the bones are thrown up, they bring the living memories, and the man lives again. This is the father, whose fortunes declined as his son's grew, the father whom the poet reinstated and for whom he obtained the coat-of-arms and the title of gentleman. Here, rather than in the Ghost, is the tribute of memory to the real father of childhood and also the witness of Œdipal guilt. Here are the 'remains' of that father who was the envied one, rich, prosperous and merry.

The major national event that occurred during the poet's thirty odd years was the defeat of the Armada (1588). Though it is the coast of Denmark upon which watch and ward is being kept against Norway when the play opens, the poet's power of evoking the atmosphere of nervous expectancy must have drawn on actual experience. The atmosphere in Denmark is true to that prevailing round the southern coasts of England

when the Spanish attack was expected. This verisimilitude is turned to good account for the purposes of the play. Hamlet's later experiences on the ship, the attack by pirates, etc., have the savour of an Elizabethan 'boy's thriller' tale. Again, Hamlet's conversation with the players concerns a problem of his time, the rise to popularity of child-actors, which was a perturbing phenomenon for older members of the profession. The problem appears in Hamlet, however, not because it was a current matter of interest, but because it has a part in the purpose of the play. All such material is used by the poet to further his own creative ends.

In this play the poet chose and reclothed an old theme in his own language, observing in the process the necessary dramatic conventions, and adapting its manifest content to suit the taste of his audience. This Elizabethan audience had a long tradition of morality plays and demanded the punishment of evil, the triumph of virtue, together with wit and jokes to please 'the ears of the groundlings'. But the discipline and organization of experience into a creative unity is achieved by inherent unconscious forces, not by consciousness. The conscious mind is only the final sifting medium, acting in conjunction with the deeper levels of the psyche. Beneath the 'secondary elaboration' of the manifest content there are the same principles at work that give rise to dream formation. A satisfying dream is one in which the psyche has accomplished the reconciliation of incompatibles, the magical fulfilment of a deep-lying forbidden wish without arousal of anxiety. This is usually only contrived by the wish being hidden, by securing a balance between opposing forces and thus ensuring super-ego acquiescence. The mechanisms of symbol formation, personification, reversal, etc., achieve such modifications of unconscious material. Hence a work of creative art, no less than a dream, will at one and the same time contain conflicts that are universal in mankind and an individual way of dealing with the universal problem. That individual way will be the achievement of the particular child, born to particular parents in a specific environment at a certain period in history and further motivated by the imponderables of physical and psychical heredity.

The play of Hamlet is a unity in which the poet communicates his own experiences, disciplined and organized into a pattern of balance and symmetry. As a piece of dramatic art it achieves within that very unity the slow accumulation of emotional tension, its complete discharge and the accompanying satisfaction and exhilaration such release affords. Representational art depends for its perfection upon its faithfulness in recreating for the beholder the phenomena of the external world. Functional art depends upon a different order of integrity, upon consonance with psychical reality. Imagination

creates persons and situations which we accept as credible because they 'body forth' psychological verities. One aspect of Shakespeare's genius is shown in the art by which psychical reality is presented as external fact, so that we accept as real events situations that are phantastic. Thus by a hundred small continuous suggestions he builds up in us the credulity with which we accept the incredible Ghost and fail to see or experience the various incongruities we have also accepted. We are bewitched to the extent that the poet's unconscious feelings are valid for us. The greatness of the play, and the full catharsis to which it may conduce, is due to its unconscious veracity and its basic unity of body, thought and feeling.

The 'testimony' or 'message' of Shakespeare to humanity is not to be found in wondering what he meant to teach, preach, or uphold. He created plays because he could do no other and wrote for his own age, little knowing or caring what posterity would think of his work. The 'message' lies in the significance of the plays themselves, their dramatization of psychic conflicts and their attempted solutions. In these plays, if

anywhere, is evidence of man's unconscious power to discipline and unify to creative ends his inner chaos of passion and destructiveness. There are naturally many different ways of achieving similar ends but the only final alternative to war and other forms of man's cruelty to man is the fuller development of his ability to use his destructive passions to constructive ends. These plays indicate the nature of the chaos the poet reduced to order in himself, in and through its dramatization. Here the genius of one man reveals on a colossal scale, in universal terms, the problems of all mankind, and in their revealing, masters them for himself. This is surely a more than sufficient 'message'.

The ego, in sublimation, achieves a way of accomplishing the fulfilment of id wishes. It triumphs over the super-ego decree 'Thou shalt not' by the abandonment of literal disobedience. Its concession takes the form of acceptance of analogy, of substitute fulfilment. In symbolical fulfilment sanctioned by conscience and society, the ego is freed from the literal implementation of incestuous desires and the accompanying burden of guilt. Sin and repentance are not the dynamic powers which initiate and maintain sublimation. The dynamic power is libido, operating through the libidinal wishes frustrated prior to the latency period. In my opinion, the repression of the Œdipal drives tends to endow the component impulses of pre-genital sexuality with something of the creative purpose of genitality. Creation, in its true sense, is inseparable from genital libido. Moreover apprehension of the self, body-mind, as 'me' is not possible until the body as such is co-ordinated as a whole and this co-ordination can scarcely be stabilized before the child can move about freely on its own feet.

The Œdipal climax of infantile sexuality thus corresponds with the attainment of physical co-ordination along with a relatively advanced degree of mental organization. It therefore coincides with the first possibility of co-ordination of the component instincts, and of implicit apprehension of the creation of 'wholes' by sexuality, the objects of desire being the parents, i.e. incest. As a result of the ensuing repression, the component instincts themselves become informed by, or take over, genital purposes. The ego, if it adapts successfully, takes over whatever is available to carry out its thwarted purposes in some alternative way. 'You stopped me from doing this, doing that. I have found a way of doing what I want in spite of your prohibitions.' This is in effect what sublimation is. It is the creation of analogy. That incestuous wishes are ever relinquished, or that the Œdipus complex 'passes' is a delusion. The literal gratification is relinquished but in sublimation, and hence in all culture, gratification is pursued at a different level of being. Many incestuous conflicts are lived out under cover of reality and utility pre-occupations of the ego.

That creative art has as its mainspring the genital aspect of the sexual instinct is for me beyond question, in spite of the fact that pregenital impulses are evident in all such sublimations. My impression is that the surge of thwarted genital impulse and desire at the Œdipal climax, re-animates pre-genital drives and imparts to them something of the creativity which is the specific attribute of genitality. They are not in themselves the stimulus to sublimation but are galvanized to a creative outcome by regression. It seems to me that the conception of a work of art in its total harmonious unity is only possible where a unification of component trends under genital primacy has occurred, even though this may have been maintained only for a very brief period. It may indeed be that the artist himself fails to re-attain full sexual development in maturity but his

work will continue to bear witness to the strongest drive in nature, the impulse to create. This impulse may be foreshadowed in the pregenital impulses and is often expressed in their terms but is nevertheless dynamized by genital libido.

The cyclic movement may therefore be described psycho-analytically as a repetition of the ebb and flow of infantile libidinal development. The upward movement represents the forward thrust of the libido to the attainment of genital primacy after fusion of the partial trends. This is the Œdipal zenith which must inevitably meet with frustration because the objects of desire are incestuous. The Œdipus complex thus forms the apex of cyclic movement and also the point from which declension begins; the libido retreats, along the same path by which it came, back to pre-genital phases (selectively accented according to individual 'fixation'). But, on its return journey, the sexual instinct, having reached though not stabilized its genital co-ordination, now infuses anal and oral activities with the creative purposes implicit in genitality. This is the difference between the initial pathway of development towards genital primacy and the regressive retreat from it. It is the retreat of genital libido, frustrated at the Œdipal stage, that makes possible creative sublimations which are so frequently and evidently shaped by anal and oral and other types of pre-genital symbolism.

The difference between the manic-depressive cycle in so-called normal people and in clinical cases seems to be not merely a matter of degree but of native strength of libido. The 'sick' manic-depressive often comes to a state of physical and psychic immobility in depression. The cyclic movement discernible in Shakespearean drama is an articulated experience throughout. The poet himself never ceased his creative activity for more than a brief year at the most. One possible explanation is such a quantitative endowment of libido as could not be completely exhausted and therefore made creative work possible at all stages of the repetitive cycles. The return of the regressed libido from its recession to oral positions and pre-natal sojourn often shows the exuberance and resilience of childhood: 'There is a tide in the affairs of men, Which taken at the flood, leads on to fortune' (Julius Cœsar, Act IV, Sc. III). Shakespeare, however, was able to create even when his tide was at its lowest ebb. The versatility of his genius is also remarkable. Like the irrepressible Bottom who volunteered for every rôle in Pyramus and Thisbe, he can play all parts, be every character, be the whole world. Apart from his unassailable position in the sphere of Art, it is these two facts which render his work an inexhaustible source of insight into the mind of man. In this respect the play of Hamlet not only holds a key position in the total cycle of Shakespearean drama, but has a vital significance of its own.

SHARPE, R. (

JONES, E. (1948) THE DEATH OF HAMLET'S FATHER. INT. J. PSYCHO-ANAL., 29:174 (IJP)

THE DEATH OF HAMLET'S FATHER

ERNEST JONES

When a poet takes an old theme from which to create a work of art it is always interesting, and often instructive, to note the respects in which he changes elements in the story. Much of what we glean of Shakespeare's personality is derived from such studies, the direct biographical details being so sparse. The difference in the accounts given in Hamlet of the way the King had died from that given in the original story is so striking that it would seem worth while to look closer at the matter.

The most obvious difference is that in the Saxo-Belleforest saga the murder is a public one, with Shakespeare a secret one. We do not know, however, who made this change, since an English play called Hamlet, thought to be written by Kyd, was extant some twelve years before Shakespeare wrote his; and he doubtless used it as well as the

Belleforest version. That play no longer exists except in a much later and much distorted German version, but a Ghost probably appeared in it, and one can hardly imagine any other function for him than to disclose a secret murder. There is reason to suppose that Shakespeare may himself have had a hand in the Kyd play, but at all events he made the best possible use of the alteration.

In the old saga Claudius (there called Feng) draws his sword on his brother the King (Horvendil)1 at a banquet and slays him 'with many wounds'. He explains to the assembled nobles that he has done this to protect his sister-in-law (Geruth) from ill-treatment and imminent peril of her life at the hands of her husband—a pretext evidently a reflection of the infant's sadistic conception of coitus. Incidentally, in the Saxo saga (though not with Belleforest), there had here been no previous adultery with the Queen, so that Feng is the sole villain, and Amleth, unlike Hamlet, unhesitatingly kills him and reigns in his stead as soon as he can overcome the external obstacles. In Hamlet, as is well known, the plot is intensified by the previous incestuous adultery of the Queen, which convulses Hamlet at least as much as his father's murder and results in an animus against women that complicates his previously simple task.

In the Hamlet play, on the other hand, Claudius disclaims all responsibility for his brother's death and spreads a somewhat improbable story of his having been stung to death by a serpent while sleeping in an orchard. How he knew this we are not told, nor why the adder possessed this quite unwonted deadliness. There is much to be said about that 'orchard', but we may assume that it symbolizes the woman in whose arms the king was murdered. The Ghost's version was quite different. According to him, Claudius had found him asleep and poured a juice of hebana into his ears, a still more improbable story from a medical point of view; he further tells us that the poison rapidly spread through his system resulting in 'all his smooth body being barked about most lazar-like with vile and loathsome crust'. Presumably its swift action prevented him from informing anyone of what had befallen him.

The source of this mysterious poison has been traced as follows.2 Shakespeare seems to have taken the name, incidentally misspelling it, from the juice of 'hebon', mentioned in a play of Marlowe's, who himself had added an initial letter to the 'ebon' (ebony) of which the walls of the God of Sleep were composed (Ovid). Shakespeare apparently went on to confound this narcotic with henbane (hyoscyamus), which at that time was believed to cause mortification and turn the body black.3 Two interesting beliefs connecting henbane with the ear are mentioned by Pliny: (1) that it is a remedy for earache, and (2) when poured into the ear it causes mental disorder.

1It was Shakespeare who changed this name to Hamlet, thus emphasizing the identification of son and father.

2See Hy. Bradley, Modern Language Review (1920), 15, 85.

3W. Thislton-Dyer: Shakespeare's England, Vol. I, p. 509.

The coarse Northern butchery is thus replaced by a surreptitious Italianate form of murder, a fact that has led to many inquiries, which do not concern us here, concerning Italian influence on Shakespeare. The identical method is employed in the Play Scene, where a nephew murders his uncle, who was resting after coitus, by dropping poison into his ear and immediately afterwards espouses the widow à la Richard III. Hamlet says he got the Gonzago story from an Italian play, but no such play has yet been traced. But there had been two instances of murder in an unhappy Gonzaga family. In 1538 a famous Duke of Urbino, who was married to a Gonzaga, died under somewhat suspicious circumstances. Poison was suspected, and his barber was believed to have

poured a lotion into his ears on a number of occasions. So the story goes: whether poison thus administered is lethal to anyone with intact tympani is a matter we must leave to the toxicologists. At all events the Duke's son got the unfortunate barber torn in pieces by pincers and then quartered. In the course of this proceeding the barber asserted he had been put on to commit the foul deed by a Luigi4 Gonzaga, a relative of the Duke's by marriage. For political and legal reasons, however, Luigi was never brought to trial.5 Furthermore, in 1592 the Marchese Rudolf von Castiglione got eight bravos to murder his uncle the Marchese Alfonso Gonzaga, a relative of the Duke of Mantua. Rudolf had wished to marry his uncle's daughter and had been refused; he himself was murdered eight months later.

The names used make it evident that Shakespeare was familiar with the story of the earlier Gonzaga murder, as he possibly was with the later one too. The 'poison in the ear' story must have appealed to him, since he not only used it in the Gonzago Play Scene—where it would be appropriate—but also in the account of Hamlet's father's death.

If we translate them into the language of symbolism the Ghost's story is not so dissimilar from that of Claudius. To the unconscious 'poison' signifies any bodily fluid charged with evil intent, while the serpent has played a well-known role ever since the Garden of Eden. The murderous assault had therefore both aggressive and erotic components, and we note that it was Shakespeare who introduced the latter (serpent). Furthermore, that the ear is an unconscious equivalent for anus is a matter for which I have adduced ample evidence elsewhere.6 So we must call Claudius's attack on his brother both a murderous aggression and a homosexual assault.

Why did Shakespeare give this curious turn to a plain story of envious ambition? The theme of homosexuality itself does not surprise us in Shakespeare. In a more or less veiled form a pronounced feminity and a readiness to interchange the sexes are prominent characteristics of his plays, and doubtless of his personality also. I have argued7 that Shakespeare wrote Hamlet as a more or less successful abreaction of the intolerable emotions aroused by the painful situation he depicts in his Sonnets, his betrayal by both his beloved young noble and his mistress. In life he apparently smothered his resentment and became reconciled to both betrayers. Artistically his response was privately to write the Sonnets (in the later publication of which he had no hand) and publicly to compose Hamlet not long afterwards, a play gory enough to satisfy all varieties of revenge.

The episode raises again the vexed question of the relation between active and passive homosexuality. Non-analysts who write on this topic are apt to maintain that they represent two different inborn types, but this assertion gives one an unsatisfied feeling of improbability, and analytic investigation confirms these doubts by demonstrating numerous points of contact between the two attitudes. Certainly Claudius's assault was active enough; sexually it signified turning the victim into a female, i.e. castrating him. Hamlet himself, as Freud8 pointed out long ago, was unconsciously identified with Claudius, which was the reason why he was unable to denounce and kill him. So the younger brother attacking the older is simply a replica of the son-father conflict, and the complicated poisoning story really represents the idea of the son castrating his father. But we must not forget that it is done in an erotic fashion. Now Hamlet's conscious attitude towards his father was a feminine one, as shown by his exaggerated adoration and his adjuring Gertrude to love such a perfect hero instead of his brother. In

4From whom Shakespeare perhaps got the name Lucianus for the murderer in the Play Scene.

5See G. Bullough: 'The Murder of Gonzago', Modern Language Review (1935), 30, 433.
6Essays in Applied Psycho-Analysis (1923), pp. 341–346.
7Ernest Jones: Hamlet and Œdipus, 1949.
8Die Traumdeuting (1900), S. 183.
9Freud: Collected Papers, Vol. II, p. 241.
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Freud's opinion homosexuality takes its origin in narcissism, 9 so that it is always a mirror-love; Hamlet's father would therefore be his own ideal of himself. That is why, in such cases, as with Hamlet, suicide is so close to murder.
My analytic experience, simplified for the present purpose, impels me to the following reconstruction of homosexual development. Together with the narcissism a feminine attitude towards the father presents itself as an attempted solution of the intolerable murderous and castrating impulses aroused by jealousy. These may persist, but when the fear of the self-castration implied gains the upper hand, i.e. when the masculine impulse is strong, the original aggression re-asserts itself—but this time under the erotic guise of active homosexuality.
According to Freud Hamlet was inhibited ultimately by his repressed hatred of his father. We have to add to this the homosexual aspect of his attitude, so that Love and Hate, as so often, both play their part.

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1946) FROM KING LEAR TO THE TEMPEST. INT. J. PSYCHO-ANAL., 27:19 (IJP)

FROM KING LEAR TO THE TEMPEST1

ELLA FREEMAN SHARPE

(Some conclusions taken from a study in progress on The Cyclic Movement in Shakespeare's Plays)

I re-read some months ago Shakespeare's plays King Lear and The Tempest, in that order, without any conscious intention of either linking them together or making any psycho-analytical study. It interested me to find that there was an interval of seven years between the creation of a tragedy in which there is a storm, and The Tempest, the last romantic play which begins with a storm. Might they not have a psychological relationship?
My interest canalized when I subsequently re-read A Short Life of Shakespeare with the Sources, abridged by C. Williams from Sir Edmund Chambers' William Shakespeare: a Study of Facts and Problems. Sir Edmund Chambers says (p. 61): '… the transition from the tragedies to the romances is not an evolution but a revolution. There has been some mental process such as the psychology of religion would call a conversion'.
To that conclusion I finally arrived myself after further study of these two plays, giving to the word 'revolution' first of all the literal translation of 'revolving', i.e. a psychical re-volution experienced by the author and communicated through poetic drama.
I hope to demonstrate this more fully from the texts in a completed study of the plays. I postulate that The Tempest is the psychological sequence of King Lear and that both plays are linked together in a cycle of inner experiences, a cycle which seems characteristic of creative artists.
The selected plays have the common factor of 'storm'. King Lear is the author's most massive achievement in tragedy, while The Tempest is the last romantic comedy.

My argument runs: King Lear stands on a bank that runs steeply down to the Slough of Despond. The 'storm' represents the rage before the onset of depression. In Timon of Athens the hero commits suicide. This is the nadir of the revolutionary cycle. Prospero in The Tempest stands on the hither bank representing the re-emergence of the psyche after depression, the climb to the zenith again, and readjustment to reality. This is the revolutionary cycle. I hope to indicate in the more detailed study of the texts of these two plays the main repetitive cyclic movements discernible in the development of the poet's dramatic work. Because of the common factor of 'storm' in King Lear and The Tempest it is possible to consider the last of the cyclic movements as a segregated unit, but to comprehend the sweep of dramatic development one cannot arbitrarily divide the last cycle from preceding ones though the high-water mark of genius was reached in the last 'revolution'.

The Tempest shows this poet's way of attaining a solution of, or respite from, inner conflict. It is a psychical solution achieved by many personalities of the manic-depressive type to which what we call 'genius' often belongs. A 'solution' of conflict is reached again during longer or shorter intervals with infinite degrees of stress, for it is a 'revolutionary' solution, not 'resolution' of conflict through further psychical evolution.

There has been little attempt in Shakespearean criticism of the past, even the psycho-analytical, to consider the 'characters' in the plays as creations by projection from the poet, nor to investigate psychological problems inherent in the dramatizations of a man of genius. Modern critics, notably S. L. Bethell, M.A. (Shakespeare and Dramatic Tradition) and John Palmer (Political Characters of Shakespeare) have departed memorably from the Victorian viewpoint. To them I am greatly indebted. Bethell's approach is indicated in such statements as 'Modern writers are in no danger of confusing Shakespeare's characters with real persons', and 'His characters are not merely personifications but on the other hand they are not precisely like real people'. He also says, 'The verse must be understood for a proper appreciation of the action'.

Modern Shakespearean criticism has stepped ahead in certain directions, not only of Victorian tradition but of Victorian psycho-analytical viewpoints, for the latter also concentrated attention on 'characters' as if they were 'persons'.

Lacking there may be the specific application of psycho-analytical principles in such criticism, or even it may betray a repugnance to such application, nevertheless in its range and comprehension of the essential unity of the Shakespearean phenomenon, our psycho-analytical studies in comparison belong to the laboratory and remain unconnected

1Read before the British Psycho-Analytical Society, February 6, 1946.

with the vital source from which the plays came, namely, Shakespeare himself.

I reflected that the author had arranged the dramatic situations, composed the speeches, and shaped the characters by the interplay of conscious, preconscious and unconscious mental operations. He would 'out-top knowledge', as Matthew Arnold says, 'sparing but the cloudy border of his base to the foil'd searching of humanity'. The 'cloudy border' was all the adventure I asked even if I were foiled in the end.

The accredited facts of Shakespeare's life that seem pertinent to the two plays are these. He married at the age of eighteen a woman of twenty-six. Susannah was born six months later. His son Hamnet died at the age of twelve in 1596, when the poet was thirty-four. He was then a successful dramatist. He reinstated his father's prestige, lost through bankruptcy, by purchasing a coat of arms and acquiring property in Stratford-on-Avon.

Queen Elizabeth died in 1603, a fact important both because of what she meant psychologically to great men of her time, and because of the political problems concerning the succession to the throne. Shakespeare had no heir.

In four years, 1604 to 1608, the poet wrote these plays in the following order: Othello, King Lear, Macbeth, Antony and Cleopatra, Coriolanus and Timon of Athens.

Susannah was married in 1607, Lear and Macbeth were written in 1606. Susannah's child was born and the poet's mother died in 1608, the year when Coriolanus and Timon of Athens were written.

In 1610 Shakespeare retired to Stratford at the age of forty-seven. Here he wrote the later romances, the last being The Tempest, seven years after King Lear. In 1613 the Globe Theatre was destroyed by fire. He wrote no play after that event. His younger daughter, Judith, married in February 1616, and he died in April of that same year aged fifty-two. Tradition claims that birth and death occurred on April 23.

I make no forced attempt to fit these facts with the plays. The plays should reveal what connections exist.

Searching for psychological meaning, I concerned myself next with the manifest content of the stories of the plays, leaving the question of the sources of the plots to the academic student, since I believed that the choice of theme and the manipulation of it would be determined from the unconscious mind of the dramatist.

There are storms in both plays. The central figure in each is a man of mature years. King Lear has three daughters, Prospero one. This central figure is not associated with carnal desire. Carnal desire only concerns Gloucester, Goneril, Regan and Edmund in King Lear, while the earthy elements are associated with Caliban and the mariners in The Tempest. There is one reference in each play to the actual mother of the daughters.

King Lear, at the beginning of the play, plans to retire from the duties of kingship by dividing his kingdom between his daughters and living out his old age with each in turn.

At the beginning of The Tempest we are told that Prospero at the time when Miranda was born was a recluse. He had put his kingdom under the authority of his brother, retaining title and nominal rights only. The brother used the opportunity to plot against him, set him adrift with Miranda on a raft from which he and his baby daughter were safely landed on the Magic Island to live isolated from the world till Miranda was twelve.

The urge to 'retire' from life, to dispossess the self (though retaining title and nominal rights) is thus a theme common to both plays. Plots for dispossessing others are also common—Edmund against his brother and father in King Lear, Antonio against Prospero in The Tempest, and Caliban charges Prospero with the same crime.

'Ingratitude' is the cry of Lear, Gloucester and Prospero. Caliban and Prospero mutually charge each other of ingratitude. Revenge dominates the play of King Lear, forgiveness and reconciliation The Tempest. The two plays radiate round the polarities of death and life, death in King Lear, life in The Tempest. This latter play abounds in 'saving' imagery. Prospero and Miranda are saved, so are Prospero's enemies. Psychical renewal is manifested in Prospero's forgiveness of his enemies and in his return to take up the duties of his kingdom again.

I considered next Lear and Prospero. It seemed natural enough that an old man of over eighty years should want to give up office when his powers were waning, natural enough he hoped to set his rest on Cordelia's nursing. But Prospero retired at the height of his powers, and after twelve years on the island was not too old to return to rule his dukedom.

I looked at the poet, aged forty-four, a man at the height of his power and prestige, a wife eight years older than he, his daughters of marriageable age, no heir.

From these considerations came my first conviction that through a literally old man, of over eighty years, Shakespeare dramatized an old conflict, a conflict not of age but of childhood and infancy re-activated in the poet's maturity. The second conviction followed. The storm that rages through the greater part of Acts III and IV in King Lear is an imaginative suggestion of an actual storm representing the psychical one raging in the mind of the poet to which he gave dramatic expression through King Lear.3, Might it not be possible to find ultimately the indications of

3Caroline Spurgeon's Shakespearean Imagery confirms this prevalent image in King Lear.

4S. L. Bethell: Shakespeare and the Popular Dramatic Tradition, p. 99: 'The metaphysical problems of the tragedies must, from the first, have presented themselves to Shakespeare in terms of concrete experience.'

childhood experiences in which emotional and physical stress were once a unity? Psychical stress throughout this play is inseparable from bodily imagery of extreme tension, such as stretching, cracking and bursting open3, 4 (cf. Sharpe, 1940).

I considered next the different characters in the play, heard their words, and followed their actions before considering in detail their interactions in the plot. I found some of them to be as designated, 'characters' and not persons, least of all the complexity we call 'personalities'. Not one is given in the 'round', though Gloucester and Lear are not mouthipeces of particular qualities, as Goneril, Regan and Edmund are. I decided that certain 'characters' were personifications of disparate impulses. King Lear is in the 'morality' tradition, not in a modern stage idiom. Goneril and Regan are personifications of lust and cruelty, Edmund and Cornwall are their counterparts. Cordelia emerges finally as a tender maternal image, while Miranda is a poet's vision, the romantic ideal with whom the romantic prince is to live happily ever after. The marriage is not consummated in the play.

The poet himself is the complex personality, neither white nor black but full of colour, the psychical 'whole' from whom proceeded these projected manifestations of vice and virtue which within the heart of man wage continual battle. Light refracted through a prism reveals the separate colours which when fused are a unity. The poet Shakespeare, through the prism of dramatic art refracted the many aspects of human nature that are fused in personality.

In King Lear I found revealed a child's massive feelings and phantasies, evoked by conflict of emotions associated with actual traumatic events in childhood. The poet in childhood did not express himself as King Lear does, but he felt as King Lear feels. The poet in maturity re-experienced with all their original massive power the genuine emotions of childhood. Psychically he regressed to the loves and hates of early childhood. The mature poet had an instrument of which he was a master, a vocabulary, and out of it, in a renewed furnace of psychical suffering, he used or minted words and metaphors that are the genuine explicit vehicles for these feelings. They are not poetic clichés. At the end of the play the poet gives Lear a fourfold 'Howl', by which the child once expressed what was then inexpressible in language. The play is the fourfold 'howl' put into words.

In spite of all analytical experience it came as a surprise to realize suddenly that the play of King Lear could not be understood in its depth if thought of as a drama developing in a progressive time sequence, nor if one considered only the 'manifest' content as of chief importance. In practical analysis progression is also retrogression and the beginning of an analysis is finally comprehensible from revelations communicated during its course.

In this way I gathered 'latent' meanings underlying the 'manifest' ones. The climax of the play I found to be a metaphorical representation very like a key dream in a specific phase of analysis. I realized that three-hundred years after the creation of this play, even for a partial understanding—which is all one dare presume to attain—one needs an inner conviction of psycho-analytical facts and the methods of ascertaining them.

Every dream mechanism is in this play. On the basis of personification, symbolism and dramatization, phantasy can be linked with emotions aroused by certain definite reality childhood situations. I found that what was explicit was often not as important psychically as the implicit, and from that fact came a realization of the main unconscious conflict revealed in the play. I discovered that nothing in the play but has its flawless, unconscious determination. The dramatic structure of the play itself is determined unconsciously by the exigencies of the unconscious drama, outer shape and inner motifs are fused. Exits, entrances, choice of places, times, numbers, stage directions, stage properties, manners of death, are dictated from the unconscious mind. It is this fact that makes a modern critic say of this play, 'It is foreordained'. Affectless remarks and undramatic situations often held the key to dramatic ones.

I found finally four criteria by which to check my individual interpretations:—

1. I must assess the import of the whole play from start to finish, not from dramatic episodes only. This followed the realization that the tragedy of King Lear begins with King Lear's entry. It finishes with his death. The beginning of the play, like the end, is forgotten in the drama. Both are short, and both are of vital importance for understanding the actual tragedy.
2. The assessment must bear a relationship to the poet in his maturity.
3. The temptation to think of the characters as persons speaking their own speeches, acting on their own volition had to be resisted all the time. This was the main discipline. Exactly the same discipline is needed in practical analysis when the patient conveys his own unconscious thoughts and feelings through reported speech and reported actions of other people. Because of constant slackening of this discipline I found that certain interpretations were changed even on a fifty or sixth reading, while others were satisfactory at the outset. There may yet be need of revision.
4. Dramatic sequences of events are psychologically

determined and 'meaning' must be inferred from their relationship.

Here is but one example of several discoveries of dominating unconscious motifs revealed in the dramatic structure, conveying meaning before words make this meaning articulate. E.g. there is in the play a repeated theme of sport and sound, or, conversely, absence of sound. In the first scene Gloucester tells Kent that his son Edmund was 'illegitimate', i.e. 'younger', for we are told later by Edmund himself that he is some twelve or fourteen moonshines 'lag of a brother'. 'Lag' means 'younger' not illegitimate. It is the author who has made the younger son into an illegitimate one.

In a matter of fact manner Gloucester says, 'Yet was his mother fair and there was good sport at his making.' The idea of 'sport' here conveys fun and enjoyment in intercourse and procreation. King Lear enters almost at once to the sound of a sennet, i.e. notes on a trumpet.

'Idea' and 'sound' have no connection here in words, but it is given in the literal, i.e. dramatic sequence. This motif gradually becomes more explicit as the drama unfolds. In Act I, Sc. 3, Lear enters a room in Albany's palace to the sound of hunting horns after a hunting expedition (Lear aged eighty and 'crawling towards death'!). Sport has become the sport of hunting and is associated with the appropriate sound, i.e. fusion of idea with sound. But Lear cannot find anyone to give him his dinner, Goneril is not

there. He says, 'I think the world's asleep', i.e. hunting, noise and silence. (Asleep implies the silence of the night.)

The third phase is in the same Act I, Sc. 4. Lear is in a rage and he bangs his head crying, 'Beat at this gate that let they folly in'. The sounds here are Lear's own raging words as he bangs his head, which he calls a gate. The fourth phase is in Act II, Sc. 4. Lear waits to be admitted to Gloucester's castle where Regan and her husband are staying. He is furious at being kept waiting, and says:

'Bid them come forth and hear me
Or at their chamber-door I'll beat the drum
Till it cry sleep to death.'

Beating at his own head, the 'gate', has now become beating at the chamber door of man and wife. We have good 'sport' first of all equated with sexual intercourse, then follows Lear's hunting to the sound of horns, the banging of his head, then he threatens banging on a chamber door, and we realize that 'hunting' has now the significance of 'hunting for' the parents. Lear later in the play is on the heath while the storm rages. He says, 'Let the gods that keep this dreadful pudder o'er our heads find out their enemies now.' 'Pudder o'er our heads' is now the noise, and it is the 'Gods" noise and they who will in turn hunt out their enemies.

A 'hunt' begins for Lear. Cordelia reappears. Her anxiety is assuaged when Lear is found. Edgar is on the heath too. He is being 'hunted' to death because he is charged with conspiring against his father's life. The search for him contrasts with the search for Lear. Events happen indoors as well as out.

'As flies to wanton boys are we to the gods
They kill us for their sport.'

Gloucester's eyes are put out. It was Gloucester who said casually in Act I, 'There was good sport'. Nemesis has overtaken him. Thus the motif of 'sport, hunting, sound and silence', with everchanging and enriched significance binds the whole play together into a more comprehensible whole—comprehensible at different levels of mental functioning.

Another 'motif' of the play is 'banishment', but considerations of this theme would lead too far afield for the purposes of this present summary. The 'banishment' theme is common to Shakespeare's histories, comedies and tragedies alike, and is probably the clue to the hidden dynamo in the unconscious realm from whence the 'cyclic' movement is driven. Nor is it possible to separate from this recurrent theme of banishment the quality of suddenness and a dramatic reversal of fortune.

I will give a short summary of my findings, without the detailed references in the fuller study. In this paper there is no attempt to allocate significances, either to every character or every situation in the play. The most notable missing figure is Gloucester, probably the most complicated one of all, and there is complete omission of the dramatization of paranoia and the allied homosexuality, a quite vital element for full understanding and a key to Hamlet's mystery so far not used in the interpretation of the poisoning through the ear of King Hamlet.

I argue that the significance of the whole play of King Lear is implicit in the conversation between the Dukes of Gloucester and Kent when the play opens. Gloucester recalls certain events in his past life, the happy intercourse with his wife and later the birth of his second son.

King Lear enters dramatically at the close of this conversation. His first royal gesture is to send Gloucester from his presence to attend the lords of France and Burgundy. Gloucester leaves the scene with his son Edmund.

This dramatic entry of King Lear, the dismissal of Gloucester and his son Edmund reveals the 'banishment' motif of the play. The 'father' and 'brother' figures of the opening conversation are sent away forthwith.

In this entry of Lear's we pass from Gloucester's adult world to the psychical world of the poet's

unconscious mind. Dramatized subsequently are some of the phantasies begotten by conflicting emotions and wishes evoked by those very events which Gloucester was happy to remember. It is the poet who makes Gloucester remember, happily, it is the poet through Lear and other 'characters' who relives the tumultuous rebellion, the dreads, wild sorrow and despairs of his consciously forgotten childhood. Some of the phantasies associated with reality events of childhood are discernible with clarity but others remain for me blurred and confused.

There are two plots, one focusses interest on Lear and his three daughters, the other on Gloucester and his two sons. The relationship between the two plots was my most difficult problem. My interim resolution and deductions may be debatable.

The three daughters of Lear represent three different 'aspects' of one mother, 'aspects' that accord with the anger felt against her or the longing for her experienced by the child. Each aspect has a discernible connection with the reality mother, but reality fact is interpreted as the child's emotion and anxiety dictate. Child Lear's phantasies are dramatized in the play. That the listener or reader accepts the events of the play as literally true is the proof of their psychical veracity, namely, the veracity of the poet's imagination and feeling.

The poet, through Lear, reveals emotional reactions to the mother of his childhood and, more hidden and more complicated are those experienced towards his father. He tells us through the Fool, 'Thou hast made thy daughters thy mothers'. He tells us there are two fools, Lear and himself. The Fool is the 'sweet fool' and Lear the bitter one, and the Fool tells us that bitterness made Lear give away his kingdom in the first case. The sweet fool pines for Cordelia and disappears before the play is over. In him is dramatized the depressive counterpart of the rage which is expressed through Lear. Both sweet and bitter fools have 'been fooled' and both fool in return, one sweetly the other bitterly. 'I was fooled' is a basic assumption in both King Lear and The Tempest worked out to different issues. It is bitterness, the sweet fool says, that made Lear think of dividing his kingdom. It is bitterness that selects with unerring choice past frustrating experiences with the mother selected and segregated from the loving and tender ones. Putting all theoretical concepts aside and working on first principles as far as I could, I asked myself 'with what motive?' What is the compulsion behind such selection on the basis of hate? Lear himself gives a partial answer: 'I am a man, more sinned against than sinning.' Perhaps that was what he had to prove, because of unconscious sin that he could disclaim because it was unconscious. Grant him his first premise of being entirely fooled and of being entirely wrongly treated and he proves his case. Our hearts are stirred to compassion because unconsciously, if not consciously, Everyman resents 'banishment' from the Garden of Eden of infancy and phantasy to a world of reality.

Lear has to prove that his mother does not love him, indeed that she is malevolent, a kite, a monster of cruelty, as indeed she becomes in the Goneril-Regan form. But 'why' is not as easy to answer. A denial so complete, so compulsive tells of a hidden dynamic—a violent rejection in consciousness is often a violent assertion from the unconscious mind.

The 'Cordelia' aspect of the mother which comes first in the play is not easy of understanding, except very superficially. Only when she reappears towards the end of the play does one begin to fill in the picture presented in outline in the opening act, and I leave further consideration of Cordelia until later.

The 'Goneril' aspect of the mother is the dominating one of the play. In connection with her I recognized certain events in Lear's childhood and the psychical defences that then originated to deal with instinctual impulses. Glimpses of the real father seemed revealed at the differing times of events. The 'Goneril' situation is the determining one and all else in the play connects with it and recedes from it when it is seen as a major trauma of childhood too difficult for psychical mastery and causing a regressive movement to earlier phases of development.

Categorically I have to assert that mother-Goneril's pregnancy is the cause of child Lear's 'storm' in the play. Awareness of her pregnancy caused a lapse from continence to incontinence because of emotions he could not deal with by psychical means alone, i.e. psycho-physical unity in early childhood. In maturity the poet had words to represent the childhood physical accompaniment of emotion. Symbolism had been achieved. Lear's 'Knights' represent at the symbolic 'remove' both the good (obedient) and bad (rebellious) fæces of childhood associated with 'good' and 'bad' feelings. 'Knights' are the dramatic representation of these. Goneril scolds Lear for their 'debosh'd and riotous behaviour' and says they 'menace' her life. Goneril's 'unconscious' informant is the poet. Lear's anger flares because Goneril scolds him for the behaviour of his 'Knights' and threatens drastic measures. The reason for his anger, her pregnancy, is not expressed by the poet until that anger is safeguarded. He makes Goneril's husband Albany appear during the angry scene between Lear and Goneril. Albany (who now represents a father figure) says, 'I am as ignorant as I am guiltless of what has offended you.' The deduction to be made from these words is that ignorance is a state of mind which permits the maintenance of innocence. To this speech Lear replies, 'It may be so, my lord.' The obsessional defence springs into being

before our eyes. Albany in effect says: I know nothing about Goneril's pregnancy and I am not the cause of it, a disclaimer of sexual relationship with his wife. In such manner does the child protest to itself, 'father knows nothing about it, has nothing to do with it'. Lear says, 'It may be so.' Conversely, 'It may not be so.' Lear then follows with an outburst to 'Nature', a subtle remove from the father, 'If thou didst intend to make this creature fruitful, suspend thy purpose.' The obsessional doubt is the defence. 'If thou didst intend', but of course 'nature', i.e. father, may not intend, a doubt that must never be resolved unless the doubter has the benefit. We note that the poet makes Albany afraid of his son, and the son afraid of his father, a fear due to the reciprocal unconscious Œdipus conflict. The obsessional defence gives place to another. Lear is psychically driven into the hysterical 'pretence' of being his mother, the corrupt thing inside her is in him, they are of one flesh, one body.

> 'O! How this mother swells up toward my
> heart.' (Act II, Sc. 4.)

and

> 'But yet thou art my flesh, my blood, my daughter;
> Or rather a disease that's in my flesh
> Which I must needs call mine: thou art a boil,
> A plague sore, an embossed carbuncle,
> In my corrupted blood.' (Act II, Sc. 4.)

This method of psychical retreat from reality is a way of controlling aggression against the real mother external to himself. More important still is the fact that we see here also a retreat from the reality of his masculinity.

Further deductions followed on associative principles. I came to the conclusion that in this play there are evidence of Lear's mother's two pregnancies (i.e. the poet's mother). One occurred when his sphincter control was not stabilized, and he became incontinent, this being dramatized in the Goneril-Lear quarrel concerning his knights. The second pregnancy occurred when the child was accustomed to walk about independently. He ran away from where he was staying for a day, a night, or even longer, I could not determine the period. Neither could I determine whether when his mother's second baby was born child Lear was sent away from home or whether the mother herself had temporarily removed to another place. It was certainly harvest time. He was found exhausted, dirty, and decked with the flowers of late summer. Cordelia commands, 'Search every acre of the highgrown field'. (Act IV, Sc. 4.)

I deduced that child Lear had a long reign of sovereignty in an adoring household which carried out his bidding. He had 'Servile ministers', eager to gratify his whims. I must ask you to accept as a fact that it was not until I had arrived at these conclusions from the internal evidence of the play that I remembered it was possible to apply an acid test concerning their validity. I had not till this moment interested myself in the lives of the poet's parents. Data was available from E. K. Chambers and Joseph Quincy Adams: a son, Gilbert, was born two-and-a-half years after William; a daughter, Joan, when William was five. The deduction that child Lear lapsed from continence to incontinence at the time of his mother's first pregnancy and wandered from home at her second is consonant with the ages of two-and-a-half and five years. The cause of more than the usual devotion of a devoted mother came to light in Joseph Quincy Adam's book. She had lost two babies in earliest infancy before William was born. In the first year of his life the plague swept Stratford-on-Avon. Every seventh inhabitant died. William survived. One has here the basis of the poet's ineradicable belief in the divine right of kings, and the repetition of childhood experiences in Lear's proud reluctance in having to admit in the first act that he is receiving less attention than formerly: 'Doth any here know me? This is not Lear: … Who is it that can tell me who I am?' (Act I, Sc. 4.)

Fortified by actual proof that my deductions of major situations and the age at which they occurred were tenable, I went further on the same psycho-analytic principles of 'association' to conclusions that could not be tested by parish registers.

From internal evidence I came to the conclusion that the decision to stay with each daughter a month in turn is the outcome of the complexity of emotional reactions concerning phantasies arising in childhood from the observations of signs of the mother's menstruation, easy enough to-day, easy enough in the much less hygienic conditions of Tudor England. This awareness of recurrent marks of blood I believe begins in the anal sadistic phase, by which time a child's own experience of blood is associated with being hurt or cut. The urge to be with one daughter and then depart and live with the other is a literal dramatization of obsessional doubt, both with regard to pregnancy and menstruation. Doubt means safety. The mother with child is menaced by the child's aggressive anger as Goneril tells us, the mother without a child menaces him as Regan reveals. (It is the poet who knows, not Goneril or Regan as beings apart from him.)

It is safer to move actually from one place to another—metaphorically this is obsessional doubt. The safe thing is 'not to know', and the repressed and feared knowledge is revealed by doubt of it. That 'blood' was an unconscious preoccupation of the poet is evident from very many plays, of which Macbeth is the outstanding example.

The phantasy constructions about the observed menstruation are clear enough in King Lear. (1) The mother is castrated. (2) The father is castrated. (3) The child is father's castrated penis—e.g. 'The

dark and vicious place where thee he got cost him his eyes' (Act V, Sc. 3). Another phantasy concerning menstruation is that a child has been killed.

An interesting historical event which must have influenced the poet's imagination of violent destruction of children can be deduced from several references in the plays to Herod, e.g.:

It out-herods Herod! (Hamlet, III, 11, 16.)

What a Herod of Jewry is this. (Merry Wives of Windsor, II, 1, 20.)

To whom Herod of Jewry may do homage. (Antony and Cleopatra, I, ii, 28.)

Herod of Jewry was a play enacted at Coventry by the Guild of Shearman and Taylors during Shakespeare's boyhood. Joseph Quincy Adams in his A Life of William Shakespeare, cites from old records that 'Herod of Jewry' was a 'Vainglorious braggart' costumed in astounding fashion, and wearing red gloves (bloody hands?—E.F.S.). One scene depicted the slaughter of the children by Herod's cruel soldiers, when the women fought valiantly with pot-ladles and other 'womanly geare'. The poet refers to it in Henry V (III, 3, 41), 'As did the wives of Jewry at Herod's bloody-hunting slaughter men'. The witnessing of these crude, wild representations at a time when the child was perturbed by the recurrent evidences of blood in his home environment surely confirmed his own phantasies of violent deeds.

One of child Lear's rationalizations concerning not being allowed to stay in his parents' room was their solicitude for him. They did not want him to see the dreadful things that they did, i.e. Edmund is sent out of the room so that he shall not see Gloucester's eyes put out. Gloucester with a bandage over his bleeding eyes looks 'like Goneril with a white beard'—telling us of repressed knowledge of menstruation, bandage, and pubic hair. Regan is explicitly associated with blood and cruelty, and she is the forerunner of Lady Macbeth.

In his ravings Lear reveals repressed childhood observations concerning the female genitals. He declares they are loathsome, disgusting, vicious and dirty. The gods inherit, but to the girdle, 'beneath is all the fiend's' (Act IV, Sc. 6).

I have already referred to the repetition of the theme of impatience before closed doors, banging at the gate, threats to make a terrific noise if not answered at once, 'The world might be asleep!' The parents might be dead! Lear's constant grievance is that doors are bolted against him. This is evidence of night terrors, of frightening phantasies of what was happening between the parents while he was 'bolted' in. In the construction of these phantasies child Lear used his observations of blood, of bandage and 'the vicious place'. One does not doubt that he banged doors that were bolted against him and that he howled till they were opened, for opened they were. 'Nothing almost sees miracles but misery' (Act II, Sc. 2). 'The worst returns to laughter' (Act IV, Sc. 1).

One must be sure the very worst has been reached and then Fortune 'turn thy wheel' (Act II, Sc. 3). Dispossession has a purpose. Cordelia in tears seeks and finds the wandering Lear and comforts him. Misery brings the mother back to the child. Lear compulsively repeats in this day (or day and night) episode at the age of five, earlier forgotten wanderings.

It is clear that in phantasy the child feels he is omnipotently responsible for all the disasters he imagines. His 'servile ministers', the gods, now bad gods, do his bidding. They are now bad because they are not 'good' to him as they used to be. Lear threatens like a child:

'I will have such revenges on you both
That all the world shall—I will do such things
What they are yet I know not, but they shall be
The terrors of the earth.' (Act II, Sc. 4.)

Thunder, lightning, rain are Lear's agents. Goneril, Regan, Cornwall, Gloucester are all killed, and Cordelia is hanged—in the poet's imagination.

Doors are closed against him. These 'closed doors' include the 'folds of favour' withdrawn in infancy, his mother's breasts.

As important as doors bolted against him are doors also left open, and if breasts are closed against him other parts of the body are accessible—at least to father.

'When the rain came to wet me once and the wind to make me chatter, when the thunder would not peace at my bidding (i.e. the pudder of the gods overhead) there I found 'em, there I smelt 'em out. Go to they are not men o' their words: they told me I was everything: 'tis a lie. I'm not ague-proof' (Act IV, Sc. 6). He had been fooled. His fury was expressed in water and fæces, noise and chattering teeth, not because he found the parents destroying each other. That was the bitter phantasy. His rage was caused because he found that he was not 'everything'. 'Yet was his mother fair and there was good sport at (Edmund's) making.' The child's reign of benign omnipotence ended. The disintegration of the world as he had known it began. The sun did not go round the earth. Malignant omnipotence, of being the agent of destruction, responsible for all imagined disasters was preferable to being what inexorable reality was thrusting on him, the fact that he was only a very very little boy. There was one who did 'bestride the narrow world like a Colossus: and we petty men walk under his huge legs' (Julius Cœsar, Act I, Sc. 2). He could not be to his mother what his father could be, nor give her a baby as father could. However good his knights were, fæcal babies do not stand up to reality testing with a real baby.

Only once in the play does Lear himself utter

the words that relate to the poet's deepest, most dramatized conflict:

'It were a delicate strategem to shoe
A troop of horse with felt: I'll put't in proof,
And when I have stol'n upon these sons-in-law,
Then kill, kill, kill, kill, kill, kill.' (Act IV, Sc. 6.)

The three sons-in-law represent three aspects of the father (as three daughters represent three aspects of one mother), the King of France, the fiery Duke of Cornwall and the Duke of Albany. The fiery duke in Lear's imagined revenges is killed, justifiably, of course, because he is cruel, Albany the ignorant and guiltless, remains alive, but the King of France is left alive without Cordelia. The poet needs Gloucester, Kent, Albany, Cornwall, France and Burgundy on whom to ring the changes of the different aspects of the father-figure. He needs Lear, Edmund, Edgar and the Fool to dramatize his own conflict with regard to the different 'feeling' aspects of the father. Glucester is a composite character.

Lear's compulsive hate against his mother with which this play starts and which is undisguised is only explicable when taken in relationship to the subtly disguised feelings to the father. The frustrations of which Lear complains include in their range at different ages, loss of the breast, less and less attention to His Majesty the Baby so long accustomed to occupy the attention of everyone, and the anal deprivations.

There is every evidence of the Goneril-mother's emotional stupidity in dealing with her son's incontinence at the time of her pregnancy.

Nevertheless, these grievances are at the same time a subtle defence used unconsciously to fool his father and to hide from him and himself his knowledge of the father's sexual love for the mother. His own incestuous wishes and thus his hostile rivalry to his father are safeguarded. 'I love her and want her' as a baby, is an escape from the dilemma. Rejection and hate of the mother is a confession of incestuous desire. His mother became his desired sexual object, and hate for his rival father ensued. The 'fooling' aspect of the hate to the mother is given in Act I, when Lear says to the King of France, persuading him to avert his liking from Cordelia:

'I would not from your love make such a stray
To match you where I hate.'

The 'unconscious' fooling in this play has still to be explored more diligently. 'I have been fooled' is explicit. 'I am fooling' implicit.

One most interesting problem was that of correlating the plots of Gloucester and his sons with that of Lear and his daughters. Edgar's unconscious guilt makes him flee to the Heath directly he hears that Glucester believes him to be a parricide. (The reciprocal Œdipus conflict in father and son is here again revealed.) Edgar lives in a hovel, covering himself with filth and flowers, and he assumes madness to preserve his life. (This is a further dramatization of Hamlet's assumption of an 'antic disposition'.) On the Heath is Lear, who also dresses himself in flowers, but his madness is not assumed. Here the two plots unite. I argue that Edgar would not be made by the poet to assume madness as a successful disguise unless he himself had experienced distraught states of mind in early childhood that had ended in an escape from expected wrath. In Lear himself is dramatized the 'mad' states of childhood upon which Edgar's assumption of madness is based.

It was at this point that the immense range and depth of this play dawned more fully. Anthropology and psycho-analytical science seem to find a meeting ground in King Lear. Archaic modes of life and thought, the psycho-physical unity of primitive psychology, so vitally dramatized that it seems a bridge across the immensity of time showing psychical defences that reveal psychological entogenesis repeating phylogenesis.

Primitive man may well have been driven by thunder storms and great rains to seek shelter in caves and holes to wait there until the wrath of the external gods had ceased and then to emerge with relief, perhaps manic joy, to the open once more. Lear defies the storm, becomes himself the storm, but is driven at last to seek shelter in the hovel and the farmhouse. Edgar seeks shelter in mother earth from the wrath of the actual father. He emerges from there, bearing we are told, 'A trumpet before him', to become the hero and possess the kingdom. Little is known of the poet's movements from the time when he disappeared from Stratford after his wife's second pregnancy until his reappearance as an established playwright in London some years later. He returned to Stratford as its leading citizen of renown. This confirmed my interpretation of 'wandering' in childhood at the age of five at the time of his mother's second pregnancy. He left Stratford after his wife's second pregnancy. He joined a theatrical company. At the age of five he saw the first company of actors who performed in Stratford.

The retreat in depression and the re-emergence to life seems at long last the psychological representation—in 'our strange eventful history' as the poet calls it—of our primitive forefathers seeking the actual underground shelter from the wrath of the gods manifested in the elements overhead. The re-emergence from the cave, from darkness to light, becomes a symbol of re-birth.

The hysterical defence mechanism reveals a basic origin in Lear. He becomes the storm, paces about defying it in the effort to control and master it. The range of this

hysterical defence is remarkable. Lear imitates the storm first. His language reveals not only an angry father, but his own rivalry with his father's penis. He will drown 'the steeple

cocks', revealing the anxiety that father will put out his sexual fire because of his wish to put out the god's and to destroy what has been created by it (i.e. the child). This is imitative magic, as is also the identification with the pregnant mother. By spilling his own bodily contents imitative magic will cause her to spill too. Identification with the supposed castrated mother seems also a form of imitative magic as a means of avoiding an expected castration. Obsessional Defences. There are three specific dramatizations in King Lear of removal from place to place. Lear, for purposes of safety, wishes to live first with one daughter and then with the other. He wanders from home. He is found, and he wakes up in a place he does not recognize. Regan and Cornwall move suddenly from one place to another to avoid having to house Lear's Knights:

'If they come to sojourn at my house,
I'll not be there.' (Act II, Sc. 1.)

Actual moving about for safety, danger being associated with decision in making a choice, may be linked phylogenetically with nomadic tribal wandering and as a psychical mechanism appears as obsessional doubt. Obsessionals are characteristically restless, disliking to 'stay put' for very long bodily, as well as mentally being unable to come to decision and choice.

Freud's theory of conversion symptoms is given in dramatic form in The Tempest. Prospero says to the 'instinct' representative, Caliban:

'If thou neglect'st, or dost unwillingly
What I command, I'll rack thee with old cramps,
Fill all thy bones with aches, make thee roar.
For this, be sure, to-night thou shalt have cramps,
Side stitches, that shall pen thy breath up.'
(Act I, Sc. 2.)

We see here the link between stings of inner conscience with external punishment from the actual father to agues and cramps visited on those who flout the elements.

Psychical survival seems patterned upon mechanisms that once were methods adopted to secure psycho-physical continuity in a world of external unknown dangers, a world where food supply had to be hunted and actual enemies fought and killed. Hunting, the first and deepest instinct of self-preservation, pervades this play. Hunting for love fuses with it, and these are the twin impulses driving every physical, artistic and scientific adventure.

The last scene in King Lear is the dramatic symbolization of the 'dispossession' upon which the poet is psychically engaged, the final curtain of which phase falls in Timon of Athens.

Lear enters with the dead Cordelia in his arms and he utters a fourfold 'howl'. This 'howl' dramatizes the identification already revealed made by the child with a 'dog', 'They flattered me like a dog.' It reveals added richness if one knows the customs of the period in which the poet lived. For example, Joseph Quincy Adams writes: 'Anthony Stafford says in his Meditations and Resolutions, written in 1612:

"It is a wonder to see the childish whining we
now-a-days use at the funerals of our friends. If
we could houl them back againe, our lamentations
were to some purpose, but as they are, they are
vaine, and in vain."'

Lear did not howl in vain.
This identification with a dog also signifies 'being treated like a dog' in a derogatory sense, i.e. sent outdoors to perform bodily functioning and whipped because of messing indoors. I take the risk at the moment of believing there were no indoor lavatories at that time. I believe that one of Lear's grievances against his 'daughters' has a basic experience of this kind, being turned out on a stormy night, not being allowed to keep his 'Knights' indoors. A later situation seems to coalesce with the earlier experience. The sweet fool tells Lear 'Truth's a dog must to kennel go when my Lady Brach stands by the fire and stinks.' 'My Lady Branch' refers to a little bitch. Floors were covered by strewn rushes. The fool then adds, 'I for sorrow sung that such a King should play bopeep and go the fools among'. History is here revealed, i.e. the recognition of the different sexes, the little sister condoned for messing, the boy sent outside and an offence for which he was punished. This I base upon Lear's reproof to the sweet Fool for being too 'unlicens'd' in his speech. He says, 'Sirrah, the whip!' and it is then that the fool says 'Truth's a dog, must to kennel go'.
The dog outside howls in its misery and disgrace, and so did the boy, so did he as a small child, so did the baby, before dogs had become identificable. 'Howling' achieved its hoped-for result long before the early boyhood crisis. His master was hot tempered, but loving, like the boy. We are told Lear and Cordelia are sent to 'prison' together. This I believe points to the fact that child Lear was caught, put in a room alone, and punished, or threatened with punishment. Cordelia comforted him. We must remember that the Cordelia-mother is the mother to whom the poet is psychically returning, out of reach of the father's wrath. He is haunted by terror phantasies. Edmund, the vehicle of his patricidal and fratricidal impulses must be killed. That is the only possible fate. Only Edgar has a chance to live, and Edgar is referred to in the play as a 'god-son'. So Lear howls. He appears with the dead Cordelia, the castrated Cordelia, as his related phantasies of Cordelia's hanging reveal to us. She is the symbol of Lear's hysterical identification. 'Upon such sacrifices the gods themselves throw incense', for the 'gods' demand appeasement. Lear howls to

Albany and Kent, calling them 'men of stone'. They are the men on whom he has already proved his power to melt their hearts. Lear says he has no eyes, no tongues, as they have, while he holds the dead Cordelia in his arms. The symbolic surrender to the father is complete in his last request to the father-figure, 'Pray, undo this button.' Kent replies, 'Oh let him pass, he hates him that would upon this rough world stretch him out longer.' Father's heart is melted, he does not hate him. In that button undone, and the symbolic 'passing' is clear enough the psychical homosexual retreat from the Œdipus conflict. It is the way of regression to very early situations where the father will yield to a baby's right to possession of the mother which right he would not give to an older boy. 'Howling' achieved its purpose. One must recognize also that the 'howl' has no note of repentance in it for the 'right' claimed is 'birth-right' and 'baby' right.

'When, in disgrace with fortune and men's eyes,
I all alone beweep my outcast state
And trouble deaf heaven with my bootless cries
And look upon myself and curse my fate,
Wishing me like to one more rich in hope,
Featured like him, like him with friends possess'd,
Desiring this man's art and that man's scope,
With what I most enjoy contented least:
Yet in these thoughts myself almost despising

Haply I think on Thee, —and then my state,
Like to the lark at break of day arising
From sullen earth, sings hymns at heaven's gate;
For thy sweet love remember'd such wealth brings,
That then I scorn to change my place with kings.'

The correlation made here between this particular sonnet written in the poet's early manhood and the play of King Lear written in maturity is but one example of the argument stated at the beginning of the paper. The whole range of the poet's work reveals an ever increasing wealth of orchestration around constantly recurring motifs. The quoted sonnet undoubtedly had at the time of its creation an immediate reference to someone who had profoundly stirred the poet's emotions. That those emotions, so definitely associated with the subject of 'banishment', of being 'outcast', drew from deeply unconscious sources and were once actually experienced in specific childhood situations is the only explanation of this ever-recurring theme. The rise of the sun in the east, its climb to the zenith, its decline and disappearance into the darkness of night, death and re-birth, the return of the hero, sudden conversion and salvation of the soul, are all pertinent to this theme of banishment. Nor can we omit the parable of the Prodigal Son in its profound psychological significance. The genuine poet is an intuitive psychologist.

If this had been a theoretical paper instead of an essay in interpretation, its title would have been 'The Rôle of Regression in Manic-Depression'. The theme of the quoted sonnet is dramatized in detail in the play.

The regression begins with Lear's denigration of Cordelia. She becomes 'little' and of only 'seeming substance'. This is a child's reaction to the realization that his mother is big and he small. He finds in reality that he is hopelessly outrivalled as a lover by the father. The mother's 'value' has gone up, not down. The child's omnipotent estimation of himself suffers the humiliation that reality forces upon him. 'Little seeming substance' is a negation of the reality of the mother's pregnancy, the proof of and result of the parents' sexual life. These are the facts at the genital level of development which for the poet set the 'fixation' point for the psychical regression to an earlier situation at the breast where a child can scorn the king he envies.

The poet in 'Prospero' stands not only on the opposite bank of the Slough of Despond, but at the zenith of the revolutionary cycle. Lear gave up the government of himself, which is the inner meaning of the division of his kingdom. Prospero resumes self-government and returns to his duties in Milan.

Prospero and Lear are alike, and different. In Prospero omnipotence becomes benign. Prospero controls the 'tempest', the 'storm' controls King Lear. Prospero's storm saves, Lear's destroys. Prospero's enemies are allowed to live and repent, Lear's are unforgiven. Prospero shows the same childhood characteristics as Lear. He is impetuous, impatient, demanding full attention and obedience in regal manner, but the control of his imperiousness is easy to recognize, and his benign impulses govern him. There is one probably authentic record of the poet's father, given by both E. K. Chambers and J. Quincy Adams: 'A merry-cheek't old man that said, "Will was a good honest fellow but he durst have crack't a jest with him at any time"'. This reference, and the evidence from King Lear of father figures who are 'hot blooded', 'fiery tempered' and 'lusty' (a recurrent type in the plays as a whole), tells us that the young boy and the mature Prospero made an identification with the father of his early boyhood—before his later decline in prestige and prosperity. Prospero is no saint and no model of serenity in old age. He is human, peccable, alive and very young at heart, full of wonder and magical thinking like a child. The poet himself said: 'The madman, the poet and the

lover are of imagination all compact.' The madman departed with Lear, Prospero remains the poet and the incorrigible lover.
The route to this accomplishment in Prospero is clear in the Prospero-Caliban episodes. Caliban is the symbol of the poet's (Prospero's) infantile sexuality. Prospero deals with him as sternly as the poet's father had dealt with his son. Caliban, surely 'dog' Caliban, is confined to one part of

the island, made to light fires not put them out, made to work for his master. The son may be like his father in all particulars except one, says Freud. Dramatized literally in Caliban is the incest tabu, with more than a hint of the Prometheus legend of the binding to a rock of one who stole the fires of the gods. Caliban reveals more than the dramatization of the incest tabu. He is himself the epitome of stages in evolution. In him is the externalization of internal history, the evolutionary story in the poet's re-volutions. The name 'Caliban' itself is derived from 'cannibal'. Cannibalistic phantasies are implicit in King Lear, for example:

'The barbarous Scythian
Or he that makes his generation messes
to gorge his appetite.'

'If I had thee in Lipsbury fold I would make thee care for me.' Even a non-analytical Shakespearean research student finding no such village as Lipsbury says, 'It is just possible it might mean in or between my teeth.' Oral impatience, oral greed, love greed, are explicit.
The superstitions of the ages even to the present time are explicit in Caliban's proposal to steal his master's magic books and burn them. He is taught by Prospero to 'name' the larger and lesser lights, he is given 'language' to express his purposes. He would have raped Miranda and peopled the island with Calibans, but Prospero prevented it. 'Ungrateful', says Prospero, 'I taught you everything, tried to civilise you. You understand nothing but beating.' Caliban replies stubbornly, 'You took the island from me, it was mine in the first place.' He pleads his mother-right, birth-right, instinct-right; 'Intractable human nature' says Freud. Caliban goes to heel, he wants to live and not to be castrated, but he is unrepentant. He has a 'case' of course. It lies in the fact that mankind has not yet evolved rational methods of dealing with instincts but still relies upon traditional safeguards. The Tempest can be regarded as an allegory of the psychical vicissitudes experienced by the poet in the struggle with instincts, the power and majesty of which sweep through these plays like a natural force, savage but noble.
Prospero is as unrepentant at heart as Caliban. Lear refuses to ask forgiveness. Prospero feels no need. It is his enemies who repent. From the epilogue to The Tempest, the poet's philosophy on this matter seems to be, that equity of exchange is the only possible solution. Parents have as much need to ask forgiveness of their children as children have to ask their parents' forgiveness. 'Forgive us our trespass as we forgive you for yours.' The spirit of this is the opposite of the Mosaic Law, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and implies a comprehension of how equally we are all involved in the travail of man's struggle with primitive passions.
Since the poet made an identification with a very human father, fiery, impatient, virile and loving, and with a loving, if disciplinary, mother, it is easy to see how 'mercy' became for him an 'attribute of God Himself'.
The stimulus for regression in the poet's maturity was the re-activation of the unconscious incest wishes towards his daughters, the buried hostility to the father being transferred to sons-in-law.

The psychical return in depression to the mother for shelter against the wrath of the 'god' is the return to an original birth-right and breast-right. To re-enter the mother as a whole baby, to reemerge from her again, re-born, evades the crucial problem of the Œdipus incestuous desires at the genital level.

Psychical re-birth seems patterned on physical birth. Miranda is symbolically mother and daughter, while Prospero is father and mother also in relationship to Miranda.

In her paper, 'Mourning and its Relation to Manic-Depressive States', Mrs. Klein says, 'In mourning as well as in infantile development, inner security comes about not by a straightforward movement but in waves.' Her use of metaphor here for the mysterious unseen movement of the libido is surely a 'live' one. In The Tempest Prospero returned to normality by actual 'waves'. From Milan he went to the Magic Island on waves, and on waves back again to Milan. It is interesting that E. K. Chambers, in the work to which I have already referred, expresses his opinion that both King Lear and Timon of Athens seem to show symptoms of mental disturbance. He comments, 'But mental disturbance may come in waves.'

Two certain factors among others will determine both the length of time before ebbing tide returns again, and the strength of this return, namely, quantitive libidinal endowment, and the nature, frequency and severity of early traumatic frustrations. What Prospero, through the poet achieved in his re-emergence from depression was an omnipotent mastery of his infantile sexuality. Omnipotent mastery of sexuality by the re-installing of the romantic ideals is not a realistic method of dealing with instinctual impulses. It is a 'revolutionary' method not an 'evolutionary' one. The unsolved problem remains, the ego in alliance with the super-ego against the sexual instinct which means a continual warfare within the psyche.

Shakespeare reveals in the cyclic movement within his plays not a peculiarity of his own inner conflict, but the psychical 'impasse' of mankind seen in the perpetual recurrence of wars and revolutions (cf. Brierley, 1945).

The massive cycle of the tragic plays gives the impression of a renewed attempt to master every phase of development. Such mastery is a function of 'play' itself. It appears to include, not exclude, the body ego experience of birth—the original

5'Wordsworth recovered by falling in love a second time with the Lake Country: Shakespeare by falling in love a second time with Stratford': The Essential Shakespeare, by J. Dover Wilson.

bodily compulsion and exile. The poet did not renounce 'nominal rights', nor his sexual love of his mother. He renounced hope of fulfilment.5 Reluctantly he faced mortality in place of omnipotence. Prospero says that on his return to Milan 'Every third thought shall be of death.'

Had the poet's torrent of energy been harnessed to a moral purpose he might indeed have done what Freud regretted Dovstoevsky did not do, led an apostolic life. Had it been harnessed to an ideology, a political cause, a religion, then instead of the 'vasty fields of France' being imagined in the cock-pit of the Globe Theatre, they might have been actual battlefields of Europe. Instead of taking the stage for a world, he might have taken the world for his stage, as Hitler did. Instead of dramatizing the creatures of his imagination as he did through a functioning symbolism he might have used men of flesh and blood, real knights, as pawns in his personal drama, a bloody instead of a 'bloodless' 'revolution'. He 'outtops our knowledge', perhaps mainly because he won his psychical conquests, his successful career in reality, laid bare his own nature and Everyman's in the service and amusement of an Elizabethan audience.

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2H. Granville Barker in Prefaces to Shakespeare, First Series, arrives at this conclusion.

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THE RELATION OF PERVERSION-FORMATION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF REALITY-SENSE1

EDWARD GLOVER

The terms 'reality', 'reality-sense' and 'reality-testing' are frequently used in psycho-analytic literature, but very seldom defined. As a rule there is no serious objection to this practice, but where the terms are themselves the subject matter of investigation, some preliminary definition seems unavoidable. There is, of course, some risk of begging the question by a too rigid statement: nevertheless, I propose on this occasion to adopt the less usual course of provisionally defining these terms before submitting them to investigation.

Thus

1. Reality-sense is a faculty the existence of which we infer by examing the processes of reality-testing.
2. Efficient reality-testing, for any subject who has passed the age of puberty, is the capacity to retain psychic contact with the objects that promote gratification of instinct, including here both modified and residual infantile impulse.
3. Objectivity is the capacity to assess correctly the relation of instinctual impulse to instinctual object, whether or not the aims of the impulse are, can be or will be gratified.

The nature of reality-sense has so far been investigated from three different points of view. The first of these can be studied in Ferenczi's classical paper on the subject (1). Ferenczi's paper was based on inferences drawn from (a) a behaviouristic study of infants, and (b) knowledge of mental mechanisms observed during the analysis of adults. The conclusions he arrived at are too familiar to require recapitulation, but is it

to be noted that from the systematic point of view his presentation was incomplete in the following respects. With the exception of the 'stage of unconditioned omnipotence', which he related to the 'oral' phase of development, no precise indication was given of the nature or complexity of the wish systems involved. Again, he described a series of relations (mostly reactions), to the object-world, but gave no corresponding description of the nature of the instinctual

1Expanded from a paper delivered before the Twelfth International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Wiesbaden, September 7, 1932.

objects concerned. This omission was partly rectified later by Abraham, who described a developmental series of libidinal objects including a number of part-objects. Since then no systematic correlation has been attempted.

From the point of view of the present investigation it is interesting to note that Ferenczi endeavoured to correlate his stages in reality-sense with adult psycho-pathological phenomena. In particular he associated certain obsessional manifestations with 'magical phases' of ego-development. The theoretical importance of this correlation was quite considerable. It implied a marked disparity between the ego-regression and the libidinal regression in obsessional neuroses. In other words, the ego of the obsessional neurotic reacted as in the very earliest stages of ego-development, while, according to then accepted views, the libidinal fixation of the obsessional neurotic was of a much later (anal-sadistic) type. Moreover, obsessional neuroses were then held to be of comparatively late onset. If the order of reality stages suggested by Ferenczi was accurate, then strictly speaking one ought to have found obsessional neuroses during early childhood. Recently Melanie Klein's views as to the appearance of obsessional characteristics and sometimes of typical obsessional neuroses during early childhood—views which I have been able to confirm not only in several adult cases but during the diagnostic anamnesis of many children—have gone far to confirm Ferenczi's conclusions as to the depth of ego regression Indeed had we paid more attention to his early correlation we might have anticipated these discoveries by several years. Even so the difficulty is by no means overcome because the phase of magical reaction which Ferenczi describes as corresponding to obsessional technique must also exist in the oral and first anal stages when so far as I know obsessional reactions are seldom observed. Ferenczi himself was evidently aware of the discrepancy because he suggested that the obsessional case makes a part-regression to this early ego-phase. I do not regard this view as very plausible. I have never been able to observe any case of striking ego regression which did not activate unconsciously the libidinal system appropriate to the phase of ego development.2

2I have omitted a later paper (2) by Ferenczi in which he emphasizes the importance of ambivalence and of defusion of instinct in bringing about the acceptance of concrete ideas. He suggests also the need for a refusion of instinct to bring about objectivity. Apart from a reference to the oral stage, he does not give any sequence of events of a clinical order.

The second line of investigation is that associated with the name of Federn (3). By means of a careful analysis of subjective as well as reported introspections, in particular, various degrees of depersonalisation, alienation, etc., he has endeavoured to delimit narcissistic ego boundaries. From this we can to some extent deduce the order of object-recognition and assessment. For example, he regards variation of corporeal ego-

feeling as an ascertainable symptom of ego regression, and he attempts some correlation of ego boundaries in transference neuroses, psychoses and dreams. More detailed study of these ego boundaries and regressions would certainly help us to arrive at some idea of the reality systems in vogue at different phases of development The main difficulty appears to be the somewhat rigid concept of narcissism generally accepted by psycho-analysts. This term really begs the question of ego-object boundaries.

The third and most recent approach is that made under the stimulus of Melanie Klein's (4) work on child analysis. Here again we have to deal with inferences, but with inferences drawn from the actual analysis of children just emerging from infancy. Consequently we have the first detailed attempt to describe in concrete terms the stages by which a stable relation to reality is attained, the mental content characteristic of these stages, and the relation of these stages to psychotic and neurotic formations. She emphasizes (a) the importance of early mechanisms of introjection and projection, (b) the importance of anxiety as an instigator of defence, (c) the importance of sadistic impulses in instigating anxiety, and (d) the gradual expansion of reality-sense and of a capacity for objectivity as the result of conflict between an arbitrary Id and an almost equally unrealistic super-ego.

Taking this and other recent work (5) into account, it becomes clear that stages in the development of reality-sense should not be considered solely in terms of impulse or object, but should be related to stages in the mastery of anxiety, in which the rôle of libidinal and destructive impulse is alternating. In the long run, of course, the definition of reality-testing must be in the simplest terms of instincts and their objects. And I have already formulated such a definition. But the demarcation of stages cannot be achieved without an accurate understanding of the earliest phantasy systems and of the mechanisms for dealing with the anxieties these systems arouse. From the adult point of view the 'reality' systems of infants and children are clearly phantastic, and this in turn is a necessary consequence of the type of

mental mechanism predominating during these infantile stages, e.g. introjection, projection, etc.

Secondly, whatever the analysis of children may establish concerning the mental content from which we can infer stages in development of reality-sense, this must have an intelligible relation to the order of perceptual experience of the external world. And this involves not only a greater number of child analyses but an entirely new behaviouristic study of infancy. In particular, a more detailed investigation is needed of the nature, order and 'scatter' of early anxiety formations. And by this term I do not mean those commonly described 'primary infantile phobias' (i.e. fear of the dark, of strangers, or of being alone), to which, owing no doubt to our preoccupation with the antecedents of castration anxiety, our attention hitherto has been rather exclusively directed. Above all, the minor phobias require systematization. These are signalized not so much by glaring anxiety reactions, but by less obtrusive manœuvres, e.g. transitory immobilization, turning away attention, sudden drowsiness, decreased play-activity, or on the other hand by concentration of attention combined with slight restlessness, increased play and so forth. As I have suggested, the earliest displacements of interest from immediate instinctual objects are stimulated by anxiety of whatever sort. Moreover these displacements are governed by symbolism, a process which is in part responsible for their apparently illogical order. Nevertheless there is every reason to believe that the frequency and order of presentation of external perceptions plays a part in the focussing of infantile anxieties as it does in the formation of adult phobias. The more an adult phobia is attached to 'unusual' objects or situations

the more successful it is: e.g. it is more advantageous to suffer from a tiger-phobia in London than in an Indian jungle. What we already know of infantile instinct would lead us to suppose that, symbolic factors apart, the child's interest should radiate out from its own body (in particular oral, glottal, gastric and respiratory zones, in other words, inner things) to food, food organs and appurtenances; from skin (and in particular zonal promontories and invaginations) to its own clothes and the clothes of external objects; from excretory zones, organs and content (again almost exclusively inner things) to excretory paraphernalia and the excretory areas of external objects, ultimately to non-excretory contacts, smells, colours, noises and tastes; from body and clothes in general to cot, bed, room, furniture, curtains, hangings, shadows: from the presence or anchorage of 'instinctual' objects to intermittent absence, disappearance or

3This interest in a new behaviouristic study is not based solely on the need for additional clinical data. It would prepare the ground for a fresh discussion of the old controversy regarding endopsychic and external factors in development or in illness. Modern tendencies in psychoanalysis have swung away from theories of traumatic environmental experiences and it would appear that the recent contributions of child analysts reinforce these conclusions very strongly. In a sense that is true: ideas of traumatic genito-sexual experiences in childhood have been so re-cast that they are now regarded as on occasion exercising a favourable influence on development (Klein) (4). But their place has been taken by others. The significance of enema experiences as representing a violent attack by the real mother on the actual body of the child has now been more adequately valued. But investigation cannot stop here. To the infant with reinforced respiratory erotism and sadism, violent expulsion of breath is a sadistic attack (6). Hence it follows that when its parents or nurses cough or sneeze they are attacking or seducing the child. When the child envelops its enemies with destructive darkness by the simple expedient of shutting its eyes, it is only natural that the drawing of nursery curtains by the mother should be regarded as a counter attack. There is no difficulty in observing that infants do react with fear to such current events. And the same argument can be applied to primal scene hypotheses. If the parents can be thought of as copulating with their breath, the conversation of parents may under certain circumstances be the primal scene. In short, we have not yet solved the problem of endopsychic and external stimuli. We have merely laid ourselves under the obligation to investigate it at an earlier level and in more primitive terms.

detachability of certain 'concrete objects'. Thus experience of the presence or absence of the nipple (breast, body, mother), establishes a criterion of interest in all moving or movable objects coming within sensory range of the child in its cot (clothes, toys, flies, etc.). And not only concrete objects but moving shadows on the wall, beams of sunlight, recurrent noises and smells. In this sense perceptual experiences are classified by instinctual experiences, but the factor of recurrence (familiarity) cannot be ignored. Sporadic stimuli may be, doubtless are, ignored unless their intensity is such as to provoke anxiety. But recurring impressions provide the earliest avenues of displacement. In other words, we may infer that stages in the sense of reality will combine an instinctual order, an apparently illogical but actually symbolic order with a natural perceptual order. The apparently illogical order of infantile interest and interest is, however, not due solely to the fact that repression has converted a primary interest or displacement of interest into a symbolism. All-important as symbolism is, we must not neglect the ignorance, blindness, lack of Einfühlung and unconscious anxiety of the behaviouristic observer, as the result of which an adult order of perceptual interest is

imposed on the natural order of the child, and is erroneously regarded as normal for the child.3

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But pending more precise analytic and behaviouristic investigations of children, we may with advantage review the possibilities of adult research. It has to be admitted that our interest in adult psychopathology has been too specialized and circumscribed. We have been so exclusively concerned with the etiology of individual neuroses and psychoses that the relations of these to other social or sexual abnormalities have been by comparison neglected. It is not difficult to imagine that pathological data could be so arranged as to give a distorted reflection of normal development. But this involves a more detailed and systematic classification than has hitherto been attempted. Some time ago I endeavoured to outline such a classification (7). By including a number of characterological abnormalities it was possible to arrange parallel developmental series in accordance with the predominance respectively of primitive introjection and primitive projection mechanisms. It was also possible to narrow the gulf between the psychoses and the neuroses by the interpolation, not of 'borderline psychoses' but of 'transitional states' such as drug addiction. Thus I would place the average drug addiction as transitional between the paranoias and obsessional character formations, the reason being that in drug addictions the projection mechanisms are more localized and disguised than in the paranoias, yet stronger than in obsessional disorders. In drug addictions the projection mechanisms are focussed (localized) on the noxious drugs: in obsessional states the need for projection is lessened by the existence of restitutive reaction-formations.

But although these correlations were of necessity rather sketchy, one point emerged from a study of transitional formations, such as drug addiction (8). It became clear that by localizing his paranoid systems on the noxious drug, the drug addict is able to preserve his reality-sense from gross psychotic disturbance. Owing to the fact that we have as yet no adequate terminology for describing reality stages, it is difficult to express this more precisely. Borrowing, however, the over-simple and one-sided terminology of libidinal primacies, we can state the position as follows: whereas the paranoiac regresses to an

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oral-anal reality system, the drug addict regresses to the point where the infant is emerging from this oral-anal reality system. In other words, up to this point the external world has represented a combination of a butcher's shop, a public lavatory under shell-fire, and a post-mortem room. And the drug addict converts this into a more reassuring and fascinating chemist's shop, in which, however, the poison cupboard is left unlocked. Having to this extent reduced the paranoid dangers of the immediate world the infant (or addict) gains breathing space in which to look out of the window (assess objective reality).

It was this observation that first directed my attention to the possibility of reconstructing the development of reality-sense from adult psycho-pathological data alone.

In the first place it was obvious that even amongst drug addictions there was an apparent order of complexity, which together with prognostic differences suggested a definite order of regression. If then there was a definite order of regression within the addiction group, presumably the stages in development of reality-sense corresponding to addictions were equally complicated. There can be no doubt about the structural differences in drug habits. Not only are there addictions of a melancholic as well as of a paranoid type, but it is clear from examination of the phantasy material that the different component instincts are responsible for some of the clinical variations. Here was an

awkward obstacle to surmount: for we have been accustomed to regard the infantile component instincts as innate tendencies having no particular order of priority and leading an autonomous existence within the boundaries of primitive narcissism. There seemed no alternative but to consider the possibility of a natural order amongst the component impulses similar to, possibly bound up with, the order of primacy of erotogenic zones.

Study of drug addictions brought out another problem in classification which has also some bearing on the development of reality-sense, viz.: the significance of perversion formations and fetichistic phenomena so commonly accompanying drug habits. Biassed no doubt by Freud's pronouncements on the subject, in particular his view that the neurosis is the negative of the perversion, I had already had difficulty in 'placing' the perversions in a systematic classification of psycho-pathological states. I was inclined at first to arrange the psychoses and neuroses in a single developmental series, and then to interpolate the perversions at different points in the main sequence. Thus

starting with the psychoses, I took drug addictions as a transitional type, introduced thereafter the more primitive polymorphous perversions, continued with the obsessional neuroses, introduced here the fetiches and homosexual perversions, and ended with the hysterias, sexual inhibitions, social inhibitions and social anxieties. But there were many reasons why this order could not be maintained. In particular, experience of the analysis of homosexual perversions, obsessional neuroses and psychotic states showed both direct and indirect evidence of a much more complicated regressional or developmental order. It can frequently be observed that during psychotic crises occurring in some analyses patients develop transitory perversion formations of a standard type. During the analysis of a schizoid state to the superficial layers of which was attached an active homosexual perversion, one of my patients was subjected to a severe heterosexual love trauma. The immediate result was not only a strengthening of schizophrenic features, but a regression of the active homosexual formation first of all to a passive phase and then to a polymorphous excretory ceremonial with both active and passive components, but without any tactile experience. The obvious feature in this regression was the weakening of true object relations in favour of part object relations. In the excretory ceremonial the 'complete object' was never seen, much less touched. Less obvious at first was the fact that these ceremonials acted as a protection against anxieties liable to induce schizophrenic systems. In other words, they assisted in maintaining the patient's reality-sense to some degree. The perversion ceremonials were not constant: they alternated with phases of schizophrenic depression. Between ceremonials he became markedly schizophrenic: his reality-sense suffered extreme diminution.

Some additional details may illustrate this point more clearly. The patient's heterosexual advances included some playful strangling gestures: his standardized form of homosexual interest concentrated mainly on the buttock area and included a very high degree of idealization particularly of the anal ring.4 The sudden regression involved visiting a lavatory (especially after having had a lonely meal)

4I have been greatly impressed by the combined re-assurance and screening function of idealization in this and many other cases. It seems to me to be much less than we have thought, a simple derivative of aim-inhibited impulse exaggerated for purposes of defence. The most urgent forms of idealization (mostly in symbolic form) occur in psychotic types; schizoid, and cyclothymic.

and there carrying out with mixed feelings of anxiety and guilt, yet with fascination and great temporary reassurance a complicated series of active and passive anal exposures through a hole in the partition. Contact was strictly limited to the passing of suggestive notes of invitation through the spyhole; the person in question was never recognized. Moreover the slightest suspicion of aggression broke the spell. For example, to pass pieces of stained or wet toilet paper through the hole or over the partition induced an immediate and terrified flight reaction. This cubicle ceremonial followed a brief phase in which urinary exposures were practised. The urinary ritual was abandoned because of the degree of contact with recognizable objects and the presence of a number of other neutral (potentially suspicious) onlookers in public lavatories.

These are not in themselves uncommon forms of ritual: their special interest lies in the fact that the ceremonial functioned as a regression to a previously unfamiliar or unknown technique. In other cases the more primitive form of ritual is already apparent or practised in a modified way as part of a more advanced homosexual relation with complete objects, but becomes accentuated by regression. One patient divided his homosexual relations into a friendly group with or without genito-anal connection and an extremely erotic group characterized by violent hostile feeling and violent erotic action towards the object who was thought of simply as one or more organs held together by an indifferent mass of connective tissue—the body. When the regression occurred the more advanced homosexual relations disappeared for the time being, and gave place to a complete lavatory ceremonial. In this case also the spyhole system reduced the object's body to the dimensions of a part object. Should a hat or other part of the ordinary external clothing be seen, the spell was immediately broken. This was obviously determined by the symbolism of the clothes, but the patient's rationalization was interesting, viz.: that it was 'too much like a real person'. These cubicle systems bear some resemblance to certain types of masturbation, for example, where the subject visits an archæological museum and has orgasm without erection on contemplating fragments of statuary, the torso, head or hands. In other melancholic and schizoid cases I have frequently noted that relief of depression with corresponding increase of reality-sense was preceded by an uprush of primitive sado-masochistic phantasy. Frequently attempts are made by such patients to sidetrack their phantasies into adult genito-sexual relations. But as a rule the attempts fail or are

unsatisfactory, in which case there is a notable drive towards perversion-formation. This may take an alloerotic or autoerotic form. As an example of the latter I would cite a depressed case who passed through a transitory phase of going to a lavatory where she stripped, defæcated and urinated into the hand basin and played with the substances with a mixed feeling of anxiety and adoration. During this phase the actual depression disappeared. In short, although I have long held that the ordinary systematized homosexual relations constitute a defensive and restitutive system protecting against earlier anxieties as well as against later purely genito-sexual anxieties, I believe that in most cases the link is not direct, that there is a deeper system of perversion (repressed and therefore not featuring directly as a perversion), which corresponds more accurately with the original anxiety system. And this I believe must be uncovered before adequate contact can be made with the repressed anxiety system. From the therapeutic point of view I believe however that this tendency to regression in perversion-formation should not exceed a transitory formation, and if possible should be short circuited by interpretation of repressed perversion phantasies.

Even more curious is the stabilisation of reality relations which can be effected by transitory fetichistic interests. I have previously reported a case (8) in which an

obsessional neurotic passed through a phase of drug addiction, the termination of which was signalized by a transitory paranoid regression. During the recovery from the paranoid phase, a temporary fetich-formation was observed. This evidently functioned as a substitute for the paranoid reaction to reality. Having localized the anxiety on a neutral yet symbolic set of body organs (legs), and having counteracted it by a process of libidinization (fetich-formation), the patient was able to recover reality relations.

Taking these facts into consideration, the problem of relating perversions to psychoses, neuroses and other social and sexual abnormalities is to some extent simplified. It appears likely not only that perversions show an orderly series of differentiations as regards both aim and completeness of object, but that this developmental order runs parallel to the developmental order of psychoses, transitional states, neuroses and social inhibitions. This obviates the necessity of interpolating perversions in any classificatory series of psychoses and neuroses. It is merely necessary to recognize or discover the elements of a parallel series. Following these ideas further it would appear plausible that waves of libidinization and true symptom formation are both exaggerations

of normal modes of overcoming anxiety, having moreover a compensatory or protective interconnection or alternation. The main problem could then be formulated thus: Do perversions form a developmental series reflecting stages of overcoming anxiety of the individual's own body or of external objects by excessive libidinization? And as a corollary do they not only help to preserve reality sense in other departments of the psyche but indicate the order in which reality sense develops?

The arguments in favour of attempted reassurance by excessive libidinization are not very seriously in dispute (see, for example, Freud's (9) remarks on the etiological relation of hate to homosexuality). The arguments against a developmental series are mainly (a) the 'polymorphous' conception of infantile sexuality, (b) the generalization that the neurosis is the negative of the perversion. As regards the first point I have already indicated that the term 'polymorphous' although accurate enough in a general descriptive sense and by comparison with genital impulse is too vague for present-day purposes. We are already more fully informed as to the orderly development of infantile impulse during the first years, and as research on children becomes more precise, the term will become superfluous. As for the second point: this generalization, viz. that the neurosis is the negative of the perversion, is still profoundly true but in a strictly limited sense. It is completely accurate for those perversions and fetiches which run parallel to their appropriate neuroses, e.g. a glove fetich and an antiseptic handwashing mania. But we must now add that certain perversions are the negative of certain psychotic formations and certain others the negative of transitional psychoses. Indeed, following Ferenczi (10) and considering the mixed clinical pictures of psychosis, perversion and neurosis one so frequently observes, it is worth inquiring whether a perversion is not in many cases a symptomatic formation in obverse or the sequela or antecedent of a symptom as the case may be—a prophylactic or a curative device?

A further difficulty lies in the earlier pronouncement of Freud (11) that perversions are not formed directly from component impulses, but that the components in question must first have been refracted through an œdipus phase. So long as this pronouncement referred to a stereotyped œdipus phase occurring between three to five years of age, it practically paralysed etiological differentiation, as witness Fenichel's textbook (12), in which the etiology of perversions is somewhat monotonously described in terms of castration anxiety. But

since Freud (13) has sanctioned a broader use of the term 'œdipus', we are quite free to consider a chronological element in perversion-formation. Even so, the idea of layering in perversion-formation has always been hinted at. Sachs (14) advanced this view on the grounds that repression was a serial process. Rank (15) too considered that the perversion group had different layers of evolution relating to corresponding psychic systems or localities, but he narrowed his generalization by stating that the pervert remains fixated to the stage before the wish for a child, suggesting that the pervert's inhibition is directed specifically against 'generative libido'. Both writers regard the determining factor as libidinal, and the accompanying anxiety as castration anxiety.
The only serious objection to classifying perversions has been made by Fenichel. He does not believe that it is practicable to produce a classification corresponding to that of the neuroses, i.e. in accordance with the depth of regression and the nature of object relations. This, he says, is due to the absence in perversions of the element of distortion which characterized neuroses and renders them amenable to classification. Another reason for his objection has already been hinted at above. If one studies the sections in his book devoted to etiology, one discovers that no matter what the nature of the perversion, the etiological formula suggested by the author never alters. He invariably relates perversion-formation to castration anxiety associated with the classical œdipus situation. Clinically speaking, this is an unsatisfactory state of affairs. I would suggest that difficulties in classification are due rather to the incomplete nature of our researches. In any case clinical differences in perversions are quite as striking as differences in neurotic distortion.
Now it appears to me that Rank was nearer to the solution of the problem when he said that sadism, in so far as it excluded guilt, was the true type of perversion. I would suggest that in the history of sadism or rather the aggressive and destructive impulses we have a sounder guide to the etiology and order of perversion-formation. Libidinal history, it is true, gives the positive and manifest content of the formation. But apart from this the main function of the libidinal contribution is a protective one. Sachs himself pointed out the relation of perversions to phobia formations: but he did not apply this view logically to the whole of infantile history. He restricted himself to castration phobias, neglecting thereby the more primitive infantile phobias. The importance of the study of perversions in relation to reality-sense is that perversions represent periodic attempts

to protect against current introjection and projection anxieties by a process of excessive libidinization. In some cases the libidinization is directed towards those parts of the body (either of subject or of object) which are threatened in the unconscious phantasy system: in others the mechanism of displacement introduces an additional element of defence and disguise. In others again it is the mode of gratification that is libidinized rather than the objects believed to be in danger in the phantasy. In all cases, however, there is some degree of interference with adult genito-sexual function. In other words, perversions assist in preserving the amount of reality-sense already achieved by what in the long run represents a sacrifice of freedom in adult libidinal function, whereas the neuroses often allow a degree of freedom of adult libidinal function at the cost of some inhibition of reality relations, and the psychoses frequently show an apparent freedom of adult libidinal function accompanied by gross disturbances of reality-sense.
To sum up: if we apply the findings of Melanie Klein regarding the early history of infantile sadism and bear in mind what psychoanalysis in general has taught us concerning the mastery of sadism by introjection, projection and other unconscious mechanisms, we are justified in postulating a constantly changing (developmental)

series of anxiety situations which, should they become overcharged, give rise to a phase either of symptom-formation or of perversion-formation. This generalization can then be turned to advantage in the study of reality-sense and its development. As Klein has pointed out, stable reality relations cannot be established so long as primitive anxieties have not been mastered. This is all the more true of the faculty of objectivity. In other words, reality-sense depends upon the emancipation of systems of bodily and environmental perception from excessive interference through projection and introjection mechanisms. And this emancipation occurs in a definite order which I suggest provisionally to be corporeal zones or organs, food, clothes and ejecta, whether belonging to the self or to instinctual objects.

The course of events can be described somewhat as follows: As a result of alternating processes of projection and introjection, brought about by frustration of instinct, the child's relation to what the adult observer would call objective reality, becomes distorted and unreal. Nevertheless the child during this phase has some primitive objective reality of its own. In the first place it has psychic contact not only with objects catering for crude self-preservative instincts, but with

objects actually threatening self-preservation (real external dangers, injury and aggression): secondly, it has contact with that part of reality which does gratify some love needs. This small enclave of infantile objective reality is swamped by the distorted products of fear. One of the primitive cures for this distortion is the process of libidinization. Libidinization cancels or holds in suspense some of the unreal fear systems and it does so by neutralizing sadism. This process is soon reinforced by some form of repression. The result is that the original nucleus of infantile reality can be extricated from the mass of unreal reactions. This libidinizing system is never really abandoned, although its most dramatic effects are to be observed just before repression becomes really massive. Adult objective reality is a bye-product of this process. Once rescued, infantile objective reality expands through the auxiliary devices of displacement and sublimation to the limits of adult necessity or interest. Only when sadism is adequately neutralized can sublimation proceed and, following the track of symbolism, add to our reality contacts. Adult objective reality, self-preservation apart, is not so much something we come to recognize, as an inheritance from infancy, something we maintain possession of and expand after it has passed through screens of fear, libidinization and sublimation. In some respects indeed it is a residue, a view which is in keeping with the fact that in many ways adults are less objective than children. This expanded inheritance or residue functions to a large extent as a guarantee of the absence of fear. It is manifestly limited in accordance with the range of individual interest plus the range of interest of individuals we either love or hate.

When, for whatever cause, some form of infantile anxiety is re-animated or exacerbated in adult life, one of many ways of dealing with this crisis is the reinforcement of primitive libidinization systems. This gives rise to what we call a perversion. I agree with Miss Searl (5) that sublimation can be successful only provided reality is not too highly libidinized, which means in turn, provided the problem of sadism has been solved. Nevertheless this does not contradict the view that a localized excessive libidinization (i.e. a perversion) may, by sacrificing some relations to reality, some sublimations and some adult genital function, preserve a reality relation over a wider area. Perversions help to patch over flaws in the development of reality-sense. For this reason the more primitive perversions are in some respects more compulsive than advanced homosexual perversions. They are more appropriate cures for old anxieties. The drawback of primitive

perversions is that they are nearer to the source of anxiety, i.e. too appropriate. Ordinary homosexuality reassures mainly in respect of complete objects, not of primitive part objects. The apparent gradual increase in the capacity of libido to reassure is to my mind more apparent than real. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say a concern with real love objects, though undoubtedly a great source of reassurance is a less appropriate cure for primitive anxieties than is a primitive love of part objects. Here we have a theoretical justification for the view put forward by Melanie Klein (4) that under favourable circumstances infantile sexual experiences may promote reality development. But we must accept also the conclusion that such experiences, whether of active or passive nature, accidental or sought-after, promote reality development only in so far as they function as infantile perversions.

I have indicated the lines along which adult psycho-pathological material may be investigated in order to discover the stages of development of reality-sense. Apart from this particular interest I believe the attempt is worth making if only to reduce existing confusions regarding the classification of mental disorders. It remains to indicate what are the most profitable lines of research and what are the most serious obstacles to progress. As regards immediate lines of approach, I am to some extent biassed by the accidental circumstance that my own material came within the group of transitional states, perversions and obsessional neuroses. And although I am bound to agree that analytical study of, for example, the stereotypies of schizophrenia, to say nothing of so-called hysterical phobias, will prove invaluable in this connection, I am inclined to believe that a better sense of perspective will be obtained by starting at the point where transitional psychoses, perversions and obsessional neuroses meet. Indeed I have the impression that one of the most profitable approaches to the study of reality-sense lies in the study of fetichism, including here narcissistic fetiches in which parts of the patient's own body or clothes provide sexual gratification. There is in fetichism a degree of localization of interest and stereotyping of displacement which promises to give more exact information of early anxiety systems than does the average ramifying perversion. Freud (16) himself has pointed out that the denial of anxiety effected by fetichism is similar to the psychotic denial of reality. And Lorand (17) has commented on the rapid intellectual development exhibited in one of his cases.

I have used the term narcissistic fetich with reluctance. On the one hand I believe that what we call 'erotic narcissism' is a compound of true autoerotic activities and concealed alloerotic relations with part objects. Again the term masturbation is notoriously unsatisfactory. And the same applies to descriptive terms such as transvestitism. Many of the phenomena I have observed would be regarded descriptively as half-way between transvestitism and masturbation. Yet I hold they are fetichistic in principle, just as many other of the so-called spontaneous sexual activities of childhood are already—in principle—perversions.

Compare, for example, the following two systems observed in one case. The individual in question had a simple piano fetich, that is to say, contact with a piano of a certain type (i.e. with a new and shiny case) induced sexual excitement and orgasm, with or without manual manipulation. Thereafter the same piano gradually lost its stimulating effect. A scratched or faded or worm-eaten piano case was tabu. On the other hand, whenever the patient put on new articles of clothing, in particular when he purchased a new suit, he developed an erection lasting twelve hours at least, and ending sometimes in orgasm. During this period he was in a state of extreme happiness. Another case combined a motor car fetich, which lost effect as soon as the car was splashed with mud

or the upholstery spotted with grease, with masturbatory excitement over his own shoes when they were new and so long as the original shine was preserved intact. In both these cases the apparently autoerotic manifestation corresponded closely to the object-system.

The examples I have given may serve to illustrate one of the many obstacles to research on this subject: viz.: the fact that terms such as 'narcissism', 'auto-erotism', 'component impulse', 'polymorphous perverse', etc., have to some extent outworn their usefulness. They must in time be substituted by terms derived from the study of introjection phenomena. We ought to be able to say exactly what stage in the introjection of part-objects is concealed by any one form of auto-erotism.

A second difficulty is also brought out by the study of fetichism, viz.: the fact that obsessional neuroses are inadequately subdivided or classified. I have already described an obsessional case in which a transitory fetich interest helped to promote convalescence from a paranoid phase. And I have frequently observed that cases of drug addiction develop (during abstinence) transitory obsessional symptoms

rather localized in action. So much so that I have described some of these obsessional reactions as 'negative fetichistic phenomena'. Many localized contamination phobias with or without washingmanias are of this type, and can be observed to alternate with erotic interest in the same parts of the body.

Referring in an earlier paper to the etiology of fetichism I wrote (8): 'perhaps two rough formulations are permissible: (1) that in the transition between paranoidal systems and a normal reaction to reality drug-addiction (and later on fetichism) represent not only continuations of the anxiety system within a contracted range, but the beginnings of an expanding reassurance system. The reassurance is due to contributions from later libidinal stages in infancy which contain a decreasing amount of sadism. (2) That clothing in general is, after food, the next line of defence in overcoming paranoidal reactions to reality. It appears reasonable to suppose that the first paranoid systems of the child attach themselves to food, that these anxieties are modified not only by the appearance of less sadistic impulse but by a determined effort at displacement of anxiety. In this displacement clothes play their part. When subsequently displacement leads to reactions to the clothes of external objects, the foundation of the classical fetich is laid. So that when anxiety is excessive the result is either a typical sexual fetich or the negative form, viz.: a contamination phobia'.

Finally, study of the etiology of fetichism brings out what is perhaps one of the most important immediate obstacles to the understanding of reality development, viz.: the lack of systematized information as to the exact nature of the oral phase of development. The first etiological formulations concerning fetichism singled out phallic, scoptophilic and sadistic factors: later the importance of the imagined phallus of the mother was increasingly emphasized. Still more recently the significance of other elements has been stressed. Freud had himself remarked that the fetich chosen may not necessarily be a common penis symbol, and we now know from the work of Ella Sharpe (18) and others that this is due to the contribution of pregenital elements, e.g. oral sadism. This new orientation follows closely on and is in keeping with Melanie Klein's expansion of the second oral stage to include a genuine phallic Œdipus interest. But the more universal such factors are found to be, the less helpful they are in etiological differentiation. Without making one single analytical observation one might safely assume from behaviouristic data that the first phase

of infantile development must be predominantly oral. Even the existence of a phallic interest during the oral phase might well have been inferred without analysis. The more analysis confirms the importance of these early phallic interests the more urgent it becomes to sub-divide the oral stages and to consider the part played during what we now call the first oral stage by other important erotogenic zones and by component impulses, in particular respiratory, gastric, muscle, anal and urinary erotism. It is not enough to establish the outlines of development in terms of phases. More detailed differentiation is needed before we can provide these etiological formulæ which the existence of clinical variations in mental disorder demands.

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(1959) THE FUNCTION OF DETAILS IN THE INTERPRETATION OF WORKS OF LITERATURE. PSYCHOANAL. Q., 28:1 (PAQ)

THE FUNCTION OF DETAILS IN THE INTERPRETATION OF WORKS OF LITERATURE

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The principle of causality, whatever shape it may have taken in the development of modern science, requires that for every observable fact a corresponding law be established. This principle also applies to psychology. The progress that Freud's work brought into psychology can be measured by the range of facts for which, until then, no regularity had been found, and for which Freud discovered laws. The extension of data subjected to scientific investigation led to intensive scrutiny of minutest details that earlier no one would have thought either worthy of attention or decisive in hypotheses or theories about the mind.

One has but to peruse one of Freud's case histories, such as the 1909 report of an obsessional neurosis,1 to sense this new importance the psychological detail acquired by psychoanalysis. To some, the psychoanalyst's preoccupation with psychological detail appeared downright scurrilous. But this reaction can occur only if one believes that psychology is not a branch of science and therefore does not have to live up to a standard of rigor similar to that which is accepted in other sciences, particularly the experimental. Indeed, in all sciences there is no limit to the subtlety of details that may be the occasion for inquiry and from which far-reaching conclusions are drawn.

The text in which the new standing of psychological detail can best be studied remains Freud's The Interpretation of Dreams. There, the single dream is broken down into its elements, each of which finds its special explanation. The sequence of these elements, their structure and the structure of the whole dream, every facet of the single element and of the complex

This paper, with some slight changes, was originally written as an Appendix to an unpublished manuscript.

1Freud: Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis (1909). Standard Edition, X, pp. 151-318.

whole, is taken into proper consideration and finds comprehensive as well as detailed explanation. As Freud demonstrated, with the change of any of these details the meaning of the whole correspondingly changes. Dream analysis, however, is only one area in which psychoanalysis exhibits its preoccupation with minutiae; another is found in psychoanalytic therapy in which the goal is to find the laws of psychological determinism governing each statement that the patient makes in the course of each psychoanalytic session.

However, with the gradual discovery of what these laws are, a change has occurred in the attitude of many analysts toward the psychological detail. Many now think that the study of the detail is superfluous and are willing to draw far-reaching conclusions even from a superficial or preliminary contact with the patient.2 Parallel to the relative neglect of details, new theories were evolved and thus Freud's theories, which are based on stringent scrutiny of the detail, were changed in adaptation to broad impressions gained from over-all observations.

There is no doubt that anyone who comprehends the basic theoretical edifice of psychoanalysis, and who commands a sufficient combinative facility, can present a plausible theory about a person's psychopathology, even on the basis of scanty information. But such theories do not possess the slightest scientific value. I am reminded of a crude example August Aichhorn liked to present in his lectures. A pubescent boy was in the habit of getting into his mother's bed at nighttime, a habit that might easily be regarded as an expression of œdipal strivings. In this particular instance, however, it turned out that the boy's bed was infested with bedbugs and this was why he took refuge in his mother's bed.3

This example demonstrates the effect of a reality factor in a situation that is usually correlated with a relevant subjective

2See French, Thomas Morton: Planning Psychotherapy. In: Psychoanalytic Therapy. Edited by Franz Alexander and Thomas Morton French. New York: The Ronald Press, 1946, p. 109.

3The extent to which the reality factor was used by the boy as pretext and rationalization is unimportant in this context.

factor. Within the realm of subjective factors too, the psychoanalyst is prone to commit gross errors when he relies on general laws and does not study the minutiae of a patient's free associations. To the grave detriment of psychological determinism, I would say that the majority of contemporary research relies only on life histories, isolated episodes, first interviews, or the manifest contents of dreams without considering the patient's free associations.

The problem that I cursorily present is of decisive importance in most fields of the application of psychoanalysis; particularly in the psychoanalytic inquiry into literary works where the writer's free associations are no longer available. I attempted to show in an unpublished manuscript on Goethe what the poet's free associations might have been by referring to letters, diaries, and events that chanced to occur in his own life or in the lives of others close to him. The absence of a response to events of whose provocative and exciting effect one can be sure (such as the death of a sister or a father) has likewise been treated as relevant psychological fact. Yet if we compare the relevance of details in the investigation of the live clinical situation, usually occurring with a therapeutic need, with that in the analysis of literary works, we discover that their function (or at least the function of some of them) is quite different. In the clinical situation the detail—in most instances—leads us toward the evolvement of explanations or theories which tend to explain the particular clinical problem. If a patient speaks of his obsessive-compulsive symptoms and himself condemns them as irrational, illogical, or inappropriate, the analyst too feels puzzled. With each analytic session new details are gathered that finally permit a satisfactory explanation of what formerly appeared senseless.

In approaching a literary work psychoanalytically, the psychological meaning usually can be deciphered easily. To cite one conspicuous example, anyone who has studied the œdipal conflict in the clinical setting is bound to acknowledge it in Hamlet and to study the particular manifestations that are found in that tragedy.

Conspicuous as the unconscious or latent psychological content of a literary work may be, it does not necessarily inform us about the corresponding psychological processes in the author which, after all, are the psychoanalyst's main interest. A tragedy may be written on an imitative level; it may be the effect of a subjective peripheral factor, the

outgrowth of a whim; or it may have grown out of the author's deepest conflicts and be a signpost of his central, archaic matrix. We may speculate about which personality layer a particular work of art has to be correlated with, but as long as we do not know, for example, that the name of Shakespeare's own son was Hamnet, we have no concrete evidence of the play's personal closeness to the author. This little detail hooks the whole tragedy to the very nub of the poet's existence.

I wish to discuss the following example because I do not know any better one to demonstrate the function of details in the psychological interpretation of a literary work.4

In 1823, the romantic-comic fairy tale, The King of the Alps and the Misanthropist (Der Alpenkönig und der Menschenfeind—Romantisch-komisches Märchen) by Ferdinand Raimund (1790-1836), a Viennese actor, stage director, and author of eight comedies, was performed for the first time. Raimund's work never entered world literature and his fame has remained essentially a local Austrian one. Some measure of his merit may be derived from the fact that when this play was presented in London (in a translation made in 1831 by Lord Stanhope), it played at the Adelphi Theater for three months, and elicited praise from an English critic as the work of perhaps the most original contemporary actor-poet to be brought before the British public.5 Raimund's last comedy, The Spendthrift (Der Verschwender), from time to time still makes its appearance on the German stage.

4I owe thanks to Dr. Ruth S. Eissler for having called my attention to this instance.

5See Fürst, Rudolf: Raimunds Werke. Berlin, Leipzig: Deutsches Verlagshaus Bong, undated, p. lxxiv.

The aforementioned fairy tale deserves interest for its amazingly modern actuality. The argument is as follows. Malchen waits for the return of her lover, an artist who has spent three years in Italy. She goes to meet him in the woods because her father, Rappelkopf ('Crazyhead'), must not know of her infatuation. He is a bookdealer who had been relieved of part of his money by embezzlement. Since then he has become suspicious, unloving, aloof, and brutally torments those about him. He will never consent to his daughter's marriage to an artist. Astralagus, a fairy king of the Alps, takes pity on Malchen and promises to help her and her unhappy lover. In the meantime, Rappelkopf rages against his wife and their servants. When he encounters Habakuk, his servant, who is carrying a kitchen knife to cut some chicory in the garden, Rappelkopf immediately suspects a plot to kill him. He inquires of Habakuk who sent him on this errand. When he learns that it was the mistress of the house he feels certain that his wife wishes to do away with him. He destroys the furniture and leaves his house. He buys a ramshackle hut from an impoverished family and decides to spend the rest of his life in a wilderness far from human habitation. But now Astralagus starts his work. When Rappelkopf does not heed his admonitions, Astralagus causes the ghosts of Rappelkopf's three previous wives to appear, burns down the hut, and finally forces him, after torrential rains, to accept his proposals: Rappelkopf is to re-enter his home in the shape and form of his wife's brother (whom she had summoned to help with her deranged husband) and Astralagus will assume the form and shape of Rappelkopf. Whatever happens to Astralagus while acting as Rappelkopf, and also the consequences of his actions, will have to be borne by Rappelkopf.

Rappelkopf, accepted by his family as brother and uncle respectively, discovers that his family loves him affectionately and realizes that he was totally mistaken in his interpretation of Habakuk's carrying a knife. Now Astralagus storms in and starts

threatening and raging against everybody, even worse than Rappelkopf had been in the habit of doing. Thus, Rappelkopf
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is gradually brought to insight, first, by finding out the real emotions of the people around him, and second, by being forced to watch his own irrational and destructive behavior from a distance and thus acquiring objectivity.
I have given here only a superficial outline, but bare as it is the reader will have been reminded of the scope of modern problems in the psychotherapy of schizophrenia. Details of the play reveal a mind that had made astounding observations about psychopathology. Rappelkopf's characterization is superbly drawn; the gradual weakening of his delusions, the temporary relapses into earlier beliefs after improvement has set in, his responses to the behavior of his mirror image, all these are psychologically sound. If, in addition, it is considered that these serious if not tragic events are presented in a farcical fashion, it is suggested that Raimund created a real masterpiece, even though it is scarcely known outside a small community. One gets, furthermore, the impression that this little-known author harbored a great discernment of human motivation, almost to the degree of genius. Interesting as all this may be, it is beside the point for the question is: what are the connections between the play and the structure of the author's personality?
Raimund had attempted suicide as a young man and had repeatedly suffered from depressions, and in the course of his life he became an exacting, quarrelsome, irritable person. It is evident that he suffered from psychopathology not very different from Rappelkopf and that he very probably pictured himself in that character. It is of particular interest that toward the end of the play Astralagus, in the person of Rappelkopf, wants to drown himself but is prevented from doing so, and that Raimund himself committed suicide eight years after he wrote the play. Thus we are presented with the life history of a person who projected insight about himself into a dramatic character that he created.6 Raimund claimed that writing the play had brought

6At another place in the unpublished manuscript I present details of a schizophrenic patient who, at the time she became delusional, worked on a novel about a woman who developed delusions, totally unaware of her own projections.
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him almost to (mental) ruination, and when he thanked the audience on opening night for its applause, he said that by playing the role of the misanthropist he cast off any trace of misanthropy in himself.
Despite all these good reasons in favor of identifying a main character with the author,7 we prefer to have more concrete evidence. After all, Rappelkopf has many literary ancestors more famous than he: Timon of Athens and Alceste, to mention only two.8 Coincidences, traditional factors, and the historical situation9 could also be cited to devaluate the psychological factor. Yet there is in the play one detail that barely comes to the attention of the audience—and then only because of its slightly inartistic quality—which is of the highest psychological importance. When Rappelkopf, in the role of his brother-in-law, returns home and finds that Malchen, his daughter, does not hate him but loves him affectionately, he says in a monologue (Act III, Scene viii), 'That was the only cheerful moment that I have experienced in five years'. [Das war der einzige vergnügte Augenblick, den ich seit fünf Jahren erlebt habe.] Why did the author specify the time of Rappelkopf's derangement so exactly? One would rather expect some such phrase as 'in a long time' or 'in several years'. The seemingly unwarranted specificity strikes one as inartistic; yet this specific period of five years appears in

another part of the tale. Rappelkopf's wife says (Act III, Scene vi) that her brother had been absent for five years. Thus Rappelkopf's 'disease of the soul', Seelenkrankheit as it is called (Act I, Scene vii), started with the

7Cf. Beutler, Ernst: Raimunds Alpenkönig. In: Essays um Goethe, Vol. I, pp. 425-437. Wiesbaden: Dieterich, 1948.
8See Castle, Eduard, Editor: Ferdinand Raimunds Sämtliche Werke, with an Introduction by Eduard Castle. Leipzig: Hesse and Becker, pp. xci-xcvi; and also the excellent essay by Politzer, Heinz: Ferdinand Raimunds Menschenfeind. Die Neue Rundschau, LXVI, 1955, pp. 110-124.
9At the time the play was written a general suspiciousness had spread in Vienna. See Castle, Eduard: Loc. cit., p. xci, f.
10Cf. Freud: Psychoanalytic Notes Upon an Autobiogrphical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides) (1911). Coll. Papers, III, pp. 387-470.

separation from his brother-in-law, who must have been close to him since Rappelkopf had entrusted him with his fortune for investment. The family expects that the brother-in-law will cure him. Clinically, this little detail would mean that the psychosis of the principal character was precipitated by the frustration of unconscious homosexual tendencies, which is in keeping with psychoanalytic theories.10 As a matter of fact, when Rappelkopf is cured, he asks Astralagus whether he can restore his fortune, for his brother-in-law whom he blames for having invested it badly is the only person whom he must still hate. The brother-in-law thereupon arrives, and Rappelkopf greets him with the sardonic words: 'You are really a darling brother-in-law! Only now you come along when everything is over', adding, 'You are to blame for my misfortune; I am a beggar'. [Sie sind mir schon der liebste Schwager! Jetzt kommen Sie erst daher wo schon alles vorbei ist. Sie sind an meinem Unglücke schuld, ich bin ein Bettler.] After the brother-in-law explains that he had withdrawn Rappelkopf's money before the bank went into bankruptcy, Rappelkopf exclaims: 'Ah, that is a brother-in-law, that's what I like'. [Ah, das ist ein Schwager, den lass' ich mir g'fallen.]
The homosexual, etiological factor does not otherwise appear directly in the play and were it not for the mention of the two five-year periods one could only demonstrate it by interpretations, whereas the evidence I offer is, I believe, direct. Yet it is not only the coincidence of the brother-in-law's departure with the onset of the disease that is noteworthy. When Raimund wrote the monologue in which he has Rappelkopf say how long he had been unhappy he might have invented any reasonable number of years. At least from the æsthetic point of view I see no difference whether he wrote three, four, or six, or seven. Why did he write five? The choice of five may be looked upon as if it were a free association and it behooves us to try to explain why the number five came to his mind at that moment. In

order to answer this question it is necessary to go back five years in Raimund's own life. There is indisputable evidence that Raimund wrote the play in 1828, the year in which it was also staged for the first time. Going back five years we find that the only remarkable event, if the rough data of his life history are considered, of the year 1823 is that on February 7 of that year he appeared on the stage for the last time with his divorced wife, never to see her again. This final separation could perhaps be compared to the motif of separation in the play; but, as will be seen, his wife probably was never anything for him but a temporary and peripheral love object and, further, we are searching for an incident of separation from a homosexual object. It may help if we

now turn to a strange parapraxia of Raimund's when he wrote the play. At two places he set down the time and place of writing. Here we are only interested in the time relation. In the manuscript, at the end of the nineteenth scene of the first act, he annotated '28th of May'; and at the end of the first act, 'on the 1st of June 828, my 37th birthday' [am I ten Junius 828 meinem 37ten Geburtstag.]11 This annotation is really strange because Raimund was born on June 1, 1790, and therefore in 1828 he celebrated his thirty-eighth birthday.12 This error and also the probability that the preconscious or even conscious evolvement of the general plan for the play started at least in 1827, suggest that it may be in the year 1822 that we should look for the key to the problem of the quinquennium; indeed, in studying the events of that year we can find evidence which may answer our question. In that year occurred the death of a person who had played an enormous role in Raimund's earlier life. This was Ferdinand Ochsenheimer (1767-1822), an actor at Vienna's renowned

11Brukner, Fritz and Castle, Eduard, Editors: Ferdinand Raimund Sämtliche Werke. (Six volumes.) Vienna: Anton Schroll. Vol. II, p. 470. (Cited hereafter as Raimund.)
12I owe thanks to Dr. Albert Mitringer, director of the Municipal Library of Vienna, who confirmed the correctness of the quotation and informed me that aside from an apraxia there is the possibility that Raimund may not have known the exact year of his birth.
13Ochsenheimer, Ferdinand: Die Schmetterlinge von Europa. Vols. I-IV. Vols. V-X by Friedrich Treitschke. Leipzig: G. Fleischer, 1807-1835.

Burgtheater, famous for his representations of such villains as Iago and for such character roles as Harpagon. He was also an entomologist.13

In his younger years when he was only an actor and not a playwright, Raimund had taken Ochsenheimer as his ideal. It may be noteworthy that Raimund's juvenile ambition was absorbed by an almost obsessional ambition to be an actor and there seems to have been no particular desire for a literary career. The fact that he adopted the famous actor as his ideal—to be imitated to the smallest detail—is historically proven. Numerous contemporary newspaper reviews of his acting are preserved in which this fact is repeatedly stated by the critics.

It may be worthwhile to quote what was apparently the first review he received as an actor when he played a tragic role in Vienna. He appeared as Franz Moor, the villain in Schiller's Die Raüber.

Mr. Raimund today copied Mr. Ochsenheimer in this role, and if we leave aside that we are no friend of copies, then we must confess that he afforded a very pleasant evening. Never before have we seen imitation so diligent, so effective, and that so exactly and deceptively in each little nuance as today. All artistic demands aside, we have to confess that this imitation of a famous artist is of rare sort. Everything Mr. Raimund does, every movement with the finger, every feature in the face, the complete play of gestures, is taken over from Mr. Ochsenheimer. Mr. Raimund is physically and psychologically so entirely an echo of his model that one thinks one is seeing and hearing the latter. His gait, the throwing of his cloak, the extension of his arms, the measured stepping back and forth, everything he has borrowed from Mr. Ochsenheimer, in everything he imitates him from scene to scene. We could be tempted to praise this young actor for it, did we not fear we would hurt him, for the copyist is always a lesser person in the

14Raimund, Vol. V, Part 1, p. 13: … Hr. Raimund kopierte heute Hrn. Ochsenheimer in dieser Rolle, und wenn wir micht daran denken wollen, dass wir von Kopien keine Freunde sind, so müssen wir gestehen, dass er uns einen sehr angenehmen Abend verschaffte. Noch nie haben wir so brav, so genügend, und in jeder kleinen Nuance bis zur Täuschung genau kopieren sehen, wie heute. Von allen Kunstforderungen abgesehen, müssen wir bekennen, dass diese Nachahmung eines berühmten Künstlers seltener Art sei. Alles was Hr. Raimund tut, jede Bewegung mit dem Finger, jeder Zug im Gesichte, das sämtliche Händespiel ist Hrn. Ochsenheimer abgelauscht. Hr. Raimund ist psychisch und moralisch so ganz Echo seines Vorbildes, dass man dieses zu sehen, und zu hören glaubt. Der Gang, der Mantelwurf, das Ausbreiten seiner Arme, das gemessene Vor—und Rückwärtstreten, alles hat er Hrn. Ochsenheimer ausgeborgt, alles ahmt er ihm von Szene zu Szene nach. Wir könnten versucht werden, diesen jungen Schauspieler darüber zu loben, wenn wir nicht befürchteten, ihm zu schaden, denn der Kopist ist immer ein untergeordneter Mensch im Gebiete der Kunst, und wird es nie zur Meisterschaft bringen, wenn er das Grosse nicht aus sich selbst zu schöpfen gelernt hat.

realm of art and will never achieve mastership if he has not learned to create the great out of himself.14

After the curtain call, the reviewer continued, Raimund thanked the audience (as was customary in those days) with the same words that Ochsenheimer used after he had played the same role.

This is just one of many instances. Two historical remarks may be added. Ochsenheimer was not Raimund's only model, but he was definitely the preferred one. Raimund, furthermore, as far as I have been able to find out, was almost always imitative when acting serious, tragic roles, but quite rarely when acting comedy. As a matter of fact, after a while he dropped the fulfilment of his ardent wish to be a tragedian and played only comedy, in which he soon celebrated triumphal successes which later made him famous not only in Vienna but throughout Europe.

The early quasi addiction to the exact imitation of a renowned actor-model may be unusual, but it would not be a matter of profound surprise were it not for a further detail. I refer to it with hesitation, despite the frequency with which it has been reported, because some scholars relegate it to the realm of legend and invention.15 The report says that Raimund

15See Raimund, Vol. V, Part 2, p. 981, f., footnote 5.

16Smekal, Richard, compiler: Charaketerzüge und Episoden aus Raimunds Leben. In: Ferdinand Raimunds Lebensdokumente. Introduction by Hugo von Hofmannsthal. Vienna, Berlin: Wiener Literarische Anstalt, 1920, pp. 4-30.

as a boy was so much devoted to his ideal model that he could not reconcile himself to the difference between the shape of his mouth and that of Ochsenheimer, the latter's being very large with drooping corners whereas Raimund's was small and well-formed; therefore, he assertedly tried to stretch it by pulling it with his fingers, and when his father in his hour of death saw him again performing this oral exercise, he invoked a curse upon him should he ever become an actor.16

Notwithstanding the possibly apocryphal nature of this report, Raimund's desire to accomplish physical identity with his models has to this extent been documented. Once when he imitated an actor who was by nature hunchbacked, he padded his own back to acquire the model's exact appearance although the role did not require such an

appearance at all. A critic, commenting on this, added that Raimund would, if his model had exceptionally large ears, let his own grow longer too! [… würde sich die seinigen aus Imitationswut sichtbar verlängern lassen].17

Whether the originator of the report in question had been stimulated by such a review and invented Raimund's youthful oral exercises or whether what he reported was biographical truth cannot be ascertained, but if it was an invention, we cannot deny to the inventor our admiration because it fits exactly into Raimund's life history. His mouth literally became his undoing. He developed a fear of rabies in his early years. When it happened that a dog bit him, he became terrified that he was certainly infected. Once when on vacation, he ate a piece of bread that had been licked by his own dog, developed a state of melancholy, and had to return to Vienna. It appeared strange to a contemporary that a man with such an excessive fear of rabies should keep dogs in his home as Raimund did. When finally he sustained a negligible injury from a dog while in the

17Raimund, Vol. V, Part 1, p. 26.

country, his fears became intolerable and he decided to return to Vienna. On the way home he committed suicide by shooting himself in the mouth.

If we give credence to the report of his oral exercises we might reconstruct the following sequence. First, the adolescent boy was in rivalry with a father substitute regarding size and shape of the genital, the whole conflict being displaced to the mouth. Later, the father was replaced by a totem animal eternally threatening the son by biting and deadly poisoning. The ambivalence is particularly impressive as Raimund evidently was also a lover of dogs. Finally death was inflicted by destruction through the conflict-arousing organ (shooting into the mouth, that is to say, self-castration).

We shall now venture an explanation of Raimund's copying his ideal models in such exact detail.18 The preponderance of imitative traits in a personality is usually taken as a signum mali ominis, for it indicates the absence of adequate identifications and lack of participation of the ego in its activities. Such an ego can be called a sham ego.19 If a young man builds his professional life on imitating others we may rightly doubt that he will be able to live up to the requirements of his chosen profession. Raimund's development suggests a different constellation: copying a father substitute in all details seems rather raising or setting up this father figure in himself and bowing to it. It was apparently not something less but, if anything, more than an identification. It may be regarded as the equivalent of the melancholic phase in the manic-depressive psychosis in which the patient's ego prostrates itself before its superego. When playing comedy such an ego could step forward, be original, and present itself to the world in its glory, elation, and joe de vivre. This then would be the equivalent of the manic phase.20 These formulations must be regarded as approximations

18I owe thanks to Dr. Edward Kronold for having suggested the following remarks.

19See Deutsch, Helene: Über einen Typus der Pseudoaffektivität ('als ob'). Int. Ztschr. f. Psa., XX, 1934, pp. 323-335.

20See Freud: Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921). New York: Liveright, 1949, pp. 106-109, where Freud's remarks about imitation should also be checked. See also, Freud: Humor (1928). Coll. Papers, V, pp. 215-221.

only, because in the role of the humorist and comedian the ego does not really lose its superego as it does in mania; the superego is only modified or reduced and it seems that

under such conditions the feeling of disloyalty to the father is sufficiently eliminated so that the comedian can set himself up as an individual. The fact that as a tragedian nothing but strict imitation of a father substitute could appease Raimund's feelings of guilt betrays the enormity of the ambivalence that existed for which Raimund ultimately paid with his life.

In view of all these factors, it is understandable that Ochsenheimer's death on November 1, 1822, was an important event in Raimund's life, although one does not find it recorded in those of Raimund's letters which have reached posterity. But in favor of our hypothesis I wish to mention the letter Raimund wrote to his sweetheart on November 3, 1822, in which he expresses his sadness over the death of the painter Christoph Franck, who had died one day after Ochsenheimer. He wrote:

Dear Toni:

I am very sad. Fate has called from this world one of the better men whom I learned to know, the painter Franck, who painted the picture in miniature that you have of me as well as that which I have in oil. A young man of thirty-four years, married for one year, possessed of a child and a fine young wife, died suddenly yesterday afternoon at five o'clock, and for a fortnight I did not even know that he was sick, let alone foreboding danger. He was honestly well disposed toward me, and my tears flow for an upright man and a fine artist. I always had the plan to have you painted by him sometime and he would have been the only one whom I could have entrusted myself.21

21Raimund, Vol. TV, p. 64, f.: Liebe Toni: Ich bin sehr traurig. Das Schicksal hat einen der besseren Menschen die ich kennen lernte, aus dieser Welt gerufen, der Mahler Franck, der sowhol das Gemählde dass du von mir in Miniatur besitzest, wie auch das was ich in Öhl habe, gemahlt hat. Ein junger Mann von 34 Jahren, ein Jahr verheyrathet, ein Kind und eine junge brave Frau besitzend starb gestern Nachmichtags (!) um 5 Uhr, plötzlich, und ich wusste gar nicht dass er krank wäre, durch 14 Tage, doch ohne ahndende Gefahr. Er war mir aufrichtig gut, und meine Thränen fliessen, einem redlichen Mann, und einem braven Künstler. Ich hatte immer den Plan einmahl dich von ihm mahlen zu lassen, und er wäre der einzige gewesen, den ich mich hätte anvertrauen können.

The last sentence has been translated literally, with as much vagueness as it has in German. One would expect the dative, 'to whom'. The German word anvertrauen may mean to entrust something to somebody or to confide in somebody. The preceding sentence may evoke the idea that Raimund would have entrusted the painting of his sweetheart's portrait only to Franck, but the sentence as it actually stands seems to say that Franck was the only person to whom Raimund could talk without reserve. Be this as it may, the letter may be the effect of a displacement of his reaction to Ochsenheimer's death onto that of a contemporary artist friend. As Raimund had tried to extend or prolong the existence of a father substitute by copying him on the stage, so Franck had perpetuated Raimund's image by painting portraits of him.

It is easy to demonstrate the periodicity in Raimund's life. In 1823, one year after Ochsenheimer's death, he wrote his first play. I surmise that the loss of the father substitute set free creative forces. From 1823 until 1829, he wrote seven plays in all, the last one showing terrifying features of a depression. There followed a period of unproductivity which lasted for five years and, in 1834, his best play, The Spendthrift, was produced and a new period of superb creation seemed to have begun. It was ended abruptly by his suicide in 1836.

In order to grasp other consequences of Ochsenheimer's death it is necessary to report on Raimund's relationship to women. His early loves are not known with certainty. The Lebensdokumente, the reliability of which is doubted, reports rather sad events such as an elopement leading to the marriage of Raimund's proxy with the girl, unfaithfulness in another instance leading to an attempt at suicide on Raimund's part, and

22See Erdmann, Walter: Ferdinand Raimund. Würzburg: Triltsch, 1943, pp. 44-47, for coördination of these episodes.
23Raimund. Vol. III, pp. 342-344.

similar events.22 One is on more reliable ground, historically, in the case of an actress with whom Raimund lived for quite a while but who deserted him because of his fitful temperament. Once, when he saw her in the theater with another man and she refused to reveal the identity of her companion, Raimund struck her with his cane, for which he found himself in jail three days.23

It would lead us too far afield to speculate about the psychological meaning of such events. Important in this context is the relationship to Antoine Wagner (1799-1879) which dominated his life. She was the daughter of an upper middle-class, if not wealthy, owner of a coffeehouse, and Raimund fell in love with her at first sight, a love that persisted throughout his life despite his subsequent marriage to another woman. He proposed marriage to Toni but her parents refused to accept an actor in the family. In his dejection he was an easy prey to a promiscuous actress who was ambitious to improve her career through a relationship with the famous actor.24 Unfortunately she became pregnant. Raimund fought bravely against marrying her but the public, knowing his unwillingness, remonstrated in accordance with the customs of the day and his further career as an actor was gravely endangered. Under these pressures he married her on April 8, 1820, approximately one year after he met Toni Wagner. Six months later a daughter was born who died in infancy.25 About a year after the birth of the child they separated, and in January of 1822 they were divorced. Shortly after his wife left their home, Raimund and Toni formed a spiritual alliance, a marriage of conscience, Gewissensehe, as it is called in German, in front of the pillar of St. Mary in Neustift, a village in the environs of Vienna. The day of that

24Important material reflecting on the character of this woman has recently been published. See Gugitz, Gustav: Die Ehetragödie Ferdinand Raimunds. Vienna: Wiener Bibliophilen-Gesellschaft, 1956, 30 pp.
25The exact dates are October 7, 1820—January 10, 1821. See Gugitz, Gustav: Die Ehetragödie Ferdinand Raimunds. Vienna: Wiener Bibliophilen-Gesellschaft, 1956, p.22.
26Of course, since people often look upon intercourse as the consummate sin they may have compromised by resorting to perversions. In Raimund's instance this question could perhaps be answered since Toni Wagner's diary covering the years of 1825 and 1826 seems to contain some reference to their intimate life (see Raimund. Vol. IV, p. ix), but it was probably exaggerated prudery that prevented the editors from publishing the full text of that important document.

alliance, September 10, 1821, played an enormous role in Raimund's life, and in his subsequent correspondence with Toni he came back to it over and over again as something that had apparently changed his entire outlook on life. Evidently the vows

that they exchanged referred not only to eternal faithfulness but also, explicitly or implicitly, to chastity, which meant possible lifelong abstinence for in Catholic Austria they could marry only after the death of Raimund's former wife. We know that the part of the covenant that referred to chastity was not kept. In 1830 Toni's parents at last agreed to let her live with Raimund. What happened before is not quite clear but it is very probable that in 1822 their relationship became carnal.26

At least one scholar interprets a letter Raimund wrote to Toni (1822) as expressing his reaction to having broken the vow of purity.27 This interpretation of the letter is not quite convincing but it would be of interest to know whether the sexual aspect of the relationship was explicitly introduced before or after Ochsenheimer's death. My reconstruction would be that with the death of the ambivalently beloved father substitute an upsurge of homosexual longing occurred that made a heterosexual relationship imperative. Aside from the defensive function intercourse would have provided, it must also be considered that the death of a father figure may have permitted a sexual relationship with what was undoubtedly an incestuous love object.

In returning to my starting point I wish to state that the psychologically relevant events, which occurred in 1822 and to which Raimund alluded in the two remarks about a five-year period in The King of the Alps and the Misanthropist, were

27Letter 36, in Raimund. Vol. IV, pp. 46-48, and Fürst, Rudolf: Raimunds Werke, p. xvii, f., cf. footnote 5.

the death of Ochsenheimer and the beginning of a sexual relationship with Toni for which he felt quite guilty, as his letters seem to prove. If we now recall that in the play Rappelkopf calls the moment when he finds that he is loved by his daughter, Malchen, the first cheerful moment after five years of misery, and that 'Malchen' is the endearing form of 'Amalie', the name of Raimund's infant daughter, we have then another link between the play and the life problems with which Raimund was struggling. The approximate reconstruction may be formulated as follows: 'I would have been able to overcome the loss of my father [who in reality died in 1804], or of his substitute, if I still had my little daughter and she loved me as dearly as Malchen loves her father in the play'.

We could, of course, speculate about many more connections of this sort but since Raimund's psychopathology is not the subject of this essay, we refrain from pursuing the reconstruction and its connection with one of his plays, only to note that through inquiry into a seemingly negligible detail we stumbled upon the poet's most personal and pressing problems which we discovered to be reflected in the play itself. As stated before, from the analysis of such details the analyst may derive with certitude that a work of art is deeply rooted in the innermost layers of the creative genius and also learn from which conflicts the creation stems. Whether psychoanalytic knowledge will ever be so elaborate that we can dispense with the use of such details and proceed to conclusions derived merely from the literary record, without the assistance and corroborative evidence derived from the biographical record, remains to be seen.

Another documented example of how literary details can be used for biographical analysis is to be found in Goethe's choice of the name 'Madame Sommer' in his play, Stella.28 This name I take to be a free association, in view of the many possible alternatives available.29 It is not merely a coincidence that Goethe's

28I have discussed this incident in detail in the unpublished manuscript on Goethe.

29Cf. Barrett, William G.: On the Naming of Tom Sawyer. This QUARTERLY, XXIV, 1955, pp. 424-436.

choice of this name and the exact number of years of unhappiness specified by Raimund impress us as unæsthetic. Probably those details that do not follow the prevailing æsthetic rules are the most promising for their value as clues leading to insight into the psychology of art.

I am inclined to surmise that, assuming the absence of other biographical sources, the perfect work of art (literary or visual) would not permit the reconstruction of its creator's personality. The more flaws there are in a work of art, the more promising an object of investigation it would be to the psychologist. The æsthetic error can thus be equated with a parapraxia that leads to the core of the artist's most acute conflicts.

In presenting a noted example of the role that detail serves in the analysis of a literary work, we may now be able to formulate the difference between the significance of details in clinical work and in psychoanalysis applied to the study of works of literature. In clinical analysis we start out with a clinical question and each relevant detail brings us closer to the solution.30 In the literary inquiry the relevant detail paves the way toward finding and delineating the problem that subsequently has to be solved by the usual means at the disposal of psychoanalysis. It is the selection of the right detail that first points out a piece of literature as the creation of a mind in conflict, and demonstrates an æsthetic unit as a psychological problem. In clinical work, the detail solves the problem; in literary analysis, the detail poses the problem. It is the fitting of details into comprehensive contexts—including both literary works and focal personal life situations—that gives certainty to correct interpretations.

It must be admitted that if the slightly inartistic remark about the five-year period had not been made in Raimund's play, the reconstruction I propose in this study would have remained a theoretical proposition. It becomes by this literary

30I omit an intermediary phase here when details that characterize the symptoms, cursorily described by the patient, initially complicate the clinical situation.

accident a clinical study comparable to one derived from a living subject.

What may be one of the reasons why the application of psychoanalysis to musical and visual art is so much more difficult than to literature is that in literature the 'artistic parapraxia' can be determined far more readily than in music and the graphic arts. The detail of the five-year period cannot possibly be dissolved into factors of history, tradition, or æsthetics, and automatically it becomes the carrier of something purely individual. In the musical and visual arts an equivalent factor is missing or, at least, can be determined only with far greater difficulty. Freud writes: 'It [psychoanalysis] can conjecture with more or less certainty from an artist's work the intimate personality that lies behind it';31 and one may add that the degree of certainty, other conditions being equal, possibly depends on the number of parapractic details to be found in an artist's work.32

31Freud: The Claims of Psychoanalysis to Scientific Interest (1913). Standard Edition, XIII, p. 179.

32In this paper I have inquired only into the theory of one method of psychoanalytic literary research. There are, of course, others such as the method I would like to call, the variant theme. See Gorer, Geoffrey: The Myth in Jane Austen. In: Art and

Psychoanalysis. Edited by William Phillips. New York: Criterion Books, 1957, pp. 218-225.
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NACHT, S. ET AL (1956) THE EGO IN PERVERSE RELATIONSHIPS. INT. J. PSYCHO-ANAL., 37:404 (IJP)

THE EGO IN PERVERSE RELATIONSHIPS1

S. NACHT, R. DIATKINE and J. FAVREAU

In most of the work dealing with sexual perversion an attempt has been made to differentiate between the perverse structures of the neuroses and the psychoses. Early writings concentrated upon instinctual development, but subsequently attention was shifted to the functions of the ego. It is, however, difficult to describe a perverse structure common to all the patients suffering from sexual anomalies which we find in clinical work. Classically, every individual who cannot have an orgasm without an anomaly in his choice of object, or without distorting the sexual act, is considered sexually perverse, sexual aberration being the necessary or sufficient condition of gratification. Observations show that there are many cases which do not come within this strict definition, some because, although they are able to have normal sexual intercourse, they prefer an abnormal sexual act, others because they experience their perversions more in imagination than in reality, which brings them within the category of neurotic patients. Despite the variety of structures which must be borne in mind, we believe we have been able to discover a constant feature in the object relationships of these patients.

i. In all the categories we have in mind, the patients keep a certain distance between themselves and the object which is unconsciously sc cathected that they escape a constantly underlying fear but nevertheless maintain a certain possibility of erotic gratification.

ii. They succeed in eroticizing just those mechanisms of the ego which permit them to maintain this particular object relationship.

Eroticization of defence mechanisms or of anxiety with the consequent possibility of orgasm is the specific characteristic of sexual perverts, whereas in neurotics this eroticization, even when it exists, is never recognized as such by the ego and in no case leads to orgasm.

A few preliminary remarks appear to us to be necessary at this point:

i. Let us remember that perversion is never a liberation of instinct in its raw state but always a complex elaboration in which various aspects of the personality participate according to the past experiences of the individual.

ii. As Freud noticed with regard to fetishism, patients who ask for treatment are never pure sexual perverts in the psychiatric sense of the word, but anxious and dissatisfied individuals who make up only a fraction of the whole mass of sexual perverts.

iii. The possibility of curing a sexual perversion depends on the actual amount of suffering of the individual, and therefore in the last analysis on the neurotic aspect of his trouble.

iv. As we have already pointed out, it is important to know if this conscious eroticization of defences which leads the patient to behave in a particular way is a specific mechanism. In fact great varieties in perverse behaviour exist, and these can take on varying values according to the stage of the individual's life history.

v. Certain perverse sexual practices cannot be distinguished from the compulsive behaviour of neurotics and particularly of obsessionals. The early definition of

compulsion as comprising impulsive activity derived from its primitive object does not allow of the comparison with sexual perversion, which can often be defined in the same terms.

An examination of all the clinical facts shows that in sexual perverts there exist numerous forms of resistance against unconscious fear, and therefore numerous forms of inhibitions. In every attempt to compare the ego of neurotics and the ego of perverts these differences must be taken into account. It is for this reason that it is necessary briefly to review the means of integration of various mechanisms modifying instinctual activity in the cases which concern us. Some

1Contribution to the Panel on Perversions. Read at the 19th International Psycho-Analytical Congress, 24–28 July, 1955. Translated by Joyce McDougall.

produce neurotic symptoms, others perverse satisfaction. It is to be noticed that in certain findings one can see the object relationship pass from one form to another while maintaining a certain topical continuity.

1. If we consider here the unconscious perverse phantasy, we should stress a number of points:

a. The pattern of these unconscious phantasies shows little variation as to type, which differentiates it from the polymorphous nature of perverse satisfactions.

b. Depending on the stage of the analysis, different phantasies come to the fore, since they now form a defence against the unconscious fear bound up with deeper phantasy situations. Similarly, conscious phantasies may result from an elaboration by the ego of a more terrifying unconscious phantasy. (cf. Freud, 'A Child is being Beaten.')

Three important types of unconscious perverse phantasy call for our attention:

A. Unconscious phantasy corresponding to the earliest elaborations and schematized by the prevalence of oral and anal interchanges at a sadistic level. We find here the elaboration of the phantasy of the primal scene.2 Clinically this pattern can embrace very different symptoms which protect the patient against his fear and prevent him from becoming aware of the interrelation between his aggressive and his libidinal impulses.

B. Unconscious homosexual tendencies have been fully described in psycho-analytical literature. Freud showed that 'there exists every-where and always a link with a homosexual object and that in most cases this homosexuality remains latent.'

Although it is interesting to understand, during the analysis, the way in which defences are built up by the ego as a result of this tendency, it must not be forgotten that the tendency itself is a defensive position with ambiguous significance.

Superficially it protects the individual (in the case of a man) against the unconscious fear of castration by the father; more deeply it represents either an identification with the phallic mother, or a flight from her. At this level we already find narcissistic defence mechanisms, believed by some to be necessary to the achievement of active homosexuality.

C. Unconscious masochism is related to different structures according to whether it comes into being in a primitive maternal relationship or a specific oedipal situation. It underlies many neurotic situations, but it will be seen that it plays an important part in the origin of numerous perverse activities. The relationship of unconscious masochism with the sadistic oral and anal phantasies mentioned above is well known.

It is classic to compare these latent perverse attitudes with sexual perversions by postulating a quantitative difference. We are of the opinion, however, that there are more likely to be qualitative differences depending on the type of structure.

2. Conscious phantasies with a perverse character supply an inexhaustible field of clinical study. They bear witness to a special activity of the ego in which the impulses are accepted but only in so far as the imaginary character of fulfilment carries a denial necessary to narcissistic reassurance. Their existence is not, however, specific to a special organization of the ego. Each type of patient, for instance, utilizes and tolerates masturbation phantasies in his own way. In normal individuals perverse phantasies can be found in adolescence and may constitute temporary regression—the last hesitations prior to sexual maturity. In some neurotics, perverse phantasy is a means of avoiding the sexual danger as well as of keeping the object at bay. It can replace all sexual activity in inhibited adults who have never had any actual experience, or it may subsequently occur after an apparently normal beginning of sexual life. In sexual perverts there is often a very intense imaginary activity, and observation demonstrates the way in which certain patients pass from an activity of meagre satisfaction with exuberant phantasies to more and more numerous experiences without any consequent modification of the phantasy-structure.

A certain number of ordinary characteristics, however, must be pointed out. Most often it is a question of a phantasy elaboration of a sadomasochistic primal scene during which the intermingling of aggressive and libidinal impulses liberates anxiety against which the ego adopts measures of protection characteristic of its organization. One of the most frequent is the scoptophilic position ('one' tortures a woman, etc. …). The individual does not take part in the scene but is present as a spectator, even though he delights in imagining himself to be the all-powerful master of ceremonies. Acted

2It is understood that we call 'phantasy of the primal scene' the imaginary reconstitution of parental intercourse and not the memory of actually witnessing the parents' sexual intercourse.

out voyeuristic tendencies are frequently found in these same individuals, since scoptophilia offers, in this case, the possibility of not having to be responsible for the intermingled aggressive and libidinal impulses while at the same time satisfying them in phantasy. The conjuring-up of the primal scene can be disturbed by defences against latent homosexuality, and some male patients like to imagine women tortured by other women. Analysis shows how complex the play of identification is, the patient living his phantasy while unconsciously substituting himself for the aggressor as well as for the victim. This permits him to avoid his fear of retaliation which prevents him from experiencing in reality his libidinal and aggressive impulses.

In male patients the imaginary object of sadistic phantasy is frequently derived from the maternal image, but consciously it is a question of a substitute, of the significance of which the patient is of course unaware. If there is a love-relationship with a real object, it is with difficulty that the latter will become part of the imaginary activities. These patients prefer to use their memories of people met a long time ago or seen from afar, and with whom in any case there was no possibility of other contact.

A certain number of defence mechanisms remain in the foreground during these imaginary activities. For many, the irreversible impairment of the body of the imaginary object is incompatible with the maintaining of sexual excitation. One of our patients could only imagine scenes of torture if he pictured to himself a whole system of separated buildings, so that even in phantasy he never found himself near the supposed

place of torture. He often took a lively pleasure in imagining at length these architectural details, in preference to the sadistic scenes for which they were built. In so doing he gave us an excellent example of eroticization of distance in space as well as in time, since he thus delayed the moment of picturing his imaginary victims.

In patients who have to a certain extent found a satisfactory sexual life, a perverse phantasy activity can intervene to complicate object relationships. In some cases these never take on either an unavoidable or an indispensable character. All the different steps between phantasy and its fulfilment can thus be observed. Certain minimal sadistic activities can be observed as well as minor forms of moral sadism (which manifest the need to remove oneself from normal sexual activity) without the individual's becoming a slave to them or losing his capacity to love.

In others, on the contrary, conscious phantasy may become indispensable to an erection, to its being maintained, to orgasm, or compel recognition compulsively, thus resulting in premature ejaculation. One of our patients could only attain orgasm in coitus when imagining that a disagreeable old woman was giving her an enema in public. She was always afterwards astonished by this imaginary activity, each element of which appeared to her repugnant and anaphrodisiac. On the other hand, she showed very clearly how, thanks to her phantasies, she cut herself off from her husband, saying 'Poor thing, if he knew how far I was from him.'

3. Patients suffering from true sexual perversion behave in appearance very differently. In the preceding cases, the anomaly hardly goes beyond the imaginary level even if some rare approximations to fulfilment are to be observed. If some neurotics sometimes indulge in behaviour of a sado-masochistic kind, it is more often a furtive ephemeral activity which sometimes helps and sometimes disturbs the sexual act. The patients of whom we have spoken above never take complete responsibility for the acting out of their impulses. On the contrary, the characteristic of the sexual pervert is his capacity to tolerate the carrying out of his act, and it is even in general his sole means of achieving an orgasm, or at least a release of tension. One could not, however, deduce from this that the sexual pervert satisfies his primary instinctual tendencies without preliminary elaboration, and extremely careful analysis of the behaviour of these patients shows how certain aspects of their activities are close to neurotic symptoms.

The polymorphous nature of sexual perversions is itself a proof of the complexity of the elaborations which underlie them. But if we wish to review rapidly their clinical forms we are obliged to divide them into three groups of very different significance.

A. Sado-masochistic perversions.

B. Overt homosexuality.

C. Other clinical forms which can be considered as flight from object relationships which are felt to be too dangerous.

A. Sado-masochistic perversions

a. It is rarely possible in a psycho-analytic practice to study criminal sado-masochistic

perverts. All we know is that the destruction of the partner's body is at the time the only means of achieving an orgasm, as is the case with certain famous criminals. Unfortunately, the work of criminologists and psychiatrists who have been able to make direct observations of these patients is not sufficiently based on the study of object relationships for us to be able to draw any worthwhile conclusions from the case-histories of these individuals.

One of us has been able to observe, though not to psycho-analyse, in the criminal lunatics section of the Psychiatric Hospital at Villejuif, a patient whose structure is of this type. He had been interned following the murder of his female companion—unpremeditated murder, followed immediately by a frenzied cutting up, evisceration, cannibalism, and orgasm. He had first committed a murder several years before which had at that time been considered an ordinary 'crime passionnel'.

There are two significant details in his history. During the 1914–1918 was he was a stretcher-bearer and loved to feel the blood of the wounded drench his clothes and to wear for a long time afterwards underclothing stiffened by the blood. Following this he had taken the habit of going regularly to slaughter-houses to drink a glass of warm blood which, according to him, was a therapeutic measure, for he had hypochondriacal tendencies.

Apart from these incidents this patient had led a peaceful existence as a minor civil servant, and at the Psychiatric Hospital he was amiable and helpful. Only a certain indifference distinguished him perhaps from ordinary working-class patients. Apart from some feelings of jealousy which had complicated his emotional life, his sexual life did not seem to have been very disturbed.

This observation shows the complexity of these apparently simple cases. In fact the acting out of oral aggression was able to go so far as cannibalism and to manifest itself in a chronic state by the degraded need to drink blood at slaughter-houses (this without any orgasm). It would seem that his ego had been capable of subtler mechanisms allowing him an apparently normal sexual life and an adjusted social life. At the hospital his exemplary behaviour showed that in certain environmental conditions his sadistic needs did not have to find an outlet. Although we have but little information about the ego of this patient, we are able to see how much the nature of his disturbance differs from usual chronic structures, since it only permitted him to act out his impulses completely in a unique circumstance. It would have been interesting to know more of the significance of this.

The history of this case tends to show that one cannot consider the structure of such patients as inevitably leading to an acting-out situation.

b. Minor sado-masochistic perversions have been well studied, and it is unnecessary to dwell on the general characteristics of their topographical structure. It is difficult, however, to assess the importance of acting out in these patients, since their practices appear considerably reduced and very elaborated when they are compared with the behaviour of the sadistic assassin. Furthermore, it is in these cases that conscious phantasies and perverse practices interact. To fight, to humiliate, to submit to such treatment oneself are just so many elaborations of the destructive unconscious phantasy, avoided at the same time as they are symbolically satisfied.

The information found in the writings of Sacher-Masoch, or in the classic observations of Dupuy, Krafft-Ebing, and Moll, and in Nacht's book, show that these patients derive as much pleasure from imagining the act as from the act itself. Even the writings of the Marquis de Sade are significant: the richness of his phantasies contrasts with the barrenness of his attempts at fulfilment and with the importance of the unconscious masochism which underlay the whole life of this famous sufferer. In patients whose tendency is to be sado-masochistic in the sexual act, gratification sometimes has the quality of a game. To be beaten by a prostitute, to spank a woman in such conditions represents an attempt to minimize deep impulses. This goes together with an amiability in social relationships, beneath which we find frequently a severely repressed aggression.

Such behaviour contrasts with the unconscious sado-masochistic tendencies which impel the active partners of certain couples to be continually alternating between aggression and reciprocal humiliation, within which the personality seems to be totally absorbed without in any way being aware of the significance involved. In such cases there are no perverse sexual practices; but frequently frigidity and impotence will show a badly integrated unconscious aggression. Most often this kind of sadomasochistic alternation is the condition which makes sexual gratification possible.

Do not let us forget that in a normal sexual life a certain sado-masochistic relationship is naturally assumed by one party and tolerated by the other.

B. Homosexuality

It is nowadays acknowledged that male homosexuality is often bound up with unconscious fear before the proof of the actual danger of castration which the sight of the female genital organs arouses; whence the need to cathect a non-mutilated object whose bodily identity with the body of the subject provides the latter with narcissistic reassurance. It is known that Freud, à propos fetishism, wondered how it could be explained that certain individuals overcome this fear without apparent damage, whereas others work out a whole network of neurotic defences in order to find an acceptable way to object relationships, while the fetishist equips the substitute object with the maternal penis, and others still become manifest homosexuals.

Clinical observations show once again that not all homosexuals can be grouped together under a single heading. More than in other types of perversion we find that analytical practice affords information about only a small group of patients. In satisfied inverts the sexual element is very often only one aspect of the total behaviour. Despite the brilliant success of some homosexuals, all the relationships between them and all vital situations are affected by this special type of object relationship. Furthermore it is not possible to compare the sexual activity of satisfied inverts with that of heterosexuals. There prevails in homosexual circles a special atmosphere of unfaithfulness, jealousy, multiple sexual frivolity and procuring, which show how the best adapted homosexuals rarely find a satisfactory object, which again stresses the precariousness of homosexual ties.

These difficulties are found accentuated and ill tolerated by anxious homosexuals who seek treatment. In them the mechanism of narcissistic reassurance plays only an incomplete part, and the patient finds in his relationship with his partner a reawakening of fears bound up with maternal relationships. It is in these cases that to be a homosexual signifies running the risk of passivity and, in living thus, warding off the danger of castration. If at the beginning of certain analyses this partial fulfilment of castration may appear to be the ransom of paternal protection, it is frequent to find patients who for narcissistic reasons cannot tolerate this position because it entails identification with the mutilated image of the mother.

Another type of patient differs from the foregoing by the existence of depressing or frankly revengeful elements, which give a psychotic aspect to their personality. The analysis of one of these patients showed that he had such a fear of finding the terrifying image of the castrated mother again that every trace of anal eroticism suppressed sexual excitation because of the displacement on to this orifice of the fear associated with the vagina. Only mutual masturbation, or better still fellatio, gave him sufficient narcissistic reassurance to achieve orgasm.

Some patients feel such a sexual inhibition that even their homosexuality does not go beyond the masturbation phantasy. It is striking to see in this respect how the cathexis of a masculine image cannot suffice to protect them against the unconscious fear of

castration. These cases resemble certain anxious bisexuals who divide their life between heterosexuality without much pleasure and furtive and extremely guilty homosexual acts.

These various clinical entities show us that it is difficult to define in a single formula the ego defences of homosexuals. The career of the homosexual in no way protects him against all the dangers of neurotic and psychotic vicissitudes, the homosexual position being able to be considered only as one of the defence methods against the unconscious fear of being broken up.

C. The clinical presentation of other sexual perversions shows a group of somewhat unusual syndromes. Even more easily than is the case in homosexuality, they can be defined as a flight from the heterosexual object and from coitus made too frightening by the intermingling of libidinal and aggressive impulses.

Here is a typical case. A man of about 30 years of age becomes impotent soon after his marriage and gives himself up to a curious sexual perversion: he gets a small boy to give him enemas, the only way he can achieve an orgasm.

Analysis revealed that he had identified his wife with his mother and that on the other hand he was unable to identify himself with his father, the two parental images being equally terrifying. Impotence protected him from both, above all enabling him to flee the maternal image in so far as it represented the genital object.

If we add that his mother had the vexatious

habit of giving him enemas until he was 14, the reason for his perversion is made singularly clear: it permitted him to find the maternal image again, but in a camouflaged way, since it was not a woman but a little boy who administered these enemas, whence he derived the only pleasure possible to him.

We shall pass over a certain number of sexual perversions frequently described but rarely observed in psycho-analytical clinics (zoophilia, necrophilia, etc.), and discuss only one of the important categories, namely fetishism.

Fetishism has been one of the best grounds for the study of sexual perversions. The fetishist derives his satisfaction from an object which has for most people no specific erotic value. Intermediate forms of fetishism immediately serve to modify this definition. Thus the fetishism of certain parts of the body is closely linked with the desires of the normal individual. But the fetishist is characterized by his incapacity to have sexual relations if these conditions are lacking.

The place that Freud gives in his works to the ego of fetishists is well known in the evolution of analytical conceptions. Patients who have succeeded in fleeing the image of the castrated woman, without, however, becoming homosexual, have raised the problem of active denial of reality in patients otherwise non-psychotic.

The interaction of fetishism and a complex neurotic structure allowed us in one case to observe more closely the determinism of this particular form of sexual activity. We are thinking here of a patient in whom different perverse activities were to be found, each corresponding to the specific structure of the ego and counterbalancing neurotic relationships with which they were bound up.

During the course of this analysis, conscious phantasies of a sado-masochistic kind were transformed into perverse satisfactions. The phantasies had the specific character of neurotic structures. They were, however, indispensable to an ejaculation. We wondered why the patient staged complicated scenes from the moment the transference took on a more maternal character, the dangerous object then being the image of the phallic mother. We were only able to understand the reasons for this through the fetishistic character of this complicated behaviour. There was in fact a swing between

the fetishistic act and certain sado-masochistic play in which the patient delighted. The patient could only carry out aggressive play during which a murderous and dangerous woman was reduced to impotence and punished, which permitted sexual relations without danger, on condition that he made the woman whole (black veils hiding the vulvar wound, the leg clothed in a black stocking, phallic substitutes). One of the difficulties which manifested itself during the last part of the treatment was the pseudo-genitalization of the analytical situation, the patient sometimes preferring to take a passive position with regard to his analyst during the paternal transference stages, in order to avoid the danger created by the aggressive cathexis of the maternal image. It was only after numerous oscillations of this kind that the patient was really able to identify himself with a virile imago.

We have related this case because it shows how certain perverse attitudes can express the way in which the ego adapts itself during development. The fact is that this patient's fetishism represents a very elaborate defence mechanism whose total eroticization is linked with the aim of avoiding unconscious fear.

This brief enumeration of perverse activities, whether they be phantasy or reality, leads us to conclude that it is not possible to classify perverts solely according to their method of activity, in a limited category. Between total sexual inhibition, the 'ritual' permitting a certain orgasm to be achieved, real compulsions and sexual obsessions, there lies a whole series of transitional forms, just as we find individuals capable of passing from one method of relationship to another according to their development or special environmental conditions.

We can now isolate a certain number of general characteristics concerning the ego of perverse patients.

i. At the level of unconscious content the prevalence of primitive sadistic oral and anal relationships with the maternal image is obvious, but various sexual perversions show a great variety of defence structure because of the fear felt during these relationships. There is, therefore, no specific unconscious content in sexual perversions, since the same findings must be acknowledged in cases of serious neuroses and in the psychoses.

ii. The intermingling of aggressive and libidinal impulses is almost constant, but not completely carried out, which again approximates sexual perverts to neurotics. Even the observation of a sadistic criminal shows that aggression totally eroticized has been acted out only quite exceptionally in the patient's life. When

we examined the criminal patient mentioned above, inhibition was dominant.

iii. Connections between perverse sexual structures observed clinically and the phases of development of infantile sexuality should be very closely studied. For a long time sexual perversions were considered as pure libidinal regression linked with infantile fixations. In fact the problem appears more complex, and we consider it useful to single out two factors:

a. In many patients suffering from sexual perversions a certain fixation of the libido permits them to regain the eroticization of certain primitive zones, or of certain narcissistic activities, which have had an erotic value during infancy. This fixation alone cannot be considered as a sufficient causal element. Not every individual having anal eroticization easily reawakened necessarily becomes homosexual. One knows, on the other hand, all the forms of sublimation of oral pleasures which demonstrate clearly the diversity of the fate of libidinal fixations.

b. The functions of the ego are more difficult to describe solely in terms of fixation or regression. The study of childhood development shows that during the oedipal

period, and above all during the latency period, structural wholes are created which lose the possibility of developing into adult sexuality. They continue, however, to develop in their own way according to the successive experiences undergone. Sometimes latent, they can only develop symptoms slowly and in special circumstances. We have been able to point out in the first part of this work that at the structural level the neurotic and the perverse ego are not fundamentally different. The specific character of sexual perversions seems to be the capacity to eroticize directly and consciously defence mechanisms which permit object relationships to be maintained while keeping a certain distance. It is then that the existence of certain pregenital libidinal fixations favours just these eroticizations and thus contributes to the origin of sexual perversions. It is necessary to compare them with certain temporary regressions involving pseudo-perverse satisfactions which never acquire an indispensable character. They are the proof that the ego possesses a flexibility sufficient to utilize the erotic possibilities of past experiences.

iv. A close examination of the object relationships of perverts leads us to distinguish two types of patients within the polymorphous character of these satisfactions. Thanks to their perversion, some can seek and tolerate a partner who, although a substitute person, is none the less alive and present.

Others, on the contrary, cannot tolerate such an actual contact. They flee, in their own way, all contact with a real partner. In this they are more comparable than the former with neurotics suffering from sexual inhibition.

This distinction obliges us to describe for one and the same perversion different structural forms of the ego. If the fetishism of some (this is the case with the patient whom we have mentioned) permits them to tolerate the presence of a sexual partner, for others the fetish provokes an orgasm without the individual being able to tolerate the presence of a partner.

v. The compulsive aspect of certain perversions is obvious. Since the study of the 'Rat Man', compulsion is considered as the fundamental element of obsessional neurosis. However, numerous compulsive acts may arise outside all obsessional context. Usually the accomplishment of the compulsive act brings about a release following the anxiety which preceded it. With some patients the same act can be lived sometimes as a compulsion, sometimes as a perversion, bringing with it an orgasm. Hence the patient who tears his clothes sometimes with keen pleasure, sometimes after an undeniable struggle. This act sometimes brings him a brief orgasm without anxiety.

A distinction between true perverse activity and compulsion might be seen in the fact that the ego of the pervert accepts the act, whereas the personality of the compulsive would condemn it. This distinction is blurred in a closer examination. One knows how much, at a certain period of their analysis, some obsessionals seem to claim a right to their compulsions and consider them legitimate. Patients suffering from compulsive hand washing consider contact with another repugnant. Can one legitimately compare this with the disgust homosexuals feel for women? The difference is established here in the fact that the genital activity of the homosexual is maintained because it is displaced on to a substitute object, whereas this is sometimes denied to obsessionals because of their rituals.

Let us add that certain perverse practices can no longer be tolerated by the ego of patients after a certain age and then take on a compulsive character.

vi. Incapacity to love is of course a common characteristic of all the patients we have observed, which confirms, if it be necessary, the

immaturity of their personality. Flight from the terrifying and incessantly sought after maternal imago, the always indispensable narcissistic reassurance, allows neither perverts nor neurotics the minimum of cathexis necessary for love. It is even significant to ascertain how often other patients have difficulty in merging the loved object in occasional perverse reveries.

We know now that perverse acting out cannot be explained by one single mechanism. From ideational compulsion to compulsive action, from the act of avoidance to procure a release to the perverse act permitting an orgasm, there exist as many clinical forms in which neurotic and perverse mechanisms are mingled. The latter's only specificity seems to be a sufficient eroticization of defence mechanisms to provoke an orgasm.

How can this phenomenon be explained?

i. Neurological studies do not seem to be able to answer this question; they are generally more concerned with the mechanism of the impulses, or the nature of psychopathic personalities, than with the origins of sexual perversions arbitrarily confused with these syndromes. (Cortical theories of Magnan, Legrain, Westphal, play a predominant role in the nucleus of the fundamental principle according to Kleist, etc. …)3 The approximation of sexual perversions to the acts of patients presenting a psychopathic personality is not consistent with clinical findings and corresponds to a moralizing position little tolerated to-day. Constitutionalist theories (Dupré) correspond to an intuitive idea which every clinician has, but do not contribute anything constructive to the understanding of the problem.4

ii. It is also necessary to cite certain biological theories which maintain that certain sexual perversions are bound up with an essential instinctual disturbance secondary to a neuroendocrinological unbalance. As Kammerer has shown in a recent general review, the supposed relationships between homosexuality and ambisexuality do not correspond with the real facts. Lang's genetic theory does not seem to be confirmed by clinical findings. But on the other hand 'the possibility that emotional experiences of sexual life may have their repercussions on endocrinological functions cannot be excluded' (Kammerer).

iii. These findings do not seem to enlighten us about the origins of sexual perversions, and still less on the special forms of ego structure. Psycho-analytical work has brought a better understanding of the ego mechanisms of sexual perverts. The resistance of these patients, both neurotics and psychotics, has been the object of much study. Attempts at differentiation pointed first to the quality of fixations or regressions. We have seen that in this sphere two types of difficulties are met with.

a. There is no overall explanation for the origin of these perversions: some may be considered as fixations, others as regressions due to difficulty of identification.

b. The same characteristics and the same differences are found in the latent content of neurotics.

Interest next turned towards the structure of the ego. In a recent work on the ego of homosexuals, Bychowski showed that there again the mechanisms involved are not specific. He gives a very clear historical study on the development of ideas on this subject.

The part played by narcissism has been stressed by Freud, by Brill in 1913, Eidelberg in 1933, and Nunberg in 1936. In an article by Bychowski there is a very interesting discussion on the idea of the weakness of the ego in homosexuals. The author takes up the conception of Federn and Nunberg and defines this form of ego weakness through the labile nature of this entity and its limitations. (He concludes that 'the homosexual ego is activated in an effort to overcome this narcissism … and to restore or establish its

capacity for loving … this perversion is an attempt to ward off the constant menace of depression and depersonalization.')

This is consistent with clinical findings, but there again we must ask if such a definition has any specific value. As Bouvet showed, obsessional defence mechanisms provide for the same need. The only difference is in the maintenance of the distance from the object through the defence mechanisms of the obsessional (which can go so far to make him lose the love object) whereas the homosexual, for example, finds a substitute object which is not as satisfying as is usually supposed. The idea of ego strength and weakness agrees with certain clinical knowledge but, by its formulation, does not allow us to go beyond this idea.

3In a recent work by H. Ey there is a very complete critical study of this question (Psychiatric Study, Vol. II).

4Neither have studies based on encephalographic examination brought, at any rate until now, any conclusive elements. We thank Professor Faure of Bordeaux for being kind enough to communicate his observations on this subject.

The same phenomena of ego weakness have been invoked with regard to fetishism (Freud, Sandor Lorand, and Bak), but Freud recognized a special process in fetishism: the splitting (Spaltung) of the ego. The importance Freud attached to this idea will be remembered. In this case the ego is divided between two tendencies, one which recognizes in the female sex the proof of dreaded castration, and the other which actively denies this reality. This partial denial of reality is, however, very different from delirious states, for consciously the individual admits the reality and does not acknowledge the substitute value of the fetish.

It is known that Melanie Klein has also attributed the greatest importance to this mechanism of ego splitting which she attributes to the earliest stages of object relationships. As Gillespie shows, the Kleinian concept is that the splitting of the object and the ego, as well as the denial, play the same role at an early stage as repression at a later one. This leads the writer to conclude that in the neuroses and the perversions, the difference does not depend on the presence or the absence of defences but on their nature—defence by repression or a more primitive defence of a schizoid or splitting kind.

CONCLUSION

It seems that we can extract the following conclusions from our work:

i. The intense intermingling of aggressive and libidinal impulses obliges the ego of sexual perverts to defend itself against the fear which derives from this by putting a distance between itself and the unconsciously sought but feared object. This type of relationship is not specifically characteristic of sexual perverts, far from it, for it is to be found also in the neurotic defence system.

ii. However, what particularly characterizes sexual perversions is the more or less total and consciously experienced eroticization of the defence mechanism itself. When this eroticization is complete it alone suffices to bring about an orgasm.

Sometimes it is the anxiety consciously experienced which plays the same role and leads to the same result. This peculiar faculty of eroticization of defence mechanisms derives probably from early pregenital fixations.

It can be assumed that the ego of sexual perverts, too weak to overcome fear, evades the genital cathexis of the prohibited or feared object. It is necessary here to compare patients who can, thanks to their perversion, tolerate their impulses in relation to an

actual present object, with those whose perverse behaviour necessitates such a remoteness that it constitutes a flight from every living object.

The ego of the former is, however, sufficiently flexible (no doubt owing to an indulgent super-ego) to allow itself regressive pregenital satisfactions, directly eroticized, such as they were at the time of their appearance originally experienced in infancy.

This last hypothesis cannot, however, be applied to cases where perverse practices only constitute a condition preliminary to normal sexual relations. Perhaps the real object is found here to be sufficiently devaluated, owing to the deviation of perverse practices, to be able to be cathected without fear.

It is just this possibility of direct eroticization of defences which constitutes the major therapeutic difficulty which has to be attacked in the psycho-analytical treatment of perverts. For them the symptom is not merely a protection, it is at the same time a direct and conscious source of gratification, whereas in neurotics it is simply an unconscious substitute.

Therefore, one can only obtain satisfactory therapeutic results when, parallel to perversion, a neurosis co-exists. It is with the help of this latter that one manages to eliminate or reduce perversion. The work of integration and the strengthening of the ego, in consequence of the destruction of neurotic mechanisms, leads then to the abandonment of perverse practices: the modified ego has been able to overcome fear, and the defences which stood in the way of normal sexuality, and these have no longer any reason for continued existence.

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NOTES

S. Nacht, Directeur and S. Lebovici, Secrétaire

L'INSTITUT DE PSYCHANALYSE DE PARIS organise un séminaire de perfectionnement les 24, 25, et 26 Mai 1958. Ce séminaire est réservé aux psychanalystes français et étrangers membres d'un institut ou d'une société psychanalytiques ainsi qu'aux étudiants français et étrangers, régulièrement affiliés à l'un de ces organismes, en particulier à ceux que leur résidence empêche de participer régulièrement à l'enseignement et aux réunions des instituts et des sociétés de psychanalyse. Les inscriptions seront notées au fur et à mesure de leur arrivée et le registre d'inscription risque d'être clos avant le ler Avril 1958, au cas ou le nombre limite des 30 participants serait atteint avant cette date.

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A CONTRIBUTION TO THE STUDY OF FETISHISM[1]

W. H. GILLESPIE

The clinical material upon which this paper is based is derived from an analysis which was interrupted by the War. I had hoped to have collected more material and reached more definite conclusions, but there is nothing to be gained now by postponement. In view of the paucity of cases recorded in the analytical literature, publication of my incomplete findings seems justified.

It is not my intention to deal with the literature of fetishism. It is not very extensive on the analytical side; and on the non-analytical side, although extensive, it is not very illuminating. Freud has expressed his fundamental contributions to the subject with great lucidity, and there is no doubt to my mind that they provide us with the most important line of approach. But I feel sure that he did not mean to suggest that the last word had been said on the matter. Further additions of great value have in fact been made, notably by Sylvia Payne. I should like to thank her both for the help she gave me in the early stages of the analysis and for her very stimulating recent paper on the subject.[2]

It will be remembered that Dr. Payne laid special emphasis on the pregenital components determining fetishism, and on the importance of introjection-projection mechanisms. She said: 'In my opinion the fetish saves the individual from a perverse form of sexuality. The component impulse which would prevail if not placed under special control is the sadistic impulse' (p. 169). The aim, she said, is to kill the love object. Ample confirmation of these views is to be found in the analysis of my own case.

This brings me to what I conceive to be the crux of the problem of fetishism at the present time, and I want to present it in as lucid a manner as possible, at the risk of appearing elementary and obvious. The problem may be stated thus: Is fetishism primarily a product of castration anxiety, to be related almost exclusively to the phallic phase, and concerned to maintain the existence of a female penis;

[1]Read before the British Psycho-Analytical Society, February 7, 1940.

[2]S. M. Payne, 'Some Observations on the Ego Development of the Fetishist', this JOURNAL, Vol. XX, 1939.

or does the main dynamic force really come from more primitive levels, which undeniably contribute to give its ultimate form to the fetish?

Although Freud was the first to draw attention to the scopophilic and coprophilic components in fetishism he made it quite clear that he regarded it primarily as a method of dealing with castration anxiety and preserving a belief in the phallic mother. At the same time, he says, it saves the patient from the necessity of becoming homosexual, by endowing the woman with the character that makes her tolerable as a sexual object. He admitted that he was unable to say why the castration fear resulting from the sight of the female genital causes some to become homosexual, others fetishists, while the great majority overcome the experience. For the present, he says, we must be content to explain what occurs rather than what does not occur. But this lack of specificity in our ætiology is one of the problems of which we are becoming more and more conscious, and the time seems to have arrived when we must attempt to answer these more searching questions.

According to Freud's conception, then, the castration complex is the alpha and omega of fetishism. I think it would be fair to say that Sylvia Payne's paper, while by no means neglecting the importance of castration anxiety, tended to emphasize the mental mechanisms and psychic layers which the work of Melanie Klein and her followers has brought so much into the foreground of our discussions in recent years.

The fact that my own observations are based on one case only tends to invalidate any generalizations one might be tempted to make; for clearly it is difficult to be sure which facts are typical of fetishism and which are peculiar to the particular patient, and perhaps have little relation to fetishism as such. But as any one worker is unlikely to have the opportunity of analysing a large number of fetishists, it would seem that the only way we can tackle the problem is by a pooling of our experiences, and the tentative conclusions derived from the study of one case may therefore be of some value. Even though I am thus limited to one case, it will not be possible for me to give anything like a complete case history. The analysis was a fairly lengthy one, covering a period of nearly three years, and the material produced was at all times profuse; often indeed embarrassingly so.

I propose, therefore, after giving a brief general sketch of the case for purposes of orientation, to concentrate on one particular facet, corresponding approximately to one phase of the analysis. This facet is one which, so far as I know, has not hitherto received much attention from analysts. I refer to the patient's struggles and difficulties in

endeavouring to achieve a full genital potent relationship with a heterosexual love object. That is to say, I propose to examine the problem from the other end, as it were: instead of discussing what makes the patient a fetishist, to consider what kind of difficulties stand in the way of his normal sexual development. It is clear that these difficulties will throw a great deal of light on the factors responsible for fetishism.

The patient, whom I shall call A., when he came to me near the end of 1936, was a young man on the eve of his twenty-first birthday. He had already had a period of some eighteen months analysis with Dr. Eder, towards whom he had developed a very emotional, superficially positive transference. The analysis had been undertaken at his parents' request on account of his masturbatory activities, which were of a fetishistic nature. It had been abruptly cut short by Dr. Eder's death in the spring of 1936. This event had at the time only a superficial effect; but by the time he came to me some eight months later, a very severe reaction taking the form of a hypochondriacal depression had developed, and it was on account of this condition that he was referred to me.

When A., the third and last child, was born in 1916, his father was serving in the War. Hence A. saw little of him until the age of three, and this fact played no small rôle in his psychological development. His parents were again separated when he was twelve; this time it was his mother who went away for a period of about a year to join his older brother in Canada. Such a separation of the parents seems to be a not uncommon finding in fetishism, though I must confess that I am not clear what is its exact ætiological rôle, if any. Younger than the brother, but several years older than A., there was a sister.

A. was fed exclusively on the bottle, a fact with which he was fond of reproaching his mother. According to his account, hers is much the more dominant personality of the two parents. She is a very dynamic woman, much interested in intellectual matters, and for this A. greatly admired her, though analysis revealed underneath this admiration a deep reproach for her lack of a more flesh and blood relationship with him—a relationship which would have been realized had she given him the breast. At the same time, she was vivid and active, virile and virulent, as he expressed it. The father, on the other hand, according to A.'s account, was much more passive and placid. In this way it was possible for A. to become very confused as to the differences

between the sexes. Typically, the thing was worked out on the mental rather than the bodily plane. This tendency to intellectualization is a very characteristic feature in my patient. On the one hand it depends on an identification with the mother and a taking over of her attitude; but much more important from the dynamic point of view, I think, is its value as a defence mechanism against bodily anxieties. In fact, I came to realize that his intellectualization plays a rôle similar to his fetishism in combating castration and related anxieties. Intellect is something which a woman can have equally with a man; so that if one concentrates on intellect one can deny the fateful anatomical difference. Similarly, by taking activity as the criterion of maleness, he could demonstrate to his own satisfaction that the female was more male than the male. Besides castration anxiety, however, another very important motive unconsciously underlying the production of this theory was the need to convince himself that the mother was strong enough to be safe against the danger of his own (and also his father's) sadistic attacks, so that she could survive them and still be there at the end of it all. Here again there is a very close connection with the fetish; if anything was established with certainty about this it was that the fetish serves to protect the loved object from the dangers inherent in the fetishist's sadistic love with its annihilating tendency.

I cannot enter into a detailed life history of this patient, but I must say a word about the development of his fetishism. Apart altogether from reconstructions, it seems first to have become recognizable in the form of a fascinated interest in schoolboys wearing O.T.C. uniforms, at the age of ten or eleven. This interest was felt to be an unhallowed and forbidden one, ostensibly on account of his mother's strongly pacifist views; and indeed he had had the same feeling at a much earlier age about playing with toy soldiers, an activity which was not forbidden but one nevertheless of which he felt his mother disapproved. A very interesting light was thrown on this when he had a dream about a house with a dark attic, like a lavatory, in which he and his brother found boxes containing amber stones, and later, rifles. They feared an attack by a little miniature man, who was a murderer. There were many other details and associations to this dream, but the point for my present purpose is that after I had interpreted 'attic' as 'attack' A. recalled that at the age of eight he remembered seeing an old uniform of his father's in an attic, and his mother saying: 'Take that horrid old uniform

away!' In view of her attachment to the uniformed father during the War, A. seems always to have felt that her attitude towards uniforms and military things was a hypocritical one. The uniform here obviously stands for the father, and it is interesting in connection with the coprophilic significance of the fetish that A. on several occasions likened his mother's attachment to his father to a woman who likes a scent which you can't bear; but she makes such a fuss about not having it that at last for the sake of peace you say: 'Have your beastly scent!'

Beginning about the age of twelve, there developed a great conflict over the possibility of A. himself joining the O.T.C. The conscious attitude was one of horror at the idea and fear that he would be forced to join; and this was rationalized on the basis of pacifism; but unconsciously the determining phantasies were not so much purely aggressive ones as homosexual-sadistic. Being made a soldier meant being made into a woman, paradoxical though it may sound; or perhaps more accurately, being made into a suitable object for the sadistic sexual attentions of the father. The utmost horror was produced when his father actually suggested that it might not be a bad thing for him to join. This found its expression in the transference during a period when he was continually under the compulsion to ask whether I had ever been in an O.T.C.

A. managed to avoid joining the O.T.C., but he compromised by joining the scouts. One day he dressed himself in his scout uniform and tied himself up, but he did not know what to do next; this was at the age of thirteen or fourteen. The idea of tying up had been anticipated at much earlier ages, when he had tied up dolls and also a dog, tying its legs to the legs of a step-ladder and thus stretching them apart.

An emission was consciously produced for the first time at the age of seventeen, when he dressed himself in a black mackintosh and chained himself to a wardrobe. The result was a surprise to him. This experiment led on to more and more complicated and sadistically designed ones, with the use of wires, tight gagging, tying himself up in a sack, etc. He was just beginning to play with the idea of hanging and complete annihilation at the time when he was sent to Dr. Eder for analysis. The further development of the fetishism consisted of various elaborations of similar themes—women, but also occasionally boys, in different varieties of uniform or mackintoshes, and latterly almost exclusively nurses in uniform. There was of course always a

phantasy of a sado-masochistic kind woven round these figures; most commonly of an older woman humiliating and punishing a younger one. During the course of his analysis with Dr. Eder he modified his technique by embodying his phantasies in drawings rather than carrying them out on his own person, though this also continued to some extent. This modification served several purposes—it made it possible for him to bring his masturbation into the analysis, as it were; it represented at a much more unconscious level an invitation to the analyst to treat him as the figures in the drawings were treated; and it also served the purpose of a further line of defence against the anxieties connected with his destructive phantasies—the fact that it was mere drawings that he was dealing with was a reassurance that it was neither his real parents nor himself that were being treated in this way.

When he came to me for treatment, A. was, as I have mentioned, in a very depressed and hypochondriacal state. This was closely connected with the death of Dr. Eder. The hypochondria proved very refractory and continued through a large part of the analysis. Time does not permit me to go into it in any detail, but I should like to make a few remarks about it.

While introjective phantasies were obvious and were interpreted from the outset, it became more and more clear that a very important function of the hypochondriacal complaints was their use as a sadistic weapon against the parents, whom in fact he often reduced to a state of despair verging on breakdown. He used it particularly to disturb them at night. This activity often took the form of demanding that his father should examine him and find something, for example a positive Babinski. Although this 'something' that had to be found was ostensibly of a bad nature, it was evidently not entirely so, and in fact he often used terms of rather ecstatic admiration about his symptoms. They represented both a penis and a baby. His abdominal pains were labour pains, while his two legs with their twitchings and inequality stood for the two parents in intercourse. I want to make it clear that I am not discounting the importance of the introjective mechanisms that were at work, which were very clear at times, as when he said that he felt his body was fragile, like china, and full of blocks of dead things. All I am suggesting is that in a case of hypochondria of this type, introjection is not the whole story, and that interpretation would be inadequate which left out of account the phantasies derived from the phallic level. I have felt for a long time that there are at

least two types of hypochondria, the hysterical and the psychotic. I should regard this case as belonging to the hysterical group.

I should have mentioned earlier that A. was a medical student and when he came to me was just beginning his clinical studies. He was therefore able to elaborate his hypochondriacal ideas with a great wealth of detail, while at the same time he was not embarrassed by too exact a knowledge of clinical and pathological facts. Thus, his ideas about inequality of his legs, to which I have referred, were related to the idea of disseminated sclerosis, to which he clung for a long period. A similar fear was that of secondary carcinoma. In both cases the notion of an infinite and increasing number of bad things disseminated inside was of importance, and this was connected with fears about robbing his mother's inside and the difficulty of putting everything back in order. These phantasies came out in a large number of dreams, which led up to the dream of the attic. The principal object inside the mother towards which these attacks were directed turned out to be the father's penis, and the attacks were chiefly of an oral-sadistic kind. But I think it is a significant fact that it was just the penis against which they were directed. These phantasies were closely related to homosexual ones about sadistic attacks on his own inside by his father's penis, as in a dream about letting a man into the house, knowing the man was going to murder him. This theme appeared also in inverted form in the idea of a woman enticing a penis or a person inside with the object of destroying it there. At the same time he unconsciously regarded his own penis as a kind of breast, much sought after by women, whom he could nourish or frustrate at will, the latter being much the more exciting phantasy.

This combination of the phallic and the oral found a pretty expression in a hypochondriacal preoccupation with his tongue which A. developed later. This symptom was connected not only with phantasies about the hidden female penis but also with oral sadistic phantasies. There were also anal elements—the tongue was dirty. I have to admit, indeed, that the picture I have given so far is misleading in that I have failed to bring out the quite prominent anal and urethral features of the case. They were very obvious and I could say a great deal about them if space allowed; but rightly or wrongly I had the impression that they were of less fundamental importance, probably because they did not lend themselves so readily to assimilation with the rest of the material. Thus it is quite possible

that I have unduly neglected them; but if so it was not for want of seeing them, for they were manifest on the surface. In connection with the anal material, however, just as with the oral, a close association with phantasies from the phallic level was not far to seek, in as much as the fæces nearly always represented a baby and were connected with a passive homosexual attitude to the father.

All this anal, urethral, and oral material linked up in an intimate way with the mackintosh fetish, for the mackintosh served as a protection for the mother against such assaults. Not only so; it also seemed to stand for the period of milk feeding, the rubber of the mackintosh being a substitute for the rubber teat. The fetish may thus be regarded, in Freud's phrase, as a memorial not only to castration fear but also to the trauma of weaning.

I pass on now to the other main aspect of the case which I wish to discuss: that is, to the difficulties A. encountered in his efforts to achieve a normal genital relationship. These difficulties may be for convenience divided into two groups: first a series of abortive and relatively short-lived attachments, with which I shall deal quite briefly, and secondly a love affair which occupied the whole of the last year of the analysis, and which still continues.

There do not seem to have been any really early attachments to girls. Up to near the time when his first analysis started, he was occupied principally with what he called the prince and princess phantasy, in which the prince represented himself. The main theme of this phantasy was misunderstanding, resulting in a quarrel and the separation of the prince and princess. This was the climax of the phantasy, and the subsequent reconciliation was relatively devoid of affect. These phantasies started at the age of twelve, at a time when he had been left in a boarding school while his parents made a new home in London—an unhappy period which is associated in his mind with being forced into unpleasant and uncomfortable clothes, such as an Eton jacket and collar; it left its mark on his masturbation phantasies.

A. translated this phantasy almost word for word into reality in the course of his first attachment, which began about the age of eighteen. He seems to have chosen his partner with almost uncanny skill, and she played her frigid part to perfection. There were constant misunderstandings and quarrels, and she would allow no caress or show of affection, even in words. This type of relationship afforded A. so much satisfaction that he continued it over a long period until

it reached the final conclusion of separation that was inherent in it. It is really inaccurate to say that it continued so long because of the satisfaction it afforded; it would be truer to say that he clung to this relationship because it gave him just the safeguards he needed; and one of the chief of these safeguards was just that he should not achieve satisfaction but on the contrary should be frustrated. This is a point to which I shall return later when discussing the last girl. I believe it may almost be described as the keynote of fetishism.

The next girl was semi-Asiatic, and the anal note was dominant. She did in the end come to mean to him merely fæces and he finally expelled her with real relish after having come into conflict with her father. He felt he had killed her by this expulsion, but so far from being troubled with guilt about this, his feeling was one of annoyance when she gave signs of further life.

There followed a fellow medical student, but this attachment never proceeded far. Its end was interesting. He began one hour by saying that he felt marvellously better. Someone had told him that a lady had been ringing for him. At once he thought it was this girl, was overcome with emotion and had a mass peristalsis, as he put it. He then

described his latest masturbation. The picture consisted of a nurse in frock and collar but without apron, cuffs or belt; there was also a fully-dressed nurse and a sister with flowing cap. This phantasy arose out of his excitement in seeing a nurse dressing at a window. It turned out that actually she was undressing, and this was a big disappointment, for the real excitement was in seeing the uniform put on, and the full phantasy would have been of a woman in a beautiful evening dress or nightdress being metamorphosed into a nurse in uniform. Here again we get the theme of satisfaction dependent on frustration, or rather a sort of partial frustration, for while the nurse is not the mother, still in phantasy she is the mother in disguise.

A. then told me that a friend to whom he had confided his passion said: 'Oh yes, she's quite a nice girl, but she does have such a B.O.' All the other men agreed that the girl smelt. It was only then that A. realized that he had known it all along, but didn't mind. The realization that everyone thought this was a tremendous relief. It meant that a pretty girl could smell bad, that fæces could be good. I suggested that another factor in his feeling of relief was due to the consideration that no one would grudge him his girl or try to take her away—for the theme of having his love object taken away was always very strong and prominent in the transference, though in fact the result was

generally engineered by himself. The following day he remarked casually that he had lost interest in this girl—so that again the girl became fæces, and as soon as he was conscious of this it was all over.

It was only three days later that he began to talk of a nurse he was working with who attracted him. He felt he wanted her to be in ordinary clothes and that all the details of uniform, collar stud, etc., which so excited him in his phantasies, repelled and sickened him in her. At the same time, he was continually getting erections when with her, a thing that had never before happened to him by reason of a girl's company. He said that in addition to all the agony from his symptoms there was excitement as well and a feeling of new possibilities in life.

A few days later A. took this nurse, whom I shall call B., to the pictures. He was not to have come to analysis the next day, but he rang up and made a special appointment, because, as he said, he had had such an experience last night as never before. B. was very friendly and cuddly and put her head on his arm. She was so warm, it really got ridiculous and he wanted to laugh. He felt uneasy because her conduct was so unrestrained. In brief, he had managed to get a girl who was warm instead of cold, because she satisfied his ascetic requirements through being a nurse, who was literally constrained by her uniform as well as her discipline. At this time his mother was in hospital, and he felt that she must be got rid of by death in order for him to have B. Later, following a reassuring visit to his mother and the realization that she was not to be castrated or to die, he became depressed, feeling he had no love left for B., for he now felt he had the penis and no longer that she had something he had not. There was a constant recurrence of this anxiety lest he find B. empty and lose all love for her. What he liked most about her and what gave him most confidence was feeling that she was physically strong and so able to withstand his aggression; and on the other hand her warmth and responsiveness most roused his anxiety. He felt that if he was not thwarted and got all he wanted there would be nothing left. Here again we find this apotheosis of frustration which seems to me so characteristic of fetishism, and which brings it into such close relation to masochism. It results in many of the fetishist's aims being so to speak inverted, as I see it. For instance, his scopophilia is satisfied not by seeing the naked body, which repels him, but rather by the clothes which serve to conceal it and

frustrate the primary impulse. For the pleasure in free bodily movement and the sadistic use of the
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musculature there is substituted pleasure in bonds and tight lacing. Manual masturbation is taboo, in the sense that it seems not to occur to him as a possibility; on the contrary, the hands are generally tied. It is therefore no surprise to find that the straightforward genital relationship is also intolerable. It appears to him as something disgusting and dangerous. The underlying phantasies were undoubtedly numerous and complicated, and they aroused powerful resistances which made this perhaps the most difficult part of the analysis. I must content myself with saying that they related chiefly to castration and to incorporation, and more specifically to incorporation by the woman involving castration of the man. Anal features were so strongly interwoven that it appeared likely that an important feature of the operative phantasy consisted of anal incorporation.

Homosexual phantasies, often quite conscious, were always in evidence. One of his first dreams about B. was actually of this nature, representing her as taking the active rôle in anal intercourse with him and causing him to produce a dirty baby.

Another important aspect of his relation to her may be expressed by saying that it was an oral relation to the father's penis. This equation of B. with the penis came out in the most interesting way in connection with one of the masturbation drawings, which represented a cross with the figure of Christ on it. Another cross was marked on the ground, and B. was kneeling on this cross, tied up, and gazing at the crucifix. When A. gave me this drawing, the first thing I noticed was a remarkable hiatus in the figure of Christ, involving all that part in the vicinity of the genitals. The second point was that B.'s position on the other cross corresponded very closely to this gap, so that she appeared to represent a huge erect penis. The conscious idea was that B. was doing penance for having come to A. It appeared from the analysis of this drawing that the sexual object of the phantasy was not just the father's penis, but really the penis plus the mother, or the mother with the father's penis.

There were a number of phantasies of attacks on the interior of the mother's body with a view to finding the penis; and it was clear that these phantasies were motivated only partially by castration anxiety—another important factor was the phantasy of the penis as a source of food. At about this period, A. spontaneously underwent a period of abstinence from masturbation for the benefit of the analysis. This led to great excitement during several of the analytic sessions, excitement felt largely in the mouth, and combined with phantasies of
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nurses in white, stiff, crackly uniform, and so on. The mackintosh was felt to be a protection against the dangers to the object inherent in these phantasies of oral aggression. Unless the woman was protected in this way, he felt unable to imagine a breast except for eating, a vagina except to be ripped open, a woman's neck except to strangle her.

There is another leading feature of this case which I have not sufficiently emphasized, and that is the strong tendency towards the mechanism of the turning of the impulse against the self. This was most conspicuous throughout. Thus, though A. always referred to his phantasies as sadistic ones, they were at least as obviously masochistic, since he was clearly identified with the victim. The same thing applies to the uniform or mackintosh: it is not merely a covering and protection for the sexual object, it also serves the same purpose for himself. Perhaps the climax of all these phantasies as regards intensity of feeling was one which he had in the analysis during the period of

abstinence; essentially it represented himself as a child in a grown-up mackintosh being copulated with in the most marvellous way by his father. A further elaboration of this phantasy was that when in the mackintosh he is really inside his mother's body and is identified with her, and that in this way his father indirectly copulates with him.

He said that the mackintosh is like a wall surrounding a town so that you can't see out. This wall is rotten at its base. He associated to this the idea of a penis dropping off, and fæces. He then had a picture of the anus and genitals, all very dark and shadowy. I interpreted that the rottenness at the base of the wall referred to the possibility of seeing up from underneath—there was much confirmatory material pointing in this direction. A. confirmed this by observing that the mackintosh must be completely buttoned up so that no clothes are visible and it is possible to imagine the body naked underneath, and also by the excitement he obtains by putting on the mackintosh over his naked body. This aspect of the matter is closely in line with Freud's theory about foot fetishism.

As the affair with B. continued, A.'s anxieties relating to his oral and phallic aggression became more acute. He felt that kissing her meant eating her up and feared her excessive kissing. He had by this time become intensely attracted by the idea of the naked female body. He had what he described as terrible erections, but said he 'couldn't press the point'. At last he bought a condom, but was much relieved at B.'s refusal of intercourse. He tried to escape from the situation by excessive masturbation.

One of his deepest fears was of eating up and destroying his object in attempting to gain exclusive possession of it. There was also all along a strong reluctance to commit himself to any love object that was outside or separable from himself. The fetish helped him to avoid the dangers of being dependent on a woman—the danger first of the woman refusing, and secondly, of external forces taking her away. It appeared that the external force was not necessarily the father, but might be the mother herself, the 'woman' in this case being not the mother as a whole object, but her breast as a part-object. Owing to these fears, for him a goal attained was no satisfaction, but only the struggle for it; he said: 'It is like following the sun; you can never reach it, and if you did you would be burnt up.' For him, the conditio sine qua non for excitement was inaccessibility.

After some work on this material, A. made two or three abortive attempts at intercourse, but was unable to get or keep an erection at the appropriate moment, in spite of attempts to stimulate himself by phantasy. Once he said he didn't want to get inside B., and proceeded to bite his finger. This led him on to say that a woman in uniform results in masturbation and orgasm; a woman not in uniform has a quite different effect—she makes his mouth water, his teeth gnash, and he wants to eat her up.

Since the analysis was interrupted, his potency has steadily increased, though the old phantasies have not entirely disappeared.

It is impossible in the space at my disposal to give any more clinical material or to touch on the many other interesting sides of the case, and I must now try briefly to sum up the points which seem to me to emerge.

First, this case once again proves abundantly the over-determination of the fetish. I think it also demonstrates beyond doubt the far-reaching importance of castration anxiety in this connection. Ample confirmation is provided also for Dr. Payne's findings regarding the importance of sadism and of introjection-projection mechanisms.

Here, however, I should like to raise a point which has only to be mentioned to be obvious, and yet I feel it is sometimes neglected: the point namely that introjection need not be an essentially oral process, though I should imagine there must always be what one might describe as an oral flavour about it. Thus, I found again and again in

this case that what appeared on the surface to be phantasies based on oral incorporative tendencies turned out to be on another level phantasies

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regarding phallic penetration, impregnation, etc. This is all so obvious that I feel ashamed to point it out; but I am not sure that it always gets the attention it deserves. There is a tendency, I think, to feel that the oral aspect is 'deeper' and therefore more important, which means presumably more active dynamically in the particular state we are dealing with; but this is surely by no means axiomatic. Although it is difficult to be sure of one's objectivity in judging such matters, I certainly gained the impression that the superficially obvious oral and anal features were often used as a disguise for more important underlying phallic anxieties; and yet I would not regard them as a mere disguise—I think they must have considerable significance in their own right. In other words, the fact that the disguise takes that particular form is by no means a matter of chance, but must be intimately connected with the nature of the phantasies that are being repressed and constitute in fact a kind of 'return of the repressed'.

That brings me to a second point which I feel is not only of theoretical but also of practical importance; I mean the problem of what factors are chiefly responsible for the occurrence of castration anxiety. Are we to regard it as the talion punishment for incestuous phallic wishes directed towards the mother, as Freud appears for the most part to do? It seemed clear to me, in this case at least, that one very important determinant is to be found in the oral aggressive impulses directed towards the father's penis incorporated in the mother. And yet it is castration anxiety that we are dealing with, not the trauma of weaning or something of that sort. If the oral and anal elements were the essential ones, it would be very difficult to account for the well-known clinical fact that fetishism is a phenomenon found almost exclusively in males.

I would stress the essential part played by masochism, and what I have referred to as the inversion of the sexual aim, for want of a better term. By this I mean that the aim of the component impulse seems to be frustration rather than satisfaction, and indeed a rather unsatisfactory kind of satisfaction is derived from frustration. Obviously this is closely related to masochism, if indeed it can be distinguished from it.

The homosexual element is also much in evidence in this case, which illustrates admirably Freud's statement that the patient is saved by his fetish from homosexuality, and it shows how narrow may be the margin.

Finally, reverting to the problem of phallic versus pregenital, I

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should like to make the following suggestion with regard to the ætiology of fetishism. May it not be that what we have actually to deal with is neither the one thing nor the other, but a combination of the two? I do not simply mean that I want to have it both ways—what I am suggesting is a specific constellation, to use Dr. Glover's conception. I do feel that there are points about this case which give strong support to this view; in particular, the extraordinary compound (for it is much more than a mere mixture) of phallic, oral and anal aggressive and erotic phantasies.

To put it in another way, I would suggest that fetishism is the result of castration anxiety, but of a specific form of castration anxiety, a form produced by a strong admixture of certain oral and anal trends.

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NOTES ON THE ANALYSIS OF SEXUAL PERVERSIONS1

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In the Three Essays Freud uttered a famous aphorism which is sometimes treated as though it epitomizes all he has to say about the perversions. I refer to his statement that 'neuroses are, so to speak, the negative of perversions'. Now neurosis is, of course, in Freud's view, a compromise between a sexual impulse and its repudiation, and the statement, as it stands, suggests that the perversion represents the positive, unmodified sexual impulse, whose modification through defensive processes on the part of the ego gives rise to the neurosis. Thus it seems implied that in perversion we are dealing with an id activity, little interfered with by ego or superego. This at least is the interpretation put upon Freud's early discussion of perversion by many of the non-analytic critics. I need scarcely add that a general survey of Freud's writings on the perversions shows that this is a travesty of his view. In his discussions of homosexuality, of sado-masochism, of exhibitionism and voyeurism, and of fetishism Freud quite clearly credits the pervert with numerous other defence mechanisms besides regression, and obviously regards the ego as deeply involved in the process of perversion formation. One of the most interesting of these discussions is related to the splitting of the ego in fetishism, a splitting which is to be found, as he points out, not only in other perversions but in neuroses and psychoses as well.

The mechanism of splitting, both of the ego and of the object, has been discussed in detail by Melanie Klein; she relates it to denial, omnipotent idealization, and annihilation. Although she has described these as schizoid mechanisms, she clearly does not mean that they are to be found only in schizophrenics, but rather that they are amongst the earliest and most fundamental of the defence mechanisms of the ego. I have no doubt myself that splitting of the object and of the ego, denial and omnipotent manipulations of the relation to objects play a leading part in perversion formation and help us to understand its relationship to psychosis. Mrs. Klein suggests that in this early phase such mechanisms play a rôle similar to that of repression at a later stage. Here we have an important clue, I think, to the striking phenomenological differences between neurosis and perversion, which led Freud to say that the one is the negative of the other. In other words, we are dealing not with a contrast between defence and no defence, but between repressive defence and more primitive defence of a schizoid or splitting character.

Now the splitting mechanism, as described by Mrs. Klein, is characteristic of an early stage of ego development, when ego organization is still very imperfect and disintegration can easily take place, It is a stage when both libido and aggressivity are expressed predominantly in oral terms and when the breast is the object of both these instinctual impulses. The importance of the oral factor in various perversions has been increasingly stressed in more recent contributions. Indeed, this emphasis on the oral factor is to be found at least as early as 1921, in Sadger's Geschlechtsverirrungen.

On the other hand, if we turn to Fenichel's discussion of the perversions, we find the main emphasis consistently placed upon the castration complex, and this ætiological monotony has led to a good deal of criticism. No analyst experienced with perverts can doubt that the castration complex is in fact extraordinarily prominent in these patients. I suggested in my previous paper that we are dealing not with an either—or, that is, either with defence against castration anxiety or defence against some earlier, pregenital danger situation—but rather with a specific modification of castration anxiety, determined in its form by earlier, pregenital, and especially oral developments. Some

such hypothesis seems to me inescapable if we are to do justice not only to the two classes of psycho-analytic experience just mentioned, but also to the well-known clinical fact that some perversions are extremely unequally distributed between the sexes. It is well known, for

1Paper read at the 17th International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Amsterdam, 1951.

instance, that fetishism and genital exhibitionism are incomparably commoner in the male sex. If one lays all the ætiological emphasis on oral factors and on such primitive mechanisms as splitting of the ego and of the object, how is one to account for such a striking clinical finding? There is always a danger that the fascination of more recent discoveries may lead to the neglect of earlier, well-established findings. By standing on Freud's shoulders it may be possible for us sometimes to see further than he could; but if we abandon that position and rely on our own stature alone, our horizon is apt to become very limited.

Clinical Material

Case A. This man came to me at the age of 30 with severe personality difficulties and gross sexual inhibition, his sexual life being confined to masturbation with sado-masochistic phantasies and shoe fetishism. He was extremely perturbed over the idea that he might be homosexual, and intensely afraid that everyone would suspect or find out his guilty sexual secrets.

This man illustrates in an extreme degree the splitting of the ego. He has two quite distinct personalities, which he calls upstairs and downstairs. Upstairs is a brisk man of the world, polite, considerate, and cooperative, capable of working out clever and successful systems of operation on the Stock Exchange, or of outstanding success in more academic fields. On the couch, however, it is mostly downstairs that is in operation. Downstairs is completely absorbed in the nursery situation, and for it everything is seen in these terms. Downstairs is a baby, and even speaks with a baby voice, entirely different from the Oxford tones of upstairs. Downstairs, in fact, takes to the transference situation like a duck to water, and intensely resents anything that interferes with its projections, as when the analyst shows signs of being a real person. Downstairs is ruthlessly aggressive and egocentric, but at the same time very timid, and analysis has to proceed with the patient holding the surgeon's hand, as he puts it. It is essential that the analyst be someone who can be ruthlessly attacked without showing signs of being hurt, and without hitting back. Hence I was for long identified with Golly, a plaything that was of great emotional significance to A, to whom he could confide his joys and sorrows, as well as make safe sexual experiments, such as rubbing him between the legs. Golly was a compromise between a living object and a completely inanimate one, such as a shoe.

Underlying this is the need to control the object fully, so that it can neither frustrate, nor cause guilt when sadistically attacked. This involves an avoidance of animate objects—A felt he could not make any sexual approach to a girl unless she were anæsthetized. Thus in the transference the analyst must be completely passive and impersonal, and is practically never referred to as 'you', but in the third person, as 'the analyst'. There is, at the same time, an intense vigilance towards me, with the closest attention to the slightest sound I may make—coughs, lip movements, 'tummy rumbles'—all of which are at once interpreted as having reference to the patient, generally as indicating disapproval, and so as danger signals. This dual attitude comes out in the fact that although he sedulously avoids looking at me, he constantly tries to catch me unawares by coming early, and by approaching my door silently and without knocking. Here

there is a clear relation to an early primal scene, and, as will appear later, it is really a third person, or father's penis inside mother, towards whom he is so vigilant and who threatens persecution. The primal scene seems to have occurred at the age of about two years, when his father came back from the war and usurped his place with his mother.

Shortly after this there occurred another experience, which he calls 'The Lady on the Lawn'. The details are not clear, but its essence must have been a sexual approach to the mother, modelled on what he supposed father to have done—this he conceived as a sadistic attack which mother at first resisted but later succumbed to and enjoyed. She was in fact frigid and regarded father as a sexual and even homicidal maniac, so the little boy's idea may be accurate enough. In the scene on the lawn, his approach to mother was rebuffed with horror and, I think, an implication that he was identified by this behaviour with the bad father. His further development seems to stem from this rebuff. It is characterized by splitting of the object. Mother becomes idealized and desexualized—a beautiful lady in the sky, cool, asexual towards whom one must deny one's love. The sexual object undergoes various transformations. In part it becomes Golly, or a shoe—but a shoe in relation to a little boy, who is having it put on and laced up tightly. The further development has much reference to the father and to punishment and the typical sexual phantasy is that a little boy is being treated in this way by nurses or other hostile adults, who are talking over his head about him, saying what they are going to do to him, the climax being to take him up to Daddy's room, where he will be punished.

A further split in the object takes place between the idealized mother and the bad nurses. He wants to tell mother of his ill-treatment by the nurses, but fears to do so, for they are always standing by to contradict him, and will take a terrible revenge when they get him back in the nursery. In the transference this situation comes out repeatedly—he feels there is a third person in the room, so he cannot tell me anything directly, but only hint at it, or say the opposite. On several occasions he has felt so

sure that there was someone listening that he has had to get up and look behind my screen. At a deeper level, this hostile, persecuting third person represents the father's penis inside the mother; a constantly recurring infantile phantasy or dream is of creeping up a tunnel under the bed, made of sheets; suddenly a terrifying figure like Punch appears, chases him and torments him by tickling—here again the homosexual persecution betrays a strong erotic component. Recently, he thought I avoided greeting him lest I betray by my voice that I was not really myself but a bad terrifying person inside me, masquerading in my external form.

Again, in the fourth year of analysis, there was a strong tendency to identification with the pregnant mother—he thought he was getting very fat, growing breasts and turning into a woman. His sister was born when he was two years old, and I think the scene on the lawn probably occurred during the pregnancy. Interpretations relating to this pregnancy have met with the most violent resistance.

The fragmentary material I have given will serve to illustrate the splitting mechanism, the withdrawal from personal objects, the denial of reality and the strong introjective and projective mechanisms. The characteristic feature, which brings this so near to psychosis, is his calm acceptance of these mechanisms and phantasies—so long as he is on the couch and 'downstairs' is in the ascendant, the ego does not resist these ideas. However, 'upstairs' is always there in the background to make sure that downstairs is safe, in or out of the analytic situation, and it seems to be this ego split, allowing a certain autonomy, and in case of danger even a degree of leadership to upstairs, that saves him from psychosis. At the same time, we have the splitting of the object, which

occurs in more than one direction; there is the split into idealized, desexualized mother, versus sexual, sadistic, bad father and nurses, who are so dangerous, on the one hand, and the fetish class of objects on the other—Golly, shoes—with whom sexuality is permissible and safe. Indeed, it had not occurred to him till he was about twenty and read a book on sexual perversions that his peculiar feelings about shoes were anything but harmless. This illustrates the very important function of perversions in avoiding guilt feeling. Whatever form they may take, they are essentially not the guilty œdipal activity. In the case under discussion, sexuality and sadism is projected on to a conveniently well-adapted father figure, or on to wicked nurses. As far as the patient is concerned he can say 'I don't do anything, it is done to me—the shoe is put on, the laces are tightened, it grips me.' Essentially, this is the masochistic defence against guilt.

Case B. My second patient, a flagellant, is singularly free from sexual guilt, though he has many phantasies of being found out and publicly exposed. This guiltlessness is readily understandable where he is being tied up and beaten; but the mechanism seems to operate just as successfully when he does the beating. What becomes of guilt feelings in sadism? I am not sure that we have the answer to this question, but I suspect that again the splitting mechanism has something to do with it. My second patient was very conscious of the double life he led and chuckled inwardly to think what people would say if they only knew that this pillar of society, as he is to outward appearance, indulged in such outrageous behaviour. He himself, however, regarded his perversion as perfectly harmless, and insisted that most people just do not have 'the right idea' about it. That is, he and those like him abhor real cruelty, and enjoy themselves only if their partners are enjoying the complementary rôle as well. None the less, one of his more refined pleasures was to revisit a girl he had beaten and examine the weals. Thus here again there is a denial of reality in the sexual sphere, and assertion that pain is pleasurable and wounds, whether in oneself or another, something to gloat over.

In addition to this split in the ego, there was in this case an equally significant split in the object. By 'object' I do not mean the female partners of his flagellations, who were of little significance to him as people, but only as fellow-enthusiasts and necessary to the execution of his phantasies; these were always in some degree spoiled by the imperfections of reality. No, the real object seemed to be the instrument of whipping, and his attitude to whips was very similar to that of a fetishist to his fetish. He was fascinated by them, collected them, and gazed at them in shop windows. The point of interest here is that he had also a severe phobia of snakes, which was a real burden to him as it interfered seriously with his hobby of travelling. He frequently dreamt of them, typically that a snake suddenly confronted him in a passage. The connection between whips and snakes, and their common phallic significance had been entirely unconscious before analysis.

The oral factor showed itself in an eating disturbance and bouts of excessive drinking to the point of amnesia. He came to analysis regularly just five minutes late, repeating his behaviour at his mother's dining table.

In this case, too, there was a marked withdrawal from all emotional involvement with people; what he most wanted in the world was to be left alone with his hobbies. This led to a

peculiar transference situation. He much appreciated me as the only person to whom he could talk freely; but at the same time the transference never developed into a personal relationship, and he did not expect any real help from the analysis, looking for his salvation to some external event which would free him from his daily tasks and enable him to carry out his phantasies undisturbed. The event he chiefly relied on to produce

this happy result was the death of his widowed mother, to whom he was extremely strongly, but extremely ambivalently attached.

Case C. This is a case of shoe fetishism in a man of 30. The material was completely dominated by a powerful castration complex and a desperate defence against feminine identification. The mother was the prime castrator, who wanted both him and his one-year-younger brother to be girls. The brother independently developed a boot fetishism, but I was not able to examine him. The mother made a religion out of a dead and angelic older sister, whom the patient never saw. She kept a room always locked which contained a life-sized doll, and after her death it was found to contain an extraordinary hoard of useless articles, including 140 handbags. The analysis was regarded as a castration threat, which would completely remove the fetish, leaving him nothing. In the shoe, on the other hand, he gets part of the woman, instead of losing his penis, as in sexual intercourse.

His actual homosexual ideas, that is, of a man as sexual object, were firmly repressed and covered up by the intense emphasis on the castrating mother and his rage and aggressive phantasies towards her. The father appeared in the rôle of prohibitor both of sex and of aggression against the mother. He was the anal expert, and frequently interfered with the patient's bowels by purgatives, enemas and suppositories. C had in his character a paranoid layer of mistrust of everyone and felt they were plotting against him. I think it was the stout defences against this paranoid-homosexual layer that led to the premature end of the analysis after two years—he left me to go and work with another father figure.

C had a great fear of any close association with a woman, because he would identify with her and so become a woman. But also he resented the demand made of a man that he should be active in sexual intercourse. Moreover, a married man has to feed the woman. The fetish makes no such demands.

There were some very interesting phantasies in connection with his rage against the castrating mother. In one of these he penetrates her body with his penis; she then turns into a hairy gorilla-like creature with great teeth with which she bites off his female nipples—that is, a talion revenge for his oral attack on his mother's breast. In another phantasy he was made female through his body being penetrated by breasts. In a dream, he was doing an operation inside a woman's body, castrating her internal penis. In another access of rage against his mother, after penetrating her body, he tears her up from inside with his penis. His mother inculcated a fear of falling on something and being split open, especially in his testicles. He had a phantasy of his mother's shoe kicking him and splitting up his anus and rectum. He had many phantasies of tearing me to pieces. He blamed me because he is in pieces and I don't put him together again. This material was closely connected with the parturient mother, and with memories of seeing her urinating.

The configuration of the material at this point led me to a speculation about the phantasy associated with the split ego and split object. Is not the female genital the split object par excellence, and cannot the phantasy of a split ego arise from an identification with this split genital? I am aware that when we speak of splitting of the ego and of the object we are referring to mental mechanisms which we assume to underlie the phenomena, and that phantasies pertain to a different level of discourse—nevertheless, phantasies, our own no less than our patients', must always play a part in the way we conceptualize these underlying processes. It seems to me, therefore, that the phantasy of being oneself split in pieces just as the vulva is split may well be very relevant to the mental mechanism of splitting of the object and introjection of the split object, leading to splitting of the ego. It is implicit, of course, in such a phantasy of the vulva as a split

object that it was once intact, and that the splitting is the result of a sadistic attack, whether by the father or by oneself. I shall return later to this subject when discussing castration anxiety in relation to the perversions.

Case D. In this man of 26, the presenting symptoms were manifest homosexuality in the form of adoration at a distance, together with marked ideas of reference in relation to this, reaching delusional intensity. In addition he had developed elaborate and bizarre masturbation techniques, often with a masochistic quality, such as pushing pencils up his urethra and umbrellas up his anus. In this case there was an obvious split in the ego similar in principle to that of A; but here there was even more fear of the part identified with the id and its aggressiveness. This fear was largely projected on to me. On the one hand he blamed me for encouraging expression of the dangerous explosive part; on the other, he thought I was a timid prim and conventional person, so that he had to keep control of the

situation on either count. In this way there was repeated in the transference the central problem of his relationship to his mother. She, he was always convinced, whilst cold towards his father, was erotically attached to him—for instance, she would appear naked in his room as if by accident—and the whole onus of avoiding incest was borne by him alone. The mother was dangerous not only erotically but also aggressively, as a death-dealer. He thought she took pleasure in having animal pets killed; and she told her children that as she had given the children life she could also take it away. The boy took flight to his father, following a pattern laid down in his second year when his mother was pregnant. The resulting homosexuality led to further anxiety of a paranoid character. The persecutors were not, however, the homosexual objects, but other men, or his mother, or other women. So here there is a split in the object of a homosexual—the erotic feelings being directed to an absurdly idealized homosexual object, worshipped at a distance, the aggressive feelings dealt with by projection leading to feelings of persecution by both men and women. The split in his ego became manifest in the transference. He felt that I sympathized only with the superficial intellectual side of him that talked to me, not with the feeling side, which I feared. He identified himself with simple emotional natives, whilst I was a typical Englishman—that is, he exteriorized the split in himself by projecting half on to me. Conversely, he had projected all his erotic œdipal feeling on to his mother.

Oral-incorporative material was prominent, and was related to his persecutory preoccupations. He was very fond of eating, but he must not be watched, as this led to persecutory ideas. While travelling in a bus he had the phantasy that unless he kept his mouth open he would incorporate the bus conductor, who would have become very small, but would swell up inside and burst him. He dreamt of going into the Underground, which then disintegrated—he blamed me for encouraging him, in the analysis, to take the risk thus symbolized. He not only feared to incorporate me or my penis, but also feared I would incorporate him and then persecute him. For instance, I was supposed to have a dictaphone, so that after he had murdered me he would be convicted on the evidence so recorded. He also thought he heard me make movements sometimes which he believed were caused by my preparing a strait-jacket for him. There were frequent erotic phantasies about me, which also caused him much trouble, their repudiation being chiefly projected on to me.

It will be seen that this patient was very near to psychosis and actually over the border line from time to time, in my opinion. His paranoid anxiety in relation to me led him to break off treatment after a year; but he had enough insight for me to succeed in

persuading him to continue with another analyst, with whom, however, the same story was repeated in some eighteen months.

Lack of space forbids me to quote more clinical material, apart from mentioning one patient seen twice in consultation at the Maudsley Hospital. This man had obsessive phantasies of hurting women, ultimately by biting into them, and an irresistible urge to photograph his wife partially or completely unclothed. Points of interest here were, first, a memory of being suckled and bathed by his mother—he was not weaned till the age of two—secondly a strong feeling of marvelling and envy at the structure and functions of a woman's body, and a desire to participate in his wife's experience of childbirth. He had a vivid childhood phantasy of being a surgeon to whom mothers brought their children, mostly little girls, in whom something had worn out, which he was to replace from his store of spare parts. We see here an omnipotent phantasy of being able to satisfy the woman's need for a penis; and on the other hand a strong wish to identify with the woman. I have no doubt that photography here signifies introjection.

Conclusions

To sum up, let me try to formulate some theoretical conclusions. First, I must repeat that the castration complex plays a leading part in every case, and that is to be taken for granted in connection with what follows. In the case of fetishism, for example, I believe that the fetish has relations to what Winnicott has described in a recent paper as transitional objects—those inanimate objects to which so many young children become inseparably attached in an affectionate way during the first year or so of life. But I think it is confusing the issue if we proceed to speak of these objects as fetishes. Fetishism, in my view, cannot arise until the phallic stage of the Oedipus complex has been reached; it occurs as a result of a partial regression, motivated primarily by castration anxiety. This partial regression reaches back to the oral-sadistic stage, and to the stage of ego development and object-relationship characterized by splitting of the ego and the object—the stage of normal development to which, I believe, Winnicott's transitional objects belong.

My analytic experience of the perversions has been weighted on the side of fetishism; but experience of other perversions leads me to believe that much of what is true of fetishism

has a more general validity. Thus, there is always a strong castration complex leading to at least a partial abandonment of genital sexuality by way of a regression to pregenital levels. The relation to the castration complex accounts for the affinity to the neuroses, noted so early by Freud. The partial regression to oral and early anal levels corresponds to the clinical fact that perverts are not infrequently near to, or actually develop, psychosis. In so far as they do not actually do so, I wish to suggest that the reason is to be sought in their exploitation of the splitting mechanism, which permits them to remain in part at the phallic level, with a superficially normal relation to reality, whereas another part of the personality is virtually psychotic. It is the fact that the first part remains to act as liaison officer with reality that prevents clinical psychosis.

Here I must explain what I have in mind by the term 'splitting mechanism'. No doubt there are numerous ways in which the ego and the object may be split, and the clinical result must depend on the nature of the split. Where both or all of the split-off parts of the ego are at a primitive level of object relationship, the split will lead to psychosis of a schizophrenic kind; thus, splitting need not preserve from psychosis. The particular kind of splitting I have in mind, however, is that to which Freud drew our attention in his Outline of Psycho-Analysis and in his paper 'Splitting of the Ego in the Defensive

Process'. Here, you will remember, Freud described how, in cases of fetishism, one part of the split ego retains a good relation to reality, whilst the other part, using the denial mechanism, clings to what is virtually a psychotic delusion. I suggest that it is this type of unequal split which is characteristic of perversion.

I should like to add that the anxiety connected with the female genital, which we call in brief castration anxiety, is not just castration anxiety if by this we refer merely to the shock of finding no penis and the classical conclusion following on this discovery. Much is contributed to the anxiety by the latent pregenital, sadistic factors which become activated only following the regression. It is in this connection that I think the term 'split object' has relevance to some of the sadistic phantasies that crystallize around the split female genital. Projected oral and anal sadism leads to the paranoid features which are so characteristic not only of homosexuals but of perverts in general. Sadism so endangers the object that it has to be protected in elaborate ways—by abandoning direct sexual demands on it, by substituting a homosexual object, by limiting oneself to looking or being looked at; most exquisitely of all in fetishism, by substituting an inanimate object with which one can do anything without hurting the ultimate personal object; an object, moreover, which is always there, never frustrates and never retaliates; an object, too, for which one does not have to fight with the father. The pregenital sadistic aim has been especially stressed by Sylvia Payne.

In conclusion, I wish to suggest that what characterizes perversion and makes it different from neurosis or psychosis is a special technique of exploiting the mechanism of splitting of the ego, by which the pervert avoids psychosis, since a part of his ego continues to accept reality and to behave fairly normally in the non-sexual sphere. The split allows his mind to function on two levels at once—the pregenital, oral-sadistic level corresponding to psychosis, and the phallic level, where his conscious mental content bears so much resemblance to the repressed content of the neurotic. This may explain why it has proved so difficult (as Glover pointed out) to place the perversions satisfactorily in a developmental series of psychopathological states.

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THE GENERAL THEORY OF SEXUAL PERVERSION1

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The subject of perversion is one which has been by no means neglected by psycho-analysts, yet in view of the central importance given to it so early by Freud in the theory both of sexuality and of neurosis, it is perhaps surprising that even more attention has

not been directed to it. One reason for this may be found, paradoxically enough, in the very fact that Freud wrote a masterpiece on the subject at such an early stage. His Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (6), published exactly half a century ago, is an outstanding example of his genius, for in that work he had the insight to perceive clearly the intimate connection between the manifestations of early sexuality, of adult sexual perversions, and of neurosis and psychosis. I think the essence of the book may be expressed by saying that perversion represents the persistence into adult life of elements of infantile ('polymorph-perverse') sexual activity at the expense of adult genitality, these infantile strivings having failed to undergo the normal transformations of puberty, and having failed also to succumb to the defence mechanisms that would have converted them into neurotic symptoms. Or, to use Freud's own famous phrase, 'neuroses are, so to say, the regative of perversions'. Thus, perversion is represented as the persistence of the infantile. Looked at from the point of view of the Three Essays, perversion is seen as a vicissitude of instinct, or to express it in later terminology, as an id phenomenon. In the Three Essays Freud seems to regard it as a more or less direct manifestation of component sexual instincts, and therefore scarcely capable of further reduction.

It is this aspect of Freud's early formulation which I think may be responsible for the relative sparseness of psycho-analytic writings on the subject, for it conveys the impression that little more can be said; and perhaps even more important, it suggests that the therapeutic outlook is a gloomy one and hence tends to discourage clinical work with the perversions.

In his interesting book, Sinn und Gehalt der Sexuellen Perversionen (Meaning and Content of the Sexual Perversions) (3), Dr. Medard Boss of Zurich bases his criticism of the psycho-analytic theory of perversion principally on this aspect of Freud's formulations—that is, on the concept of component instincts and of the possibility of a causal-genetic understanding in psychology. Or so, at least, I apprehend his criticism. Although he mentions later analytic work on the rôle of the ego, he concentrates in this connection chiefly on Reich, Schultz-Hencke, and Horney, and accordingly concludes that it is not possible to apply one line of criticism to such widely divergent views—a conclusion with which one can only agree. What Boss seems to overlook is that there has been a steady growth of psycho-analytic theory since 1905, theory of the ego as well as of the id—a development which was mainly due to Freud himself. We are not dealing with a situation of either-or—either id or ego—but with both interacting. This fact, however, is not apparent from a study of the Three Essays, which was written before egopsychology existed except in the most rudimentary form. In spite of Freud's frequent additions and emendations in later editions, the book was left substantially in its original form, as a historical document. It is therefore necessary to look elsewhere if one wishes to appreciate the present-day status of the psycho-analytic theory of the perversions.

Only a few years after the publication of the Three Essays it began to be recognized that sexual perversions might have to be regarded as defensive formations rather than simply as pieces of infantile sexuality that had evaded defence. This was implicit in Freud's 1910 paper on Leonardo (8). It first became fully explicit in 1919, in 'A Child is being Beaten' (9), where a particular perverse fantasy is unequivocally

1Contribution to the Panel on Perversions. Read at the 19th International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Geneva, 24–28 July, 1955.

related to the Oedipus complex and to various forms of defence against it. In this paper Freud further suggests that it may be found that the relationship to the Oedipus complex has a more general validity for all sexual perversions.

I wish now to draw your attention particularly to a very important theoretical paper which appeared four years later, in 1923. I refer to Hanns Sachs's 'Zur Genese der Perversionen' (On the Origin of Perversions) (25), a paper which unfortunately has not been translated into English. Here Sachs has undertaken the task of reconciling the viewpoint of the Three Essays with the new ideas put forward by Freud in 'A Child is being Beaten'. The essential problem as he saw it at that time was the relation of perversion to the Oedipus complex, to the unconscious, and to repression. 'A Child is being Beaten' had shown that the component instinct is not continued through in a straight line to the perversion, but must first pass through the Oedipus complex and be deflected by it somewhat as a light ray is refracted by passing through a lens. Thus we find that perverse gratification is subject to quite narrow conditions which far exceed the demands of a simple component instinct. Moreover, these component instincts generally appear in the perversion only after an elaboration which has raised them to a higher level and mad them capable of normal libidinal cathexis of an object, sometimes of the most refined kind. In view of the evident fact that perversion is only the conscious part of a much larger unconscious system, the statement that neurosis is the negative of perversion does not exhaust the subject. In neurosis the repressed phantasy breaks through only as an egodystonic symptom, whereas in perversion it remains capable of consciousness, being egosyntonic and pleasurable; but apart from this difference in sign there is much similarity between the two, for both are mere residues of the great developmental process of infantile sexuality, the conscious representatives of unconscious instincts. Indeed, in some cases there is an alternation between neurotic phobia and perverse gratification, and Sachs observed such a change when in the course of analysis a phobia of beating gave way to sado-masochistic masturbation fantasies. I have myself observed two cases where whipping fantasies or practices were combined with an intense snake phobia.

Sachs saw drug addiction as something intermediate between perversion and neurosis, in that like perversion it is clearly a gratification, yet like neurosis it has ostensibly nothing to do with infantile sexuality. This relationship with drug addiction was, of course, worked out much more fully nine years later by Edward Glover (17).

Sachs drew attention to the general finding in a perversion that in spite of the transformations it may go through in the course of development, one element remains constant, for example the idea of being beaten. This is seen particularly plainly in fetishism, where one piece of a repressed complex remains conscious, like a harmless screen memory, which hides the essential piece of infantile sexuality. Thus, he says, a perversion comes into being through the preservation in consciousness of a specially suitable piece of infantile experience, on to which the infantile pleasure is displaced.

Now this particular piece of experience must have some peculiar relationship with the ego, which allows it to escape repression—and this brings us to the kernel of Sachs's theory. He suggests that when there is a conflict involving a specially strongly developed component instinct, complete victory may be impossible for the ego, so that repression may be only partially successful; the ego then compromises by repressing the greater part at the expense of sanctioning and taking into itself the smaller part—that is, allowing conscious expression to the perverse phantasy. The mechanism of perversion seems to be this solution of division, whereby one piece of infantile sexuality enters the service of repression and so carries over pregenital pleasure into the ego, whilst the rest undergoes repression. 'A Child is being Beaten' illustrates how this mechanism is used

especially to deal with the task of repressing the Oedipus complex, and Sachs proceeds to show that his hypothesis fits equally well the case of male homosexuality based on too strong fixation to the mother, where resolution is achieved only by sanctioning homosexual fixation, which is incorporated in the ego. Sachs emphasizes, however, that what he has described is only the mechanism, not the dynamics of the instinctual victory. The component instinct involved owes its strength not to the alliance with the ego but to factors of constitution and experience which have caused it to develop more than normal strength.

I would remind you again of the date of this paper, 1923. Many of you may agree with me that Sachs has constructed here a remarkably

firm and coherent foundation for the building up of a theory of perversion. Much remained to be added, of course, but I would suggest that it should be added to, rather than replace, Sach's formulation. These necessary additions include the part played by the superego, a concept just beginning to emerge in 1923; the central importance of castration anxiety; the rôle of aggressive impulses and of the death instinct and of the related anxieties, together with erotization as a defence against anxiety; the rôle of denial and splitting of the ego and of the object in the defensive process; and the relation of perversion to reality sense and to psychosis.

Let us turn our attention first to the superego, since Sach's theory is to an important extent one related to structure, and his structural formulation is clearly incomplete without reference to the superego. It is a remarkable fact that in Freud's later writings on the perversions—'Fetishism' (13), 'Splitting of the Ego in the Defensive Process' (14), and in the relevant chapter of his 'Outline of Psycho-Analysis' (15) —he nowhere mentions the superego. I wonder whether the explanation is to be sought in a persistence in Freud's mind of his original conception that neurosis is the negative of perversion, so that if the superego plays an essential part in the formation of neurosis, perhaps perversion comes about through the absence of superego activity. Be that as it may, this tendency to ignore the superego in perversion is evident also in many other psycho-analytic writings besides Freud's.

If we accept as generally valid Freud's suggestion in 'A Child is being Beaten' that perversion is an outcome of the Oedipus complex, then in so far as the superego is to be regarded as the heir of the Oedipus complex it would be natural to look for a particularly close relationship between perversion and superego. In fact, this has been fully recognized in the case of masochism, for example in Nacht's monograph on the subject (21). And indeed, although the rôle of the superego in other perversions has been less explicitly emphasized, it is only fair to say that this has been done implicitly in a considerable number of more recent contributions which make it clear that perversion constitutes a defence not only against castration anxiety but also against guilt feelings. It is possible, of course, that much that was formerly expressed in superego terms is nowadays stated instead in terms of relationship with internal objects. In fact, in Sylvia Payne's 1939 paper (23) she writes that 'The relationship of a man to his fetish is the same as his relationship to his internalized parents', and that 'The fetish therefore stands for part-objects which have been eaten, and also preserved. The internalized objects may have the significance of pre-genital superego formations.' She also describes how the defensive and protective function of the mackintosh fetish rests on its capacity to defend against sadistic attacks, especially those connected with excretory activities. That is, the fetish protects the 'good' object against the aggression which might destroy it. I have quoted this paper merely as one example of a number of contributions which touch on the superego. Many of these contributions refer, however, mainly to the

pregenital type of superego, which is not universally acknowledged to deserve that name.

Recently there has been an interesting approach to an investigation of the rôle of the classical superego in perversion formation. I refer to the work of Melitta Sperling based on the simultaneous analysis of mother and child; of Otto Sperling on group perversion; and of Kolb and Johnson on the attitudes to sexuality of the parents of adolescent perverts. These investigations have drawn our attention to the way in which a faulty superego may be developed when the parental model which is offered is one which prohibits normal heterosexuality above all else, and treats pregenital or perverse activities with relative leniency, or even encourages them, because they fulfil an unconscious perverse need in the parent, who is therefore unable to cope with the child's behaviour and his defective superego. This reminds one of Sadger's (26) views of over thirty years ago about how women have no need of perversion because they have ample opportunity to gratify their pregenital sexuality in their relations with children.

I should like to illustrate some of these points by a clinical example. The patient's sexual activity consists of male shoe fetishism, sadomasochistic fantasy, and masturbation. His mother was closely attached to her own dominating mother, who is said to have wrecked his parents' marriage. The mother was sexually frigid and regarded the father as a sexually perverted monster, implying also that all men were like that and that male sexuality was sadistic and disgusting. The primal scene was visualized in these terms, but with a horrified

realization that finally the mother succumbed and perhaps actually enjoyed it. The little boy had been breast-fed, then weaned and handed over to a series of nurses whom he felt to be sadistic. Approaches to his mother on an oral-breast level met with a relatively gentle rebuff. Later, however, a genital approach called forth an intense emotional reaction in her, a precipitate withdrawal, and an open equation of him with the unspeakable father. This episode proved to be the turning-point in my patient's development. The violently prohibiting and deeply injured mother was introjected and continued from then on to be felt as something inside his head, pinning him down with a finger-nail (it appears that in the oedipal scene she had pushed his head away). His sexual impulses continued active, but ever since then his preoccupation has been to find outlets for them which would not offend the mother or her internalized imago. When about seven years old he was caught by her masturbating, and this too was treated as an injury he had done her, making Mummy very sad, and he had to promise solemnly never to do it again. Needless to say, this promise has been broken on innumerable occasions, but honour is satisfied if it is only a 'little' masturbation, and especially if emission is avoided or is minimal. The positive side of the perversion, the shoes and sado-masochistic fantasies, are related to the father, whom he attempts to keep as a bad figure, but one for this very reason compatible with sexuality, especially when this can be disguised as a situation of punishment. I have picked out these elements in a very complex case with a view to illustrating the importance in perversions of faulty superego formation arising from faulty sexual adjustment in the parents.

If we attempt now to amplify Sachs's formulation by allowing due importance to the superego, perhaps we might alter it to run something like this: A sexual perversion consists in the acceptance and adoption by the ego of a certain element or elements of infantile sexuality, the other elements (and in particular the oedipal wishes) being warded off by repression or other means. The reason for the ego's adoption of the chosen piece of infantile sexuality may lie in its innate or acquired strength which the ego is too weak to repress and which it therefore accepts in order to be the better armed

with id energy to oppose the rest; but the dynamics and economics of the situation cannot be understood without reference to the superego. That is to say, the choice by the ego of the particular piece of infantile sexuality is dictated to an important extent by the ego's judgement of what will please, or at least pass relatively unchallenged by, parental imagos, eventually internalized, i.e. by superego formations. The attempt to please the superego is especially obvious in masochism, but it operates in other perversions also. This formulation must be understood to refer to pregenital archaic superego formations as well as to post-oedipal ones concerned with the supposed parental attitude to genital sexuality, so that the ego is coping also with reintrojections of projected pregenital id impulses; hence perversions can be seen to deal with the danger of destructive impulses directed towards the object, which threaten both the self and the object. The perversion thus preserves a modicum of sexual outlet and pleasure whilst at the same time it avoids the unpleasure of anxiety and guilt feelings that would otherwise arise.

Let us turn now to a consideration of castration anxiety, whose significance in the perversions was so much emphasized by Freud, and following him by Fenichel (4). No one who has had much clinical experience with sexual perverts can fail to have been impressed by the way in which they are dominated by castration fear and defence against it. Differences of opinion arise only over the significance of this concentration of attention and fear on the penis, for it is open to different interpretations. Ever since the analysis of Little Hans (7) Freud stressed the fateful conjunction for a little boy of an external castration threat for masturbation with the observation of female genitals, leading the boy to the conclusion that castration really may happen to him. Now few will be disposed to deny that such experiences may have an important crystallizing effect and may give conscious form and expression to the fear; but as a full explanation for such a dominating and far-reaching anxiety Freud's theory seems to depend too much on accidental and external factors, too little on endopsychic ones. The problem was discussed very fully by Ernest Jones in his 1933 paper, 'The Phallic Phase' (19), which I cannot attempt to summarize. He stresses the part played by sadistic projection, the genital sadism being derived from earlier oral sadism which, he says, may well be the root of male as well as of female homosexuality. Perhaps we may put it in the following way: the

stumbling-block for the future male pervert comes in the oedipal situation when the sexual aim becomes an actively phallic one directed to the mother. Such active phallic function is necessarily combined with a certain amount of aggression, and in the pathological case which we are considering the sadism is of such a high intensity and so much reinforced by preexistent oral and anal sadism that it gives rise to intense anxiety and the need to retreat from the situation. The essential point of controversy seems to be this: what are the main sources of this intense anxiety, and why is it experienced as a threat to the penis? The talion principle at once springs to mind; if the penis is the executive of the sadistic impulse, punishment will naturally fall on the penis, and if the father is regarded as the injured party, he will be the castrator. This is undoubtedly true at one level—the question is whether this is the level from which the anxiety is mainly derived. Bak (2) has recently drawn attention to the conflict created by identification with the penisless mother, leading to a wish to give up the penis in order to maintain the identification and avoid the danger of separation from her; this gives rise to the alternative danger of castration, and the dilemma may be solved by a fetishistic compromise, where the apparent insistence on the maternal phallus is really a protection against the id wish to shed the penis in order to maintain identity with the mother.

In Jones's view the boy fears castration as the consequence of his phallic impulse to penetrate into the mother's vagina, of which he has unconscious knowledge. The danger of the mother's vagina is due to the presence of the father's penis, and conflict arises when feminine wishes are developed or exploited to deal with this internal penis in the vagina, the reason for conflict being that such feminine wishes imply castration. Thus, there is a measure of agreement with Bak's viewpoint; but for Jones the phallic mother is really a combined parent figure, and we are dealing with a disguised triangular relationship, not just an alternating identification with two different mother-imagos. The ostensibly 'feminine' attitude to the father's penis inside the mother conceals oral and anal sadistic designs on it, phantasies of getting possession of it and destroying it. These sadistic wishes are displaced on the cavity supposed to contain the penis, so that penetration into the vagina exposes the boy's penis to as much danger as his father's penis would face if it entered the boy's sadistic mouth. If this view is accepted, then Jones is justified in claiming that oral sadism is at the root of excessive castration anxiety, and hence at the root of sexual perversions in so far as they are a defence against castration anxiety.

We can now perhaps add to our formulation that the force which drives the ego to the particular defensive manoeuvres that we have recognized as characteristic of perversion is fear, which takes the form of intense castration anxiety, and that the intensity of this anxiety in relation to penetrative phallic activity is due to sadistic components, ultimately of oral origin.

This brief discussion of the significance of castration anxiety has brought us naturally to the next topic, the rôle of aggressive impulse. I will not say the rôle of the death instinct, for that would raise a thorny theoretical problem, which I hope we can avoid. In his paper on jealousy, paranoia, and homosexuality (10) Freud described a new mechanism in certain cases of homosexuality where the homosexual love relationship is based on a defence against earlier intense jealousy and hostility for rival brothers; and two years later in 'The Economic Problem in Masochism' (11) he attempted to elucidate the problems of sadism and masochism in terms of the death instinct. It was more especially in England, however, largely owing to the influence of Melanie Klein's work, that specially strong emphasis began to be placed on the rôle of early aggressive impulse with its associated anxieties, and on the defence mechanisms of introjection and projection; this general tendency naturally showed itself also in writings on sexual perversion. This is true, for instance, of Edward Glover's paper 'The Relation of Perversion Formation to the Development of Reality Sense' (18), where he suggests that perversions may form a developmental series reflecting stages in the overcoming of anxiety concerning the individual's own body or external objects, and that they represent attempts at defence against introjection and projection anxieties by means of excessive libidinization. Certain perversions are the negative of certain psychotic formations, and they 'help to patch over flaws in the development of reality sense.' Jones's paper 'The Phallic Phase', already mentioned, is also very relevant in this connection.

A further contribution to the rôle of aggression in homosexuality was made by Nunberg in 'Homosexuality, Magic and Aggression' (22),

where he describes a type of male homosexual whose aim represents a compromise between aggressive and libidinal impulses, expressed in the desire to possess strong men and thus become magically strong and potent, at the same time achieving revenge on the rejecting mother, restoring narcissism, and strengthening the weak ego. It will be noted that a similar concept of a destructive love, from which the object needs protection, is to be found in Payne's paper on fetishism (23), though she lays more stress

on its pregenital nature. Another, more recent, example is Bak's 1953 paper on fetishism (2) in which he has stressed the danger of destruction of the object and the perverse defence against this. Indeed, the report of the discussion of perversions at a meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association in 1953 (1) states that the identification of narcissistic object choices as defences against destructive wishes appeared in almost every contribution.

Herbert Rosenfeld (24) has brought forward clinical material to demonstrate how paranoid anxieties encourage the development of strong manifest or latent homosexuality as a defence, and how clinical paranoia may result when the homosexual defence fails. The idealized good father figure is used to deny the existence of the persecutor. Rosenfeld stresses the mechanism of projective identification in homosexuals, which he traces back to infantile impulses of forcing the self—not just the penis—into the mother.

These and similar contributions clearly show not only the importance of aggressive impulse and the defence against it in the aetiology of perversion, but also the close relations that exist between perversion and psychosis, confirming Glover's statement (18) that certain perversions are the negative of certain psychotic formations, libidinization and idealization of the object being exploited as a defence against aggression and its concomitant paranoid anxieties.

Another aspect of this relation to psychosis must now be considered, approaching the matter from the angle of the ego. I have in mind in the first place Freud's discussion of splitting of the ego and the mechanism of denial of reality. For an understanding of the theoretical background we must take account of Freud's 1925 paper on 'Negation' (12), which was further elaborated by Ferenczi in 'The Problem of the Acceptance of Unpleasant Ideas' (5). The essence of negation is that the ego can by this means extend its boundaries in that it accepts what would otherwise remain repressed, with the proviso that this particular thing is consciously denied. Freud's 1927 discussion of fetishism (13) gave a prominent position to this mechanism of negation, whereby the ego at once defends itself and enlarges itself. The boy's castration fear leads him to deny his perception that the female has no penis. This use of negation enables him to preserve his belief in the female phallus, yet at the same time he gives up the belief and constructs a compromise object, the fetish. The fetish represents the female phallus in which he can still believe and which now absorbs all the interest previously directed to the latter; at the same time he is aware of real female genitals and is left with an attitude of aversion to them. Freud remarks that such a dual attitude to unacceptable reality can occur in other non-psychotic conditions besides perversion.

Many years later, at the end of his life, Freud took up this problem again in 'An Outline of Psycho-Analysis' (15) and in 'Splitting of the Ego in the Defensive Process' (14). In psychosis, he says, there is not a complete withdrawal from reality but a split in the mind; if the stronger part is detached from reality then the necessary condition for psychosis is present. Such splits can be found also in fetishism and in neuroses, but in neuroses one of the contrary attitudes is repressed, so that there is no split in the ego. In fetishism, too, we can speak of a split in the ego only when the patient continues to dread castration despite his fetishistic denial of it. This means, I suppose, that if the fetishistic defence succeeds in warding off castration anxiety, the state of affairs resembles that in neurosis, where repression obviates any split in the ego.

In this discussion Freud concentrated his attention on what was happening in the ego. It is easy to see, however, that he could equally well have approached the matter in terms of the object, and have spoken of a splitting of the object in fetishism, the fetish representing one product of the split, the still dreaded female genital the other. Equally

obviously, the one is a 'good' object, the other a 'bad' one in the sense of Melanie Klein. In fact, her paper on schizoid mechanisms (20) elaborated this concept of splitting of the object, and it seems reasonable to attempt to establish a connection between splitting of the ego and splitting of

the object as defensive processes. It will be remembered that Rosenfeld (24) drew attention to the rôle of projective identification in male homosexuality. Now, identification with the object would account for the coincidence of the two splitting processes, and it is a widely accepted fact that narcissistic object choice is characteristic of perversion in general, not only of homosexuality. This would be in agreement with Bak's formulation of fetishism (2), with its alternating or simultaneous identification with the phallic or penisless mother. In my Amsterdam paper (16) I made an attempt to combine Freud's concept of splitting of the ego with Klein's splitting of the object, and I suggested that a successful exploitation of these mechanisms saves the pervert from psychosis; and that when the split in the ego fails to salvage a sufficiently important part of the ego for the service of reality adjustment, then psychosis is the result, a clinical outcome not unfamiliar in sexual perversions.

This discussion has been concerned essentially with perversion in the male, though no doubt much of it is relevant also to female perversion. I have avoided opening up the latter subject, partly because it is clinically much less important, partly because our knowledge of it is so much scantier, and partly out of considerations of time.

I will now attempt the difficult task of summarizing very briefly the principal points to which I have drawn your attention, and I must hope you will pardon the inevitably dogmatic formulation.

The raw materials of perversion are supplied by the constituent elements of infantile sexuality. A clinical perversion, however, is generally specialized in an elaborate way, leaving only one or two routes open for achieving sexual excitement, discharging sexual tension, and establishing a sexual object relationship. Such a perversion represents a defence against the Oedipus complex and castration anxiety. The defence involves a regression of libido and aggression to pregenital levels, so that there is an increase of sadism, leading to further anxiety and guilt feeling and defences against them designed to protect both the self and the object. Libidinization of anxiety, guilt and pain is specially characteristic as a method of defence in perversion.

The ego's behaviour and defensive manoeuvres are no less important for an understanding of perversion than are the vicissitudes of instinct. The ego adopts a certain piece of infantile sexuality and is enabled in this way to ward off the rest. The ego is able to do this, first because the superego is specially tolerant of this particular form of sexuality, secondly because of a split in the ego and in the object such that an idealized object and a relatively anxiety-free and guilt-free part-ego are available for the purposes of a sexual relationship, which takes place, so to say, in an area where the writ of reality-testing does not run.

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EGO PSYCHOLOGY AND INTERPRETATION IN PSYCHOANALYTIC THERAPY

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While during half a century of its history the development of psychoanalysis has been comparatively little influenced by simultaneous discoveries in other fields of science, the various applications of psychoanalysis have almost continuously influenced each other. It is in this sense that the history of psychoanalysis can be viewed as a progressive integration of hypotheses. The clearest interrelationship exists between clinical observations and the development of both psychoanalytic technique and theory (23), (24). The development of the structural point of view in psychoanalysis, i.e., the development of psychoanalytic ego psychology, can profitably be traced in terms of such an interdependence. Freud was at one point influenced by his collaborators in Zürich who impelled him to an intensified interest in the psychoses. This led him to formulate the concept of narcissism and thus to approach the ego not as a series of isolated functions but as a psychic organization. The second group of clinical

impressions that favored the development of a structural psychology was the observation by Freud of individuals motivated by an unconscious sense of guilt, and of patients whose response to treatment was a negative therapeutic reaction. These types of behavior reinforced his conception of the unconscious nature of self-reproaches and autopunitive tendencies, and thus contributed to the recognition of important characteristics of the superego. There is little doubt that other clinical impressions to which Freud referred during these years were derived from what we would today describe as 'character neuroses'—cases in whose analyses the unconscious nature of resistance and defense became particularly clear and which, therefore, facilitated

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formulations of unconscious and preconscious functions of the ego.

However, these events were not fortuitous. Nobody can believe that the clinical impressions of which we speak reached Freud accidentally. Surely Freud did not turn to the study of psychoses merely to engage in polemics with Jung, or in response to suggestions of Abraham; nor can it be assumed that his interest in character neuroses was due only to an increase in the incidence of character neuroses among his patients during the early 1920's, and hence to a 'psychosocial' event (17)—though it is probable that such a change of frequency distribution occurred. It is obviously more sensible to assume that a readiness in the observer and a change in the objects observed were interacting.

Freud's readiness for new formulations is perhaps best attested by the fact that the principles of ego psychology had been anticipated in his Papers On Technique1 (18). Most of these papers were written contemporaneously with his first and never completed attempt at a reformulation of theory, which was to be achieved in the Papers On Metapsychology.2 The precedence of technical over theoretical formulations extended throughout Freud's development. It was evident during the 1890's when in the Studies in Hysteria3 Freud reserved for himself the section on therapy and not that on theory. Several years later, when his interest in dreams and neuroses was synthetized, and the importance of infantile sexuality gained ascendancy, he was first concerned with a modification of therapeutic procedure: the 'concentration technique' was replaced by the technique of free association (22). Similarly, Freud's papers on technique during the second decade of the century anticipate by implication what a few years later he was to formulate in terms of ego psychology. His advice that analysis should start from the surface, and that resistance be analyzed before interpreting content implies principles basic in ego psychology. This accounts for

1Freud: Coll. Papers, II.
2Freud: Coll. Papers, IV.
3Freud (with Breuer): Studies in Hysteria. Translated by A. A. Brill. New York: Nervous and Mental Disease Monographs, 1936.

the status of Freud's papers on technique in psychoanalytic literature: they have retained a pivotal position and most treatises on technique have illustrated or confirmed rather than modified his rare fundamental precepts. If one rereads Freud's address to the Psychoanalytic Congress in Budapest in 1918 (11), one becomes aware of the fact that many current problems concerning the variation of technical precepts in certain types of

cases, as well as the whole trend of the development that at present tries to link psychoanalytic therapy to psychotherapy in the broader sense, were accurately predicted by Freud. The development which he predicted became possible, however, through the new vistas that ego psychology opened to the earliest and probably best systematized modifications of psychoanalytic techniques, the development of child analysis by Anna Freud, the psychoanalysis of delinquents by Aichhorn, and later to some of the various modifications of technique in the psychoanalytic treatment of borderline cases and psychoses.

Not only did ego psychology extensively enlarge the scope of psychoanalytic therapy, but the technique of psychoanalysis of the neuroses underwent definite changes under its impact. These changes are part of the slow and at times almost imperceptible process of development of psychoanalytic technique. Isolated changes which constitute this development are difficult to study because what one may describe as change can also be viewed as difference, and differences in technique among analysts who share approximately the same fundamental views may be due to many factors; however, if we study the trends of changing attitudes, we are in a more favorable position.

Neither all nor most of the changes in psychoanalytic technique are consequences of the development of some aspect of psychoanalytic theory. If we reread Freud's older case histories, we find, for example, that the conspicuous intellectual indoctrination of the Rat Man was soon replaced by a greater emphasis on reliving in the transference, a shift which has no apparent direct relation to definite theoretical views. Similarly, better understanding and management of transference was probably not initially connected with any new theoretical insight. It was

4Such a view is not uncontested. In describing her own development as an analyst Ella Sharpe stresses the fact that only familiarity with the structural concept, particularly the superego, enabled her to handle transference problems adequately (31, p. 74). For a similar report of his early technical vicissitudes see also Abraham (1).

5This naturally does not apply to all individuals. The relation of theoretical insight to therapeutic procedure varies from analyst to analyst, and there is no evidence upon which to base an opinion as to which type of relation is optimal.

6These or similar formulations of the analysis of resistance were achieved in two steps, in the writings of Wilhelm Reich (27), (28), and of Anna Freud (6). The difference between them is significant. Reich regards the problem predominantly as one of technical 'skill'; formulations tend to be oversimplified or exaggerated. They lead to the rigorous 'resistance' or layer analysis, the shortcomings of which have been criticized by Hartmann (18). By Anna Freud, resistance is fully seen as part of the defensive function of the ego.

a process of increasing skill, of improved ability, in which Freud and his early collaborators shared,4 not dissimilar to that process of a gradual acquisition of assurance in therapy which characterizes the formative decade in every analyst's development. But other changes in psychoanalytic therapy can, I believe, clearly be traced to the influence of theoretical insight.5 Every new discovery in psychoanalysis is bound to influence to some extent therapeutic procedure. The value of clinical presentations is that in listening to them we are stimulated to review our own clinical experiences, revise our methods, and to profit—in what we may have overlooked or underrated—from the experience of others. To assess this influence of ego psychology it is necessary to recall the ideas which developed synchronously with or subsequent to the new structural orientation: the psychoanalytic theory of instinctual drives was

extended to include aggression, and the series of ontogenetic experiences studied included in ever greater detail preœdipal conflicts deriving from the uniqueness of the mother-child relation. A historical survey of the psychoanalytic literature would, I believe, confirm that these new insights were having reverberations in therapy, influencing, however, mainly the content of interpretation and not the technique of therapy in a narrower sense. A gradual transformation of technique came about largely through better understanding and improvement in the handling of resistances. In interpreting resistance we not only refer to its existence and determine its cause, but seek also its method of operation which is then reviewed in the context of other similar types of behavior as part of the defensive activities of the ego. Resistance is no longer simply an 'obstacle' to analysis, but part of the 'psychic
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surface' which has to be explored.6 The term resistance then loses the unpleasant connotation of a patient who 'resists' a physician who is angry at the patient's opposition. This was the manifestation of a change in what may be described as the 'climate' of analysis.

In one of his last papers Freud (12) defended analytic interpretations against the reproach of arbitrariness especially in dealing with resistance; he discussed in detail the criteria according to which, by the patient's subsequent reaction, correctness of the interpretations can be verified. In doing so he stresses an area of coöperation between analyst and patient and implicitly warns against dictatorially imposed interpretations.7 That does not mean that it is possible or desirable always to avoid opposition of the patient to any interpretation, but it means that through the development of ego psychology a number of changes in the technique of interpretation have come about—not 'random' changes, characteristic of the work of some analysts and not of others, but changes that constitute a set of adjustments of psychoanalytic technique to psychoanalytic theory.

ILLUSTRATIONS

To clarify issues, I cite first a simplified version of an incident in the analysis of a six-year-old boy reported by Anna Freud (6, p. 119). The visit to the dentist had been painful. During his analytic interview the little boy displayed a significant set of symptomatic actions related to this experience. He damaged or destroyed various objects belonging to the analyst, and finally repeatedly broke off the points and resharpened a set of pencils. How is this type of behavior to be interpreted?

7Waelder (33) has further elaborated this point.
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The interpretation may point to retaliatory castration, may stress the turning of a passive experience into an active one, or may demonstrate that the little boy was identifying himself with the dentist and his aggression. All three interpretations can naturally be related to the anxiety which he had experienced. The choice between these and other possible interpretations will clearly depend on the phase of the analysis. The first interpretation, an 'id interpretation', is directly aimed at the castration complex. The second and the third aim at mechanisms of defense. The second emphasizes that passivity is difficult to bear and that in assuming the active role danger is being mastered. The third interpretation implements the second by pointing out that identification can serve as a mechanism of defense. It might well prove to be a very general mechanism in the little boy's life. It may influence him not only to react aggressively,8 but to achieve many goals, and may be the motivation of many aspects of his behavior. The interpretation that stresses the mechanism of identification is,

therefore, not only the broadest, but it may also open up the largest number of new avenues, and be the one interpretation which the little boy can most easily apply in his self-observation. He might learn to experience certain of his own reactions as 'not belonging' (i.e., as symptoms) and thus be led an important step on the way toward readiness for further psychoanalytic work.

We did not choose this example to demonstrate the potentialities of an interpretation aimed at making the use of a mechanism of defense conscious, but rather in order to demonstrate that the situation allows for and ultimately requires all three interpretations. A relevant problem in technique consists in establishing the best way of communicating the full set of meanings to the patient. The attempt to restrict the interpretation to the id aspect only represents the older procedure, the one which we believe has on the whole been modified by the change of which we speak. To restrict interpretation to the defense mechanism only may be justifiable by the assumption that the

8This is probably what Anna Freud means when she says that the child was not identifying himself 'with the person of the aggressor but with his aggression'.

9Another apparent discontinuity or 'jump' in reaction, no less frequent and no less important, is designated by what Hartmann calls 'the principle of multiple appeal' in interpretations (18). Examples of this kind make the idea of interpretation proceeding in layers, advocated by Wilhelm Reich, highly doubtful (27), (28); see also in this connection Nunberg (26) and Alexander (2).

patient is not yet ready—a valuable piece of caution, though it seems that there is a tendency among some analysts to exaggerate such caution at times. It may also happen that though we carefully restrict the range of interpretation the patient reacts as if we had not done so. While our interpretation points to the mechanism by which he wards off danger (e.g., identification), the next set of associations causes the patient to react as if we had interpreted his femininity. A sequence of this kind indicates normal progress: the interpretation concerns the warding-off device, the reaction reveals the impulse warded off.9

No truly experimental conditions can be achieved in which the effects of alternative interpretations can be studied. Comparisons of 'similar cases' or comparisons of patients' reactions to 'similar situations' help us to reach some useful generalizations. The occasional situation under which somewhat more precise comparisons can be made is the study of patients who have a second period of analysis with a different analyst. The need for a second analysis is no disparagement of the first analyst, nor does it imply that the first course of treatment was unsuccessful. In several instances of reanalysis in which I functioned as second analyst, the first analysis had been undertaken at a time when the problems of ego psychology had not yet influenced analytic technique, or by a colleague who (at the time) did not appreciate its importance. The initial treatment had produced considerable improvements, but the very same problems appeared in a new light, or new relationships, when interpretations of a different kind, 'closer to the surface', were 'inserted'. In a few of the cases in which these conditions existed, a published record of the first analysis was available and furnished some reliable comparison.

At the time of his second analysis a patient, who was a young scientist in his early thirties, successfully filled a respected academic

position without being able to advance to higher rank because he was unable to publish any of his extensive researches. This, his chief complaint, led him to seek further

analysis. He remembered with gratitude the previous treatment which had improved his potency, diminished social inhibitions, producing a marked change in his life, and he was anxious that his resumption of analysis should not come to the notice of his previous analyst (a woman) lest she feel in any way hurt by his not returning to her; but he was convinced that after a lapse of years he should now be analyzed by a man.

He had learned in his first analysis that fear and guilt prevented him from being productive, that he 'always wanted to take, to steal, as he had done in puberty'. He was under constant pressure of an impulse to use somebody else's ideas—frequently those of a distinguished young scholar, his intimate friend, whose office was adjacent to his own and with whom he engaged daily in long conversations.

Soon, a concrete plan for work and publication was about to materialize, when one day the patient reported he had just discovered in the library a treatise published years ago in which the same basic idea was developed. It was a treatise with which he had been familiar, since he had glanced at it some time ago. His paradoxical tone of satisfaction and excitement led me to inquire in very great detail about the text he was afraid to plagiarize. In a process of extended scrutiny it turned out that the old publication contained useful support of his thesis but no hint of the thesis itself. The patient had made the author say what he wanted to say himself. Once this clue was secured the whole problem of plagiarism appeared in a new light. The eminent colleague, it transpired, had repeatedly taken the patient's ideas, embellished and repeated them without acknowledgment. The patient was under the impression he was hearing for the first time a productive idea without which he could not hope to master his own subject, an idea which he felt he could not use because it was his colleague's property.

Among the factors determining the patient's inhibitions in his work, identification with his father played an important part. Unlike

the grandfather, a distinguished scientist, the father had failed to leave his mark in his field of endeavor. The patient's striving to find sponsors, to borrow ideas, only to find that they were either unsuitable or could only be plagiarized, reproduced conflicts of his earlier relationship with his father. The projection of ideas to paternal figures was in part determined by the wish for a great and successful father (a grandfather). In a dream the œdipal conflict with the father was represented as a battle in which books were weapons and conquered books were swallowed during combat. This was interpreted as the wish to incorporate the father's penis. It could be related to a definite phase of infancy when, aged four and five, the little boy was first taken as father's companion on fishing trips. 'The wish for the bigger fish', the memory of exchanging and comparing fishes, was recalled with many details. The tendency to take, to bite, to steal was traced through many ramifications and disguises during latency and adolescence until it could be pointed out one day that the decisive displacement was to ideas. Only the ideas of others were truly interesting, only ideas one could take; hence the taking had to be engineered. At this point of the interpretation I was waiting for the patient's reaction. The patient was silent and the very length of the silence had a special significance. Then, as if reporting a sudden insight, he said: 'Every noon, when I leave here, before luncheon, and before returning to my office, I walk through X Street [a street well known for its small but attractive restaurants] and I look at the menus in the windows. In one of the restaurants I usually find my preferred dish—fresh brains.'

It is now possible to compare the two types of analytic approach. In his first analysis the connection between oral aggressiveness and the inhibition in his work had been recognized: 'A patient who during puberty had occasionally stolen, mainly sweets or books, retained later a certain inclination to plagiarism. Since to him activity was

connected with stealing, scientific endeavor with plagiarism, he could escape from these reprehensible impulses through a far-reaching inhibition of his activity and his intellectual ventures' (30). The point which the

second analysis clarified concerned the mechanism used in inhibiting activity. The second set of interpretations, therefore, implemented the first by its greater concreteness, by the fact that it covered a large number of details of behavior and therefore opened the way to linking present and past, adult symptomatology and infantile fantasy. The crucial point, however, was the 'exploration of the surface'. The problem was to establish how the feeling, 'I am in danger of plagiarizing', comes about. The procedure did not aim at direct or rapid access to the id through interpretation; there was rather an initial exploratory period, during which various aspects of behavior were carefully studied. This study started on a descriptive level and proceeded gradually to establish typical patterns of behavior, present and past.10 Noted first were his critical and admiring attitudes of other people's ideas; then the relation of these to the patient's own ideas and intuitions. At this point the comparison between the patient's own productivity and that of others had to be traced in great detail; then the part that such comparisons had played in his earlier development could be clarified. Finally, the distortion of imputing to others his own ideas could be analyzed and the mechanism of 'give and take' made conscious. The exploratory description is aimed, therefore, mainly at uncovering a defense mechanism and not at an id content. The most potent interpretative weapon is naturally the link between this defense and the patient's resistance in analysis, an aspect which in the present context will not be discussed in any detail. The

10The value of similar attempts at starting from careful descriptions has been repeatedly discussed by Edward Bibring. I quote his views from a brief report given by Waelder (32, p. 471). 'Bibring speaks of "singling out" a patient's present patterns of behavior and arriving, by way of a large number of intermediate patterns, at the original infantile pattern. The present pattern embodies the instinctual impulses and anxieties now operative, as well as the ego's present methods of elaboration (some of which are stereotyped responses to impulses and anxieties which have ceased to exist). Only by means of the most careful phenomenology and by taking into consideration all the ego mechanisms now operative can the present pattern of behavior be properly isolated out. If this is done imperfectly … or if all the earlier patterns are not equally clearly isolated, there is a danger that we shall never arrive at a correct knowledge of the infantile pattern and the result may well be an inexact interpretation of infantile material.'

11When analyzing the patient here discussed I was familiar with Deutsch's paper. Without being consciously aware of it, I followed her example when entering into the detailed examination of the patient's intellectual pursuits.

12In the case here discussed the analysis was interrupted by the Second World War. During its course the patient published at least one of the contributions he had for a long time planned to publish. He intended to resume analysis after the end of the war but contact with him could not be re-established at the time. I have since heard that he has found satisfaction in his home life and in his career.

exploratory steps in this analysis resemble those which Helene Deutsch (3) describes in a strikingly similar case, in which the unconscious tendency to plagiarize ideas of an admired friend led to so severe a memory disturbance that the psychoanalytic method was used to eliminate fully the diagnosis of neurological disease. Had it been possible

to obtain material from the childhood of Helene Deutsch's patient, we might have been able to link similarities and dissimilarities in the early history of both men to the later differences in the structure of their defenses and their symptomatology.11 The mechanism described and made conscious in our patient's analysis, the id impulse, the impulse to devour, emerged into consciousness and further steps of interpretation led without constraint into the area which the first analysis had effectively analyzed. It is naturally not claimed that such procedures were altogether new at the time. There surely always have been analysts who approach a problem of interpretation approximately as outlined here. This type of approach has to some extent been systematized by the support and guidance of ego psychology. It seems that many more analysts now proceed similarly and that they have gained the impression that such a shift in emphasis is therapeutically rewarding.12

PLANNING AND INTUITION

One difference between older and newer methods of analyzing defense mechanisms and linking 'surface' and 'depth' of psychoanalytic findings to each other deserves a more detailed discussion. The advance in theory has made the interrelations of various steps in analytic work clearer and has thus facilitated communication about these problems. We can now teach more accurately both the 'hierarchy' and the 'timing' of interpretations,

13See Fenichel (4), Glover (14), (15), Sharpe (31) and particularly Lorand (23) who discuss some of these problems. A group of colleagues has started a highly promising method of investigation. Long after graduation from supervised work, they continue regularly to consult with several others on some of their cases over periods of years in order to make comparisons of the analytic 'style' among the consultants. It is to be hoped that this comparison will include the problem of prediction in analytic discussions.

14The idea of small teams working over a number of years (with or without institutional backing) seems rapidly to be gaining ground among analysts. The comparison of technique in general and specifically the study of planning and predicting might well be ideally suited to stimulate team work, which, if adequately recorded, might prove to be of considerable documentary value.

and the 'strategy' and 'tactics' of therapy (25). We are, however, gradually becoming aware of many uncertainties in this area. In speaking of hierarchy and timing of interpretations, and of strategy or tactics in technique, do we not refer to a plan of treatment, either to its general outline or to one adapted to the specific type of case and the specific prognosis? How general or specific are the plans of treatment which individual analysts form? At what point of the contact with the patient do the first elements of such plans suggest themselves, and at what point do they tend to merge? Under what conditions are we compelled to modify such impressions and plans; when do they have to be abandoned or reshaped? These are some of the questions on which a good deal of our teaching in psychoanalysis rests, and which are inadequately represented in the literature.13 The subject is of considerable importance because in using checks and controls on prediction we could satisfy ourselves as to the validity and reliability of tentative forecasts of those operations on which analytic technique partly depends.14

The tendency to discuss 'planning' and 'intuition' as alternatives in analytic technique permeates psychoanalytic writings though it has repeatedly been shown that such an antithesis is unwarranted.15 Theodor Reik's and Wilhelm Reich's unprofitable polemics

against each other are liberally quoted in such discussions. In my opinion not only this controversy but the problem which it attempted to clarify is spurious. It is merely

15See Fenichel (4), and particularly Herold (19) and Grotjahn (16), who make similar points.

to be determined at what point preconscious thought processes in the analyst 'take over' and determine his reaction, a question which touches upon every analyst's personal experience. There are some who are inhibited if they attempt consciously to formulate the steps to be taken, with whom full awareness acts as inhibition or distraction. There are those who at least from time to time wish to think over what they are doing or have done in a particular case, and others who almost incessantly wish to know 'where they are'. No optimal standard can be established. The idea, however, that the preconscious reactions of the analyst are necessarily opposed to 'planning' seems, in the present stage of our knowledge about preconscious thought processes, to say the least, outdated (21). Once we assume that the optimal distance from full awareness is part of the 'personal equation' of the analyst, the contribution of preconscious processes gains considerable importance.16 For one thing, it guarantees the spontaneity that prompts an analyst to say to a patient who showed considerable apprehension on the eve of a holiday interruption of analysis: 'Don't trouble, I shall be all right'. Many may at first feel that Ella Sharpe (31, p. 65), who reported this instance, had taken a daring step, and thought we may conclude that, provided the patient had been suitably prepared for the appearance of aggressive impulses within the transference, the wit of the interpretation may have struck home and created insight. Whether or not one approves of such surprise effects—and I confess my own hesitation—it is obvious that conscious premeditation could hardly bring them about. But even those of us who do not share the ebullient mastery of Ella Sharpe have reason to believe in the constructive contribution of intuition. Let me briefly refer to a patient who had been analyzed as a child, and whom I saw fifteen years after his first analytic experience had been interrupted through the influence of a truly seductive mother who could no longer bear to share the child with the child analyst. I was familiar with

16See Freud's description of these relationships in various passages of his early papers (13, p. 334).

some of the aspects of the earlier analysis. Some of the symptoms had remained unchanged, some had returned, particularly prolonged states of sexual excitement, interrupted but hardly alleviated by compulsive masturbation or its equivalents, which in some cases led to disguised impulses toward exhibitionism. Long stretches of the analysis were at first devoted to the details of these states of excitement. It became clear that they regularly were initiated and concluded by certain eating and drinking habits. The total condition was designated by the patient and myself as 'greed'. In a subsequent phase phallic fantasies about the seductive mother were gradually translated into oral terms; the violent demand for love became a key that opened up many repressed memories which had not been revealed during the child's analysis. At one point, however, the process began to stagnate, the analysis became sluggish, when suddenly a change occurred. During one interview the patient manifested vivid emotions; he left the interview considerably moved and reported the next day that 'this time it had hit home'. He now understood. And as evidence he quoted that when his wife had jokingly and mildly criticized him he had started to cry and, greatly relieved,

had continued to cry for many hours. What had happened? In repeating the interpretation I had without conscious premeditation used different terms. I did not speak of his demand for love, but of his need for love or expressions with a connotation which stressed not the aggressive but the passive craving in his oral wishes. Intuition had appropriately modified what conscious understanding had failed to grasp or, to be kinder to myself, had not yet grasped. This instance may serve to illustrate the necessary and regular interaction of planning and intuition, of conscious and preconscious stages of understanding psychoanalytic material. It is my impression that all advances in psychoanalysis have come about by such interactions, which have later become more or less codified in rules of technique.

Whenever we speak of the intuition of the analyst, we are touching upon a problem which tends to be treated in the psychoanalytic literature under various headings. We refer to

the psychic equilibrium or the state of mind of the analyst. One part of this problem, however, is directly linked to the process of interpretation. Many times a brief glance in the direction of self-analysis is part and parcel of the analyst's intervention. The interconnection between attention, intuition, and self-analysis in the process of interpretation has been masterfully described by Ferenczi (5):

One allows oneself to be influenced by the free associations of the patient; simultaneously one permits one's own imagination to play on these associations; intermittently one compares new connections that appear with previous products of the analysis without, for a moment, losing sight of, regard for, and criticism of one's own biases.

Essentially, one might speak of an endless process of oscillation between empathy, self-observation, and judgment. This last, wholly spontaneously, declares itself intermittently as a signal that one naturally immediately evaluates for what it is; only on the basis of further evidence may one ultimately decide to make an interpretation.

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